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Autonomy and Death
Annette E. Clark*
In this Article, Professor Clark explores the contours of the current debate over
physician-assisted death. She begins by focusing on the legal issues raised by statutory
attempts to eitherlegalize or criminalizephysician-assisteddeath, with particularemphasis on
the constitutional questions that are currently before the United States Supreme Court. She
then examinesphysician-assisteddeathfrom both medical and societalperspectives. Professor
Clark uses a thought experiment in which assisted death is facilitated by persons other than
physicians, and in doing so, questions whetherphysicians are the properpersons in whom to
rest power over assisted death. She points out the irony in a process that would set up
physicians as protectorsof individual autonomy, and ultimately concludes that by deferring to
the medical profession in this process, we risk losing the very autonomy that assisted death is
designedto effectuate.
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JNTRODUCTION

A physician writes a prescription for a lethal dose of pills with the
knowledge that an individual intends to use the medication to end his
or her own life.! Or, at the request of the individual, a physician
intentionally causes the person's death by administering a lethal dose
of a drug.2 An extraordinary confluence of events-legal, medical,
and ethical-has forced the issues of physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia to the forefront of the debate over individual autonomy and
the power of the state to regulate individual decisionmaking.3 In the
past five years, opponents and proponents of legalization of euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide have advanced and retreated in waves,
making their voices heard within the state legislative processes,
through grassroots state initiatives, and more recently, through federal
constitutional challenges. It now appears that the opposition is at an

1.
Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a physician writes a prescription for a
lethal dose of pills or counsels the patient on doses and methods of administration with the
knowledge that the patient intends to take his or her own life. See Peter A. Singer & Mark
Siegler, Euthanasia-A Critique, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1881, 1881 (1990); Sidney H.
Wanzer et al., The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second
Look, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989). Thus, the physician provides the means and
guidance but the final act is performed by the patient. See Singer & Siegler, supra at 1881.
2.
Voluntary euthanasia occurs when a physician administers a drug or other agent
at the individual's request, thereby performing the final act that results in the patient's death.
See David Orentlicher, Physician Participationin Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844, 1844
(1989); Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1881 (defining euthanasia as "the deliberate
action by a physician to terminate the life of a patient"). Literally, the term "euthanasia"
means "good" or "gentle" death. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Doctors Must Not Kill, 3 J.
CUmCAL ETHIcs 95, 95 (1992). Of course, although this point is frequently ignored or
forgotten, euthanasia can be performed by non-physicians.
3.
In this sense, the debate over assisted suicide and euthanasia follows in the
rather formidable footsteps of the abortion debate. The question of whether a state can
constitutionally prohibit physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill turns on an analysis
of the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. See discussion infra Part II.C; see also Seth
R Kreimer, Does Pro-ChoiceMean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and the Right
to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803 (1995) (discussing whether the abortion cases support a
constitutional right to assisted suicide).
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ebb and we will soon see the practice of legal physician-assisted
suicide or euthanasia in one or more states."
An interesting phenomenon has occurred in the ongoing debate
over whether we, as a community, should move toward a society in
which assisted death5 is allowed and even facilitated. In virtually
every proposal, initiative, constitutional challenge, and debate, a
crucial and often implicit assumption has been made: if we legalize
assisted death for the terminally ill, the medical profession, specifically
physicians, will be the individuals empowered to assist or actually
perform the acts that result in death. It is almost as if legislators and
commentators cannot imagine any other possibilities
4.
See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting
Rights and Obligationsin the Physician-PatientRelationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
PoL'Y 47, 61-62 (1994) (stating that, given the current trend in public and professional
opinion, voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide will likely be legalized); States Wrangle
with Death Wishes, USA TODAY, May 23, 1994, at 8A (quoting Arthur Caplan of the Center
for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania as stating, "I expect to see a state in the next
few years legalize [physician-assisted suicide]").
The citizens of Oregon in 1994 passed a ballot measure legalizing physician-assisted
suicide under some circumstances, but the statute was struck down as unconstitutional. The
case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See infra Part H.B.2. In addition, the
Washington and New York statutes that criminalize assisting suicide have been declared
unconstitutional by the Ninth and Second Circuits respectively, to the extent that they
prohibit physician-assisted suicide for the competent, terminally ill. See infra Parts ll.C.2-3.
If the United States Supreme Court affirms these decisions, we will see legalized assisted
suicide in the near future.
Legalized physician-assisted death already occurs in Australia. In 1995, a regional
parliament in Darwin, Australia passed a bill legalizing physician-assisted suicide and lethal
injection for the terminally ill. See Philip Shenon, Australian Doctors Get Right to Assist
Suicide, N.Y TIMEs, July 28, 1995, at A8; see also Tom Bates, Australian Territory OKs
Suicide Bill, OREGoNiAN, May 25, 1995, at A5. Any Australian who meets the statutory
requirements may travel to the Northern Territory to take advantage of the statute's
provisions. See id.
5.
I have borrowed the term "assisted death" from an article by Howard Brody and
will use it to include both assisted suicide and euthanasia. See Howard Brody, Assisted
Death-A Compassionate Response to Medical Failure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1384
(1992).
6.
When commentators do explicitly discuss physician involvement, it is usually in
response to the broader substantive question of whether to permit or prohibit euthanasia and
assisted suicide. Discussion of physician participation also comes up in process debates, but
there the focus is on how to regulate physicians as opposed to whether they should be
involved at all.
7.
Occasionally the idea of assisted suicide or euthanasia performed by nonphysicians is raised, but only as a scare tactic in the argument against assisted death rather
than as a serious proposal. Consider, for example, the following language that appeared in
an editorial piece in the New York 7imes:
Society finds terminal illness and terrible suffering a bitter pill to swallow.
Some physicians, laymen, legislators, jurors and judges prefer to deal with that
pill by sugarcoating it with the legal veneer of medical killing: somehow, it is
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This, then, is an article about processes and possibilities. It
challenges the notion that the only question to be answered is whether
we should, as a legal, ethical, and moral matter, support some form of
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.' It posits that the question
whether physicians are the proper persons in whom to rest this power
is equally important. And, in asking this question, it explores why we,
as a society, are so intent on placing euthanasia and assisted suicide
within the realm of medicine.
To this end, Part II sets the stage by describing the current climate
for physician-assisted death in terms of public opinion and legal
developments. Part II uses the medical literature and physician
surveys as a means of discerning the medical profession's perspective
on the proper role of the physician in these processes. Part IV then
moves to a broader societal perspective on the physician's role through
the use of a thought experiment in which assisted suicide and
euthanasia are facilitated by individuals other than physicians. In the
course of carrying out this thought experiment, I explore the irony of
the current proposals that would set up physicians as protectors of
individual autonomy in the medical decision-making process. The
analysis then comes full circle by exploring how the contemporary
societal desire to defer to the medical profession in this context
informs the debate on the broader substantive question whether to
legalize assisted death.

easier if doctors rather than trained bureaucrats do the killing. Any non-physician
could be trained to do what Dr. Kevorkian does, and society could decide that
creating a suicide-assistance bureaucracy, without the benefit of the fig leaf of
medical-based killing, would be an efficient way to contend with terminal
suffering.
Walter Reich, First,Do No Harm, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A17. Reich is a physician
and scholar with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
8.
I do not intend by this Article to minimize the importance of the first question.
However, it has already received considerable attention. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT
KIND oFLiFE: Tim Limrrs OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 221-49 (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, Lim's
DOMINION 179-241 (1993); EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1989); CARLOS . GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH (1991); PHYSICIANASSISTED DEATH (James M. Humber et al. eds., 1994); TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND
DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE (1993); DAVID C. THOMASMA & GLENN C.
GRABER, EurHANAsIA: TowARD AN ETHICAL SOCIAL POICY (1990); VOLUNTARY EurHANAsIA

(A.B. Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986); Dying Well? A Colloquy on Euthanasiaand
Assisted Suicide, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 6-55. In contrast, the issue
of physician involvement from a societal perspective has received little or no attention.
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II.

THE CURRENT CLiMATE

A.

Public Opinion

Jack Kevorkian. One need only utter the name to invoke a
response. Depending on whom you ask, he is either an "angel of
mercy" or "Dr. Death." His exploits have generated newspaper
headlines over the past four years that would do justice to a
supermarket tabloid. In fact, these headlines provide a very useful
chronology of his activities, beginning in 1990 with Janet Adkin's
death in the back of Kevorkian's van, and continuing to the present
day.9 The current count stands at forty-four Kevorkian-assisted deaths
with no end in sight.
9.
The following New York Tmes headlines are arranged in chronological order
and are divided into groups by the year in which they appeared.
1990: Lisa Belkin, DoctorTells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 6, 1990, at Al; Isabel Wilkerson, Physician Fulfills a Goal: Aiding a Person in
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1990, at D22; Isabel Wilkerson, Inventor of Suicide Machine
Arrested on Murder Charge,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at Al; Tamar Lewin, Doctor Cleared
of Murdering Woman with Suicide Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at B6; William E.
Schmidt, ProsecutorsDrop CriminalCase Against DoctorInvolved in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1990, at 10. (Hereinafter any New York imes article that does not have a letter
designating the section in which the article may be found is contained in the Late Evening
Edition of that newspaper).
1991: Isabel Wilkerson, ProsecutorsSeek to Ban Doctor'sSuicide Device, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1991, at 6; Michigan Court Bars Doctorfrom Using His Suicide Machine, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at A13; DoctorAssists in Two More Suicides in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1991, at Al; Isabel Wilkerson, Opponents Weigh Action Against Doctor Who Aided
Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at A10; Judge Says Suicide Doctor Does a 'Service,'
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at 21; Doctor in Suicides Assails U.S. Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
3, 1991, at 30; Michigan Board Suspends License of Doctor Who Aided in Suicides, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991 at D22; ProsecutorSeeks Murder Charges Against Doctor, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at A18.
1992: Suicide Device Inventor Charged with Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at
A21; Inventor of Suicide Machine Tied to Death of Dentist in California,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 1992, at B14; Ruling FavorsDoctor Who Aided in Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992,
at A20; Doctor Faces Murder Trial for Suicide Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at 10;
Michigan Doctor at Side of 4th Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1992, at 6; Kevorkian
Provided the Gas for Woman's Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1992, at 21; Death at
Kevorkian's Side Is Ruled Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1992, at 10; Murder Charges
Against Kevorkian Are Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at A12; Doctor Assists in
Another Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at 32; Doctor in Michigan Helps a 6th Person
to Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at A10; Isabel Wilkerson, Michigan Moves
to Ban Doctors' Aiding in Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at A14; 2 Commit Suicide,
Aided by MichiganDoctor,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A21.
1993: Kevorkian Aids Ninth Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A21; Kevorkian
Aids 2 More in Committing Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at A15; Kevorkian Assists
Patient,3d in Week Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at A9; Kevorkian Assists a
Suicidefor FourthTime This Month, N.Y. TmES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A12; Kevorkian Aids in
2 More Suicides; Total Is at 15, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at A10; Kevorkian-Aided
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Suicide Investigated as Homicide, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at A10; New Inquiry Puts
Pressure on Kevorkian, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at 9; ProsecutorSays He Won't Charge
Kevoridan Now but Seeks Inquest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, at 9; Doctor Who Aided
Suicides Loses License in California,N.Y TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A13; Isabel Wilkerson,
Suicide Doctor Tests Law, Stays with Man Who Dies, N.Y TIMES, May 17, 1993, at A12;
Isabel Wilkerson, Kevorkian's Role in Latest Death Confounds Experts in Michigan, N.Y
TIMES, May 18, 1993, at A17; Don Terry, Kevorkian Assists in Death of His 17th Suicide
Patient, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at A14; Kevorkian Details His Role in Suicide, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 28; Kevorkian Said to Face Charge,N.Y TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at
A12; Don Terry, As He Hoped, Kevorldan Is Chargedin a Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 18,
1993, at A12; Kevorkian Asks Judge to Dismiss a Charge of Assisting in a Suicide, N.Y
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at 7; Kevorkian, Ordered to Trial, Aids in a Suicide, N.Y. TMES,
Sept. 10, 1993, at A16; Kevorkian Charged a 2d 77me Under Suicide Law, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1993, at A20; Suicide Doctor Gets a Trial Date, and a Warning, N.Y TIMES, Sept.
25, 1993, at 10; Kevorkian Is Facing 2d Trial, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at A21;
Kevorkian, Pushingfor Jail,Aids in Suicide in His Home, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, at 8;
Kevorkian Still Free on Bond After Attending 19th Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at
14; Suicide DoctorIs Jailedin DetroitAmid a Threat to Starve Himself, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 6,
1993, at 8; After 3 Years of Assisting in Suicide, Kevorkian Lands in Jail,N.Y TMvES, Nov.
6, 1993, at 1; Kevorkian Leaves JailAfter 3 Days, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at A15; Don
Terry, While Out on Bail, Kevorkian Attends a Doctor's Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993,
at Al; Evidence Is Reported on Suicide Assistance, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 26, 1993, at A31;
Kevorkian Is Charged Again with Aiding a Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at A18;
Kevorkian Returns to Jail,Refusing to Pay His Bond, N.Y Two, Dec. 1, 1993, at B10;
Weak but Defiant, Kevorkian ContinuesJailhouseHunger Strike, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993,
at B6; Weakened by Fast, Doctor Appears in Court, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at 11;
Kevorkian Is Taken to Emergency Room with Pains in Chest, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at
B8; Suicide Law Struck Down, but Kevorkian Stays Jailed,N.Y TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at
A18; Claifying Decision, Judge Voids All of Suicide Law, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at
A24; Kevorkian Is Freed After Pledging to Refrain from Aiding Suicides, N.Y TIMES, Dec.
18, 1993, at 8; Jack Lessenberry, In Tactical Change, Kevorkian Promises to Halt Suicide
Aid, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at 1.
1994: Kevorkian Ordered to Stand Trial, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A16; Court
HearsArguments on Assisted Suicide Ban, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 7, 1994, at A16; Aided-Suicide
Law InvalidatedAgain, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at A17; Kevorkian Begins Ballot Drive
For Suicide Measure, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at A13; Trial Is Orderedfor Suicide
Doctor,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at 9; Suicide Law Still in the Dock as Kevorkian's Trial
Nears,N.Y TIES, Apr. 4, 1994, at Bll; Suicide TrialSet to Begin on Tuesday, N.Y TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1994, at 23; Using Surprise Strategy, Kevorkian's Lawyers Seek Acquittal, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at A19; Judge Rejects Motion to End Suicide Trial, N.Y TIMES, Apr.
26, 1994, at A21; Kevorkian Takes Stand in Own Defense, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at
A16; Tamar Lewin, Kevorkian Jury, Deliberating,Seems to Focus on Site of a Suicide, N.Y
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1994, at 8; David Margolick, Jury Acquits Dr Kevorkian ofIllegally Aiding
a Suicide, N.Y TIMES, May 3, 1994, at Al; Michigan Court Invalidates Law Banning Aid
for Suicide, N.Y TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A22; Kevorkian's Ballot Drive on Suicide Aid
Stumbles, N.Y TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A14; Michigan's High Court Hears Arguments on
Assisted Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at A21; Jack Lessenberry, Kevorkian Helps in a
Suicide as Ban Expires, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at 28; Kevorkian Challenges the
Motives of 2 Doctors Who Offered to Intervene with His Patient,N.Y TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994,
at B12; New Suicide-AssistanceBan Gains in Michigan, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at A26;
Michigan Suicide Bill Advances, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at A18; Kevorkian Vows to
Keep FightingLaws BarringAssisted Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at 43.
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1995: Kevorkian Cases Dropped,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at 17; Linda Greenhouse,
Court Won't HearAppeal in Case of Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at A17;
James Bennet, Dr Kevorkian Assists at His 22d Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at A20;
Kevorkian Once Again Aids Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1995, at 6; Angry Michigan
Court Upholds Injunction Against Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at A14; Iver
Peterson, In One Doctor's Way of Life, a Way of Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at 14;
Woman Dies at Kevorkian Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at A12; Suicide Clinic
Unwelcome, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at A12; In Assisted Suicide, Body Is Left Near
Hospital,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at A13; Doctor Seeks to Quash Case of Murder in
Suicide Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A12; Murder ChargesAgainst Kevorkian in
1991 Case Are Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1995, at A21; Kevorkian Faces Trial on
Suicide Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at A12; Body in Auto Is Reported to Be
Kevorkian's26th Assisted Suicide, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A17; After Kevorkian-Aided
Suicide, Clash over How Ill Woman Was, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at A20; Jack
Lessenberry, Dr Kevorkian Resumes Use of Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, at 25;
CancerFinding in Suicide Case of Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at 35; Doctors
OfferSome Support to Kevorkian, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at A21.
1996: Kevorkian Attends Another Death; Woman's Body Is Left in Van, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1996, at All; Kevorkian and the Issue of Assisted Suicide Will Go on Trialfor
Second Tune, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at A10; 2 Views of Kevorkian: Killer or
Comforter,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1996, at A16; Testimony Continues at the Kevorkian Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at A14; Kevorkian Jury Watches Tape of Patient Who Chose
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at 28; Kevorkian, Exploiting Exemption in Suicide Law,
Testifies on the Pain That His Efforts End,N.Y. TMES, Mar. 2, 1996, at 20; Kevorkian Says
He Aims to Ease Suffering, Not to Hasten Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A19; Jack
Lessenberry, Kevorkian Again Not Guilty ofAiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at 7;
Jack Lessenberry, After Victory, a New Trialfor a Weary Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1996, at A13; Kevorkian Going on Trial for 4th Time in Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1996, at 29; ProsecutorsAre Ordered to Show Kevorkian's Intent Was to Kill, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1996, at 14; Kevorkian FacesSuicide ProsecutionWithout a Law Being Cited, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996, at A20; Kevorkian Is Excusedfrom Attending Trial,N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
19, 1996, at A26; Jack Lessenberry, Specialist Testifies Depression Was Issue in Kevorkian
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1996, at A17; Trial Turns to Statements About Death on
Videotape, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996, at 21; Jack Lessenberry, In Latest Suicide Trial,
Kevorkian Asserts 'Duty as a Doctor,' N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1996, at 10; Appeals Set
Kevorkian Back Repeatedly, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, at 27; Jack Lessenberry, Dr"
Kevorkian Says His Trial Is a Lynching, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1996, at A15; Despite Trial,
Kevorkian Is at a Suicide, May 8, 1996, at A20; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Tape Recalls a
Canadian'sGratitude to Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1996, at A17; Kevorkian Back at
Trial as Talk of Detroit Is of Another Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at A16; Jack
Lessenberry, Once Again, Jurors Weigh Kevorkian's Fate, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at 20;
Caryn James, Dr Kevorkian on Trial, with Hints of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1996,
at C18; Jack Lessenberry, Jury Acquits Kevorkian in Common-Law Case, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 1996, at A14; Kevorkian Assists Woman from New Jersey in Dying, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1996, at A20; Man Ordered to Live with Wife Who Had Consulted Kevorkian, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1996, at A20; Dr Kevorkian Helps in Woman's Suicide, 3d Case in 9 Days,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1996, at A18; An Ailing Woman Kills Herselfwith Help from Dr:
Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1996, at 20; Prosecutorof Kevorkian Loses Re-election
Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at A23; Jack Lessenberry, New Assistant to Kevorkian Is an
Old Hand at Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at 22; Jack Lessenberry, Kevorkian Goes
from Making Waves to Barely a Ripple, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at 6; Question of Family
Violence Arises in a Kevorkian Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, at 25; Clash in
Detroit over How Ill a Kevorkian Client Really Was, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1996, at A13;
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No matter what opinion one holds of Kevorkian as a person,
there is no question that his actions, more than those of any other, have
forced the issues surrounding assisted suicide and euthanasia into the
public arena.'0 The result is an increasingly polarized debate,
presented by proponents in terms of an individual's right to personal
autonomy at the end of life, and by opponents in terms of society's
interest in preserving and protecting life and preventing the abuses that
would inevitably accompany such practices.
While Kevorkian has effectively brought the issue of assisted
death into the public arena, society's awareness is founded on more
than the activities of one physician. The surprising success of Derek
Humphry's best-selling book Final Exit" suggests a tremendous
reservoir of public interest in the concept of death and assisted suicide.
That interest has been fed in recent years by a steady stream of media
attention directed at, among other things, state legislative and
constitutional attempts to legalize assisted death, 2 the Dutch policy of
refraining from prosecuting physicians who perform assisted suicide
and euthanasia, 3 a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada
Kevorkian Held Briefly after 2d Suicide in Day, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at A15;
Timothy E. Quill & Betty Rollin, Dr Kevorkian Runs Wild, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 29, 1996, at
A25; Jack Lessenberry, PoliceBreak in on Patients Meeting with Kevorkian for an Assisted
Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at 8; Jack Lessenberry, Kevorkian Helps 40th Suicide,
Day After Police Tried to Intervene, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1996, at 38; Jack Lessenberry,
Video May Lead to a Case Against Kevorkian, N.Y TMES, Sept. 21, 1996, at 6; Kevorkian
Aids 41st Death, N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1996, at A15; Another Body Left at Hospital by
Kevorkian, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A22; Kevorkian Assists in 44th Suicide Case, N.Y.
TMES, Oct. 25, 1996, at A26.
10. See Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World: Use of Suicide Device Sets in
Motion Debateon a DisturbingIssue, N.Y TIMEs, June 12, 1990, at C3.
11. Final Exit is a poorly written and rather macabre manual designed to instruct
dying individuals in the various methods of committing or assisting in suicide. See DEREK
HuMPHRY, FINAL. Exir (1991). Derek Humphry's method of choice is a combination of
lethal doses of drugs and asphyxiation by use of a plastic bag. See id. at 95-99. The book
generated controversy from the very beginning, see Meg Cox, Suicide Manual for
Terminally Ill StirsHeatedDebate,WALL ST. J., July 12, 1991, at B1, but a study linking the
book's publication with an increase in suicide by asphyxiation in New York City fanned the
flames of the debate. See Peter M. Marzuk et al., Increase in Suicide by Asphyxiation in
New York City after the Publication of Final Exit, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1508 (1993);
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Methods Used in Suicide Follow Book, N.Y. IMES, Nov. 6, 1993, at
25.
12. See infra Part lI.B-C.
13. Although assisted suicide and euthanasia are still technically illegal under Dutch
law, a 1993 statute codified an exemption from prosecution for physicians who follow strict
medical and ethical rules in assisting their terminally ill patients to die. See Marlise Simons,
Dutch Move to Enact Law Making Euthanasia Easier,N.Y. TmES, Feb. 9, 1993, at Al;
Marlise Simons, Dutch ParliamentApproves Law PermittingEuthanasia,N.Y. TMES, Feb.
10, 1993, at A10. In order to avoid prosecution under Dutch law, the doctor must ensure
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upholding a ban on assisted suicide, 14 and the vote by an Australian
territory to legalize physician-assisted death."5 Media attention has
taken a more personal turn as well. It is not uncommon these days to
read narratives of the lives of the terminally ill and their struggles to
achieve dignified deaths, with physicians' help or without.' 6

A

number of these stories are those of individuals dying from AIDS, who
are increasingly turning to assisted suicide as a way to assert control
over the relentless process of the disease.17 Even the unassisted deaths
of former President Richard Nixon and former First Lady Jacqueline
Kennedy Onassis have been touted in the press as examples of

that the request is voluntary and not coerced; the patient is experiencing intolerable
suffering, has no hope of recovery, and has made repeated requests for euthanasia over a
period of time; the individual is competent and well-informed at the time the aid is given;
and another physician has been consulted. See id.
In two recent highly publicized cases, Dutch physicians provided assisted death in
circumstances that fell outside the statutory guidelines. A psychiatrist gave a fatal dose of
sleeping pills to a physically healthy but severely depressed woman who wished to kill
herself. In a landmark ruling, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the physician would
not be punished even though his actions fell well outside the legal guidelines. See Doctor
Unpunishedfor Dutch Suicide, N.Y. TnMEs, June 22, 1994, at A10. In the other case, two
Dutch doctors face criminal prosecutions for having euthanized two severely disabled
newborns. See Dutch Bring a Test Case in Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994, at A3.
The Royal Dutch Medical Association has now proposed changes in the guidelines, calling
for physicians to use physician-assisted suicide instead of euthanasia when at all possible,
emphasizing the need for consultation with an independent physician, and reaffirming the
right of physicians who are morally opposed to euthanasia to refuse to assist. See Marlise
Simons, Dutch Doctors to 7ighten Rules on Mercy Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at
A3.
14. In that case, Sue Rodriguez, an individual suffering from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease), challenged the Canadian ban on assisted suicide. See
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Woman Who Lost Right-to-Die Case in Canada Commits Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1994, at B13. The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 5-4 decision, ruled
that the government's interest in protecting life's sanctity took precedence over an
individual's right to a dignified death. See id Ms. Rodriguez committed physician-assisted
suicide four months after the Court's ruling. See id.
15. See Shenon, supra note 4, at A8; see generallyChristopher J. Ryan & Miranda
Kaye, Euthanasiain Australia-The Northern TerritoryRights of the Terminally Ill Act, 334
NEw ENG. J. MED. 326 (1996).
16. See David M. Eddy, A Conversation with My Mother, 272 JAMA 179 (1994);
Dudley Clendinen, When Death Is a Blessing and Life Is Not, N.Y TMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at
A15; Dick Lehr, Death and the Doctor'sHand (Part I), BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1993, at 1;
Dick Lehr, Death andthe Doctor'sHand (Part 1I), BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 1993, at 1; Dick
Lehr, Death and the Doctor's Hand (Part Ill), BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 27, 1993, at 1; Andrew
Solomon, A Death of One's Own, NEw YORKER, May 22, 1995, at 54.
17. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Vancouver AIDS Suicides Botched, N.Y TIMEs, June
14, 1994, at C12; Gina Kolata, AIDS Patients Seek Solace in Suicide, but Many Find Risk
Added Painin Failure,N.Y TMES, June 14, 1994, at Cl.

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:45

orchestrating death with dignity.18 To the extent that the media
expresses the realities of contemporary life, it is clear that many
individuals are struggling with the profound issues related to death and
dying.
In order to assess the range of societal beliefs and values on the
specific topics of assisted suicide and euthanasia, three researchers
performed a landmark study in which they analyzed the results of
public opinion polls taken over the last forty years. 9 The study
revealed a significant shift in public attitudes on the issues of assisted
suicide and euthanasia. In 1950, only thirty-four percent of
respondents answered affirmatively the question, "When a person has
a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed
by law to end the patient's life if the patient and his or her family
request it?" 20 By 1977, this number had increased to sixty percent and
has remained relatively stable ever since. 2' A 1991 Globe/Harvard
poll confirmed the current consensus, with sixty-four percent of
respondents agreeing that physicians should be allowed by law to
respond to a terminally ill patient's request for lethal drugs or
injections. 22 These study results suggest, somewhat surprisingly, that
the shift in public opinion actually occurred years before the current
debate over Kevorkian and legislative attempts to criminalize or
legalize these practices.
The Globe/Harvard poll also went beyond the public-policy
perspective to explore the personal dimension of beliefs on this
subject. When asked what they would do if they themselves were
terminally ill and in great physical pain, twenty percent of respondents
18. See Janny Scott, An OnassisLegacy: FacingDeath on One's Own Terms, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 1994, at 1.
19. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Should PhysiciansAid Their Patients in Dying?,
267 JAMA 2658 (1992). The researchers used a 1991 national opinion poll conducted by
The Boston Globe and the Harvard School of Public Health to assess current opinion. See
id. at 2658. To obtain information on how these attitudes and opinions have changed over
time, they compiled and analyzed data from surveys conducted by various polling
organizations between 1950 and 1991. See id.
20. Id. at 2659 fig. 1.
21. See id. Age seemed to play a significant role in these results. For example, 79%
of respondents in the 18- to 34-year-old group believed a physician should be able to
administer lethal drugs at a terminally ill individual's request, as compared to 53% of
respondents aged fifty years and older. See id. Significant differences were seen across
racial groups as well. From 1977 to 1989, whites were more likely than African Americans
to support legislation legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia by an average margin of
20%. See id.
22. See id. In sharp contrast, only 37% responded that it should be legal for a
relative or close friend to assist. See id.
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said they would ask their physician to administer a lethal drug, while
nineteen percent said they would ask their physician to prescribe lethal
drugs that they could take themselves.23 Thus, a much smaller
percentage of individuals believe they would actually turn to
euthanasia or assisted suicide services than support their legalization.
Only eleven percent of respondents would consider asking family or
friends to help end their lives under these circumstances. 24
Interestingly, a full seventy-two percent would refuse to assist friends
or relatives if asked to do so, with the result that "[t]he burden to act in
such cases will ultimately rest with the attending physician." ' The
authors of the 1992 study concluded their report by predicting that,
given the significant level of support for some form of legalized
euthanasia, efforts to change public policy through legislation would
continue and perhaps escalate.26 They were right.
B.

Legalizing Physician-AssistedDeath

With the significant public support expressed for physicianassisted death for the terminally ill and suffering, one would expect
that the legal efforts in this country to codify such processes into law
would have met with more success than they have thus far. That
various attempts have been defeated or put on hold pending further
legal challenge is more a reflection of the political process than a
public mandate against assisted death.
1.

Attempts at Legalization

A number of state legislatures have considered bills that would
legalize physician-assisted death,27 but no state legislature has yet

23. See id. at 2661. A total of 52% of all respondents indicated that they would
consider alternatives to end their lives, including withholding of life support, physicianassisted suicide or euthanasia, and asking family or friends to help. See id. at 2660-61.
24. See id. at 2661.
25. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the societal desire to have physicians
involved, see infra Part IV.
26. See iLat 2662.
27. See David R. Schanker, Note, OfSuicide Machines, EuthanasiaLegislation, and
the Health Care Crisis,68 IND. L.J. 977, 1002-03 (1993) (describing bills introduced in the
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire legislatures in 1992 alone). More recently,
state Senator Joseph Galiber introduced legislation in the New York State Senate that would
legalize physician-assisted suicide for mentally competent, terminally ill adults. See
Legislation Introduced to Permit Physician-AssistedSuicide, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No.
25, at 851 (June 23, 1994).
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passed such a measure.21 In an attempt to sidestep these legislative
bottlenecks, proponents have turned to the initiative processes within
various states that allow them to present the question of legalization
directly to the citizenry.29 In 1991, the voters in Washington State were
asked to pass upon Initiative 119, which would have legalized
physician-assisted death.3" Specifically, Initiative 119 contained a
provision that would have allowed mentally competent adults with
medically certified terminal conditions to legally request and receive
' 31
"aid-in-dying" from their physicians as a "medical service.
Following heated and controversial campaigns on both sides of the
issue, the voters rejected the initiative by a margin of fifty-four percent
to forty-six percent.32 One year later, the citizens of California rejected
a similar proposal, entitled Proposition 161, 33 by an identical margin. 4
The defeats of Initiative 119 and Proposition 161 were the result
of remarkably successful campaigns by opponents to convince voters
that the proposals lacked sufficient safeguards against abuse. In
Washington, anti-Initiative 119 spokespersons regaled the public with
long lists of safeguards that they claimed should have been included in
28. In fact, a recent vote in the New Hampshire House, in which a bill to legalize
physician-assisted suicide was overwhelmingly defeated, marked the first time a state
legislature has even voted on such a measure. See State Legislators Defeat Measure to
PermitPhysician-AssistedSuicide, 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 57 (Jan. 11, 1996).
29. In 1988, the first such attempt failed when supporters of legalized physicianassisted death in California gathered less than one-third of the signatures necessary to place
the issue on the ballot. See Victor Cohn, Is It 7YTmefor Mercy Killing, WASH. PoST, Aug. 15,
1989, at Z12.
30. See Initiative for Death with Dignity, Washington Initiative No. 119 (1991)
[hereinafter Initiative 119].
31. See Initiative 119 § 2(7). The initiative defined aid-in-dying as:
[A]id in the form of a medical service, provided in person by a physician that will
end the life of a conscious and mentally competent qualified patient in a dignified,
painless, and humane manner, when requested voluntarily by the patient through a
written directive in accordance with this chapter at the time the medical service is
to be provided.
Initiative 119 § 2(9).
32. See Results, SEA.rETIMES, Nov. 6, 1991, atD6.
33. See The California Death with Dignity Act (Californians Against Human
Suffering 1992) [hereinafter Proposition 161]. Proposition 161 defined aid-in-dying as:
[A] medical procedure that will terminate the life of the qualified patient in a
painless, humane and dignified manner whether administered by the physician at
the patient's choice or direction or whether the physician provides means to the
patient for self-administration.
Proposition 161 § 2525.2(k).
34. See Lori Olszewski, Right-to-Die Law Apparently a Loser, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4,
1992, at A12.
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Initiative 119, but were not.35 These lists included: a waiting period
between the request and the provision of physician aid-in-dying,
mandatory psychological testing of the individual to determine
competency and rule out treatable depression, mandatory notification
of family members, and a reporting requirement triggered whenever
physicians administered aid-in-dying.36 In California, even though
Proposition 161 contained safeguards beyond those contained in the
Washington proposal, 370pponents once again successfully raised the
specter of abuse.38 The defeats in California and Washington did not,
35.

See Robin Bernhoft, Initiative 119-Should Aid-In-Dying Be Allowed-No,

SEATrtLE TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at A21; Susan Gilmore, Death Initiative Divisive-No

Middle Ground on Euthanasia Issue, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at B5; Warren King,
Hospitals Bracefor Aid-in-Dying Requests, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at Cl; Warren
King, Doctor,Patient Could Pick Means of Death-Initiative119 Would Create First Such
Law Anywhere in World, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at Al (quoting Dr. Arthur Caplan);
Warren King, Doctors Group Declares War on 'Death with Dignity' Initiative, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at B36.
36. See id. Opponents also contended that Initiative 119 should have limited aid-indying to those individuals who were experiencing unbearable pain, and that only those
physicians with experience and expertise in treating dying patients and an established
doctor-patient relationship with the person requesting aid should be allowed to assist. See
Edward Larson, Washington State: The Nevada of Death?, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991,
at All.
37. Proposition 161 stated that a qualified individual must, in addition to executing
an aid-in-dying directive, request assistance at least one more time in order to meet the
"enduring request" requirement. See Proposition 161 § 2525.2(i). Proposition 161 also
dealt explicitly with the potential need for psychiatric or psychological consultation by
stating that "[a]n attending physician who is requested to give aid-in-dying may request a
psychiatric or psychological consultation if that physician has any concern about the
patient's competence, with the consent of a qualified patient." Proposition 161 § 2525.13.
As a further safeguard, the California proposal provided that a directive executed by a
patient in a skilled nursing facility would be invalid unless one of the two witnesses to the
directive was a Patient Advocate or Ombudsman. See Proposition 161 § 2525.4. The intent
of this section was to provide special protection for patients in nursing homes who might be
"insulated from a voluntary decision-making role, by virtue of the custodial nature of their
care." Id. Finally, Proposition 161 required hospitals and other health care providers who
carried out the aid-in-dying directives to keep a record of those cases and report annually to
the State Department of Health Services. See Proposition 161 § 2525.21. The patient's age,
type of illness, and date of death were to be reported, but the patient's identity was to be kept
strictly confidential. See id.
38. Opponents argued that the California proposition should have required a
mandatory psychological evaluation, a waiting period between the aid-in-dying request and
the actual assistance, and mandatory family notification. See Lori Olszewski, Right-to-Die
Advocate in S.Y, He's Promoting Ballot InitiativeAllowing Physician-AssistedSuicide, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 28, 1992, at A25; Robert Reinhold, Californiato Decide if Doctors Can Aid
in Suicide, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at Al. In addition, they contended that Proposition
161 was remiss in not including a requirement that the terminally ill individual be
experiencing pain and that the assisting physician have special expertise in diagnosis and
treatment of the dying. See Leslie Berkman, O.C. in Middle of 'Deathwith Dignity' Debate,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at Al.
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however, mark the end of the efforts by aid-in-dying proponents to
place the issue before the citizenry.39 Oregon was next, and as it turns
out, the third time was the charm.
2.

The Oregon Death with Dignity Act
On November 8, 1994, the citizens of Oregon approved Ballot

Measure 16,4 also called the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.41 It

allows a capable, 42 adult resident of Oregon43 diagnosed with a
terminal disease 4 to "make a written request for medication for the
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner."45
Physicians who write such prescriptions in good-faith compliance with
the Act are immune from civil or criminal liability or professional
discipline. 6 Oregon thus became the first jurisdiction in the world to
explicitly legalize physician-assisted suicide.47
The authors of The Oregon Death with Dignity Act clearly
crafted the statute to take into account the "inadequate safeguards"
39. During 1992 alone, as many as 20 states had initiatives in the pipeline on the
subject of physician-assisted death. See Blendon et al., supra note 19, at 2658.
40. See Mark O'Keefe, Assisted-Suicide Measure Survives Heavy Opposition,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al. The final tally was 51% in favor and 49% opposed. See
Bill MacKenzie, Whose Life Is It? Oregon Battles over Suicide Law, NEwSDAY, Dec. 5,
1994, at A17.
41. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.895 (1995)
[hereinafter Oregon Act].
42. An individual is "capable" if he or she has the ability to make and communicate
health care decisions to the health care provider. See Oregon Act § 1.01(6).
43. The initiative contains an explicit residency requirement. See id. § 3.10.
Presumably this section was included to prevent individuals from other states from flocking
to Oregon to take advantage of the Act.
44. 'Terminal disease" is defined as "an incurable and irreversible disease that has
been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death
within six (6) months." Id. § 1.01(12).
45. Id. § 2.01. The measure legalizes only physician-assisted suicide, stating that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to authorize a physician or any other person to end
a patient's life by lethal injection, mercy killing or active euthanasia." Id. § 3.14. Thus,
terminally ill individuals who are physically incapable of ingesting a lethal dose of
prescription medication are prevented from receiving more direct physician assistance, such
as a lethal injection, to end their lives.
46. See id § 4.01(1). Without this provision, physicians who assisted a suicide
would presumably be subject to prosecution under OR. REv. STAT. § 163.125 (1995), which
makes it a crime to intentionally cause or aid another in committing suicide.
47. While physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia have been practiced in the
Netherlands for years, such activities remain technically illegal. See supranote 13. In May
1995, the Northern Territory in Australia became the second jurisdiction to legalize
physician-assisted death. See Bates, supra note 4, at A5. The Rights of the Terminally Ill
Bill legalizes both physician-assisted suicide and lethal injection for qualified terminally ill
Australians. See id.

1996]

AUTONOMYAND DEATH

complaints that had surfaced previously in Washington and
California. 48 The most striking aspect of the Oregon measure is its
high degree of procedural specificity The terminally ill individual
must first make an oral request of the attending physician, then a
written request, 49 and finally another oral request before the physician
may assist.50 Once the initial oral request is made, the attending
physician is required to inform the patient of the diagnosis, prognosis,
risks, and results of taking the medication, as well as alternatives
including comfort care, hospice care, and pain control.51 The initiative
requires a waiting period of fifteen days between the initial oral request
and the writing of the prescription, and a minimum of forty-eight hours
between the individual's written request and the writing of the
prescription.52 During the waiting period, the attending physician must
refer the individual to a consulting physician for medical confirmation
that the patient is terminally ill, mentally capable, and acting
voluntarily;53 send the individual for counseling if appropriate;54 and
5
request that the patient notify next of kin of the request for assistance.
Physicians are required to document every aspect of the process,
particularly that the individual is acting voluntarily and that the
decision is an informed one.56
As one might expect, Oregon's Ballot Measure 16 evoked a
vigorous public response, both positive and negative.57 The most
48. In fact, one of the sections of the legislation is entitled "Safeguards." See
Oregon Act § 3. However, the Act lacks a number of the safeguards proposed in the
Washington and California debates such as mandatory counseling, mandatory family
notification, an established physician-patient relationship, and a requirement that the
terminally ill individual be suffering unbearable pain.
49. The initiative contains a form for the written request, see id. § 6.01, and requires
that two witnesses attest to their belief that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily in
signing the request. See id. § 2.02(1).
50. See id. § 3.06. At the time of the second oral request for a prescription, the
physician must offer the individual an opportunity to rescind the request. See id.
51. See id. § 3.01(2)(a)-(e).
52. See id. § 3.08.
53. See id. § 3.01(3).
54. See id. § 3.01(4). If either the attending or consulting physician believes that the
individual is suffering from depression causing impaired judgment or a psychiatric or
psychological disorder, the attending physician must refer the patient for counseling. See id.
§ 3.03. No prescription may be written until the counselor determines that the individual is
not suffering from any of these disorders. See id.
55. See id. § 3.01(5). An individual who declines or is unable to notify next of kin
would still be entitled to receive assistance. See id. § 3.05.
56. See id. § 3.09.
57. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Death By Prescription: The Oregon Initiative, 331
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1240, 1243 (1994) (taking the position that Oregon's Ballot Measure 16
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significant response, however, came in the form of a lawsuit brought in
federal district court by a group of physicians, residential care
facilities, and terminally ill individuals who challenged the
constitutionality of Ballot Measure 16.58 While the plaintiffs attacked
the statute on a number of grounds,59 the Fourteenth Amendment
challenge lies at the heart of their lawsuit. Specifically the plaintiffs
asserted that Measure 16 violates due process and equal protection
rights by failing to protect vulnerable terminally ill individuals who,
due to severe undiagnosed depression or undue influence, will resort to
physician assistance to end their lives prematurely. 60 These assertions
should sound familiar: the plaintiffs merely recast the political cry of
"insufficient safeguards" in constitutional terms. When faced with the
initial question whether to enjoin the statute pending a determination
on the merits, Judge Michael Hogan granted the plaintiffs' request for
a preliminary injunction, stating, "[s]urely, the first assisted suicide law
in this country deserves a considered, thoughtful constitutional
analysis.",6' Eight months later, Judge Hogan struck down Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act on equal protection grounds 62 in a decision
that, unfortunately, falls short of his stated goal.

will do more harm than good for the terminally ill); The Oregon Death with Dignity Act
[Letters], 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1174-75 (1995) (responses to Professor Annas);
Robert A. Burt, Death Made Too Easy, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at A19 (asserting that
physician-assisted suicide should not be the first or only response to the social isolation and
abandonment currently experienced by the dying); Timothy Egan, Suicide Law Placing
Oregon on Several Uncharted Paths, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994, at Al (quoting both
opponents and proponents of the measure); Diane M. Gianelli, Oregon Doctors Fear
Fallout from Assisted Suicide, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 23/30, 1995, at 1 (describing
physicians' reactions to the law); Leon R. Kass, Death by Ballot in Oregon, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 2, 1994, at A14 (arguing that Oregon's Ballot Measure 16 is both unnecessary and
dangerous); Doctor-Assisted Suicide Gives Patient 'Freedom' [Letters], WALL ST. J., Nov.
14, 1994, at All (responses to Dr. Kass).
58. See Lee v. Oregon, 869 R Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994). The constitutional
challenge was filed in federal district court in Oregon two weeks before the Act was
scheduled to take effect. See Suit ChallengesAssisted-Suicide Law in Oregon, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1994, at A26.
59. The plaintiffs alleged that Ballot Measure 16 violates the 14th Amendment's
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the First Amendment's Freedom of Religion and
Association Clauses, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Lee, 869 F. Supp. at
1493.
60. See id. at 1496-97.
61. Id. at 1502-03; see also Ruling Blocks Suicide Law, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994,
at 10.
62. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). Because Judge Hogan
found the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, he did not find it necessary
to rule on the plaintiffs' additional constitutional and statutory claims. See id. at 1437.
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Ballot Measure 16 operates on the implicit premise that
physician-assisted suicide, when freely chosen by a capable, informed,
terminally ill adult, is rational. It is the rationality of the choice to end
one's own life under these circumstances that arguably justifies the
State's willingness to treat these individuals differently from other
"irrational" persons who desire assistance in ending their lives.63 It
should come as no surprise, then, that a large portion of Ballot
Measure 16 is devoted to setting up a statutory scheme by which
physicians can distinguish between individuals who fall within the
statutory class (terminally ill persons who voluntarily and rationally
choose assisted suicide) and those who fall without."
Judge Hogan's ruling centers on the adequacy of Oregon's
procedures for determining which individuals qualify for physicianassisted suicide. He held that the Act lacked sufficient safeguards to
protect terminally ill individuals whose consent to assisted suicide
might be colored by undiagnosed depression or outside coercion, and
that this lack of safeguards rose to the level of an equal protection
violation.65 According to the court, the specific failings of the statutory
scheme included: (1) allowing physicians who may not be mentalhealth specialists to assess whether the patient is suffering from a
psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired
judgment, 66 (2) allowing physicians to determine whether the person's
request is voluntary rather than being a product of undue influence, 67
(3) failing to provide for an independently chosen consulting physician
68
to confirmn that the person is capable and the choice voluntary,
(4) holding physicians to a good-faith standard of care under the Act
rather than an objectively reasonable one,69 and (5) failing to require
assessment of the individual's psychological state and circumstances at
the time of the suicide.70 According to Judge Hogan, these procedural
infirmities combined to produce a "severely overinclusive class who

63. This difference in treatment takes the form of a statutory immunity from criminal
or civil liability or professional discipline for those persons who, in good faith, assist a
terminally ill individual to commit suicide under the Act. See Oregon Act § 4.01(1).
64. See Oregon Act §§ 1-3; see also supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.

65.
66.

See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
See id. at 1435.

67.

See id.

68.

See id. at 1435-36.

69.

See id. at 1436-37.

70.

See id. at 1437.
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may be71competent, incompetent, unduly influenced, or abused by
others."
Judge Hogan is clearly right in concluding that a statute
legalizing physician-assisted suicide could be so lacking in safeguards
as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. He is
also undoubtedly correct in asserting that Oregon's Death with Dignity
Act could have been drafted in such a way as to provide more
procedural protections to terminally ill individuals. The astonishing
aspect of his decision is that he struck down this particular statute,
which clearly contains a number of safeguards, while purporting to use
a rational basis standard of review.72 In the course of his analysis,
Judge Hogan acknowledges that under that standard, he must uphold
the statutory classification against equal protection challenge "'if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.' ' 73 But he then proceeds to use
this supposedly deferential standard to strike provision after provision
of the Act.
Consider, for example, the court's discussion of the statutory
procedures that would allow physicians other than psychiatrists or
mental-health specialists to assess whether an individual suffers from
depression or another psychiatric condition that would affect his or her
decision-making capacity.74 Judge Hogan first attacks the Act's failure
to provide for decisionmaking through the use of "substituted
judgment," which he asserts is a safeguard present in withdrawal-oflife-support cases but conspicuously absent from Measure 16.75 The
notion that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act would be more
protective had it incorporated the use of substituted judgment is simply
wrong. Substituted judgment allows a third party to make a medical
treatment decision on behalf of an incompetent person.76 In limiting
71. Id.
72. Plaintiffs argued that the statutory classification is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. See id. at 1431 & n.2.
73. Id. at 1432 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311-12
(1993)).
74. Judge Hogan tends to use the terms "capacity" and "competency"
interchangeably in his opinion. Technically, the term "capacity" refers to an individual's
ability to make decisions as a factual matter, whereas "competency" refers to an individual's
legal status to make decisions. See 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE 173 (1989). The
Oregon Death with Dignity Act defines a qualified patient as one who is "capable." See
Oregon Act § 1.01(11).
75. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434.
76. See id. The substituted-judgment standard as used in treatment-withdrawal cases
calls upon a surrogate decisionmaker to make medical decisions in accordance with what the
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physician-assisted suicide to capable individuals, 7 Ballot Measure 16
specifically avoids the pitfalls and potential abuses inherent in such
third-party decisionmaking. Thus, the Act is more protective of
terminally ill individuals than if it contained the "safeguard" that the
court proposes.
Judge Hogan next points to Oregon's involuntary civil
commitment statute, and the provision therein requiring evaluation by
a psychiatrist prior to a commitment hearing." He concludes from this
comparison that Ballot Measure 16 is unconstitutional because it fails
to include a similar requirement." His analogy to involuntary civil
commitment proceedings is inapposite for several reasons. First, civil
commitment proceedings are by definition involuntary. They are
initiated only when an individual has exhibited symptoms or signs of a
mental illness and a propensity to endanger himself or others. In this
context, evaluation by a licensed psychiatrist operates to protect the
person from state overreaching in the form of an erroneous involuntary
commitment. In marked contrast, physician-assisted suicide is, by
Oregon's statutory definition, voluntary. Further, assuming the
statutory premise of rational suicide, a terminally ill individual who
requests assisted suicide does not exhibit irrationality or symptoms of
mental illness merely by making the request; he or she is entitled to the
same presumption of competence or capacity that is accorded
everyone else. Finally, mandatory psychiatric evaluation in the
physician-assisted suicide context would operate to protect an
individual not so much from the state but from herself and her own
choices.
Even if one concedes that mandatory psychiatric evaluation
would operate as an additional safeguard for the terminally ill who are
contemplating assisted suicide, 0 it does not follow that failure to
include such a requirement is unconstitutional under a rational review
standard. Physicians who are not psychiatrists make implicit
judgments every day as to their patients' medical decision-making
capacities. Furthermore, they do so in contexts such as the withdrawal
incompetent individual would have wished had she been competent. See 1 MEISEL, supra
note 74, at 270-72.
77. See Oregon Act § 1.01 (11) (defining a qualified patient as one who is capable).
78. See Lee, 891 . Supp. at 1434-35.
79. See id. at 1435-36.
80. The argument here is that psychiatrists are better trained to diagnose depression
and other psychiatric disorders that may impair judgment or lead to lack of decision-making
capacity. See id.
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of life support, where, similar to physician-assisted suicide, the end
result of the person's decision may be his or her death. In addition to
making judgments concerning an individual's decision-making
capacity, non-psychiatrist physicians (including family practice
physicians and internists) both diagnose and treat depression as a
regular part of their medical practices. Given this state of affairs, it is
difficult to understand how statutory procedures that allow physicians
other than psychiatrists to make those same judgments in the
physician-assisted-suicide setting are irrational or unrelated to
legitimate state objectives. While strong public policy reasons may
exist for requiring psychiatric consultation prior to physician-assisted
suicide, the question here is one of constitutionality and not merely the
wisdom of Oregon's statutory scheme."1
A similar critique can be applied to the standard-of-care analysis.
The court states that Oregon's use of a good faith rather than a
negligence standard of care "is not rationally related to any legitimate
state interest., 82 But surely it is not irrational for the legislature (or the
citizenry in this case) to conclude that, without immunity from civil
liability for negligence, many health care providers would be reluctant
to enter such a controversial and uncertain area of medical practice.
Nor would it be irrational to conclude that the statutory purpose of
providing terminally ill individuals with the choice of physicianassisted suicide would be best effectuated by providing such immunity.
It appears that something other than a rational-basis review took
place in the Oregon court. Judge Hogan simply did not accept the
premise that a person can provide truly voluntary and rational consent
to assisted death. 3 Instead, he seemed to assume that terminally ill
individuals who would choose death are presumptively incompetent
until declared otherwise by an expert. 84 Such a belief, that persons
81. The court also expresses concern over the lack of a referral requirement to a
"certified social worker" or other specialist to explore social services available to the
terminally ill individual. See id. Again, it is difficult to take seriously the position that such
a requirement is constitutionally mandated.
82. Id. at 1437.
83. Judge Hogan's skepticism comes through most clearly in footnotes, where he
raises the specter of the slippery slope, see id. at 1432-33 n.3, questions whether the
Constitution can distinguish between classes of people for whom assisted suicide would be
rational, see id., and asserts that it would be equally rational to conclude that no person
at 1434 n.6.
could benefit from self-destruction. See id.
84. How else to explain his statement that "[u]nder Measure 16, the very lives of
terminally ill persons depend on their own rational assessment of the value of their
existence, and yet there is no requirement that they be evaluated by a mental health
specialist"? Id. at 1438.
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who would choose assisted suicide are irrational and need to be
protected from themselves, drives a constitutional analysis that is
simply unsupportable. 5 Not surprisingly, the State of Oregon
appealed the district court's decision. Should the Ninth Circuit reverse
and uphold the constitutionality of Ballot Measure 16,86 legalized
physician-assisted suicide will be a reality in Oregon.
C.

CriminalizingPhysician-AssistedDeath

Based on the initiative processes in Washington, California, and
Oregon, one might be inclined to assume that the political trend has
been solely in the direction of legalizing physician-assisted death. In
fact, several states have moved in exactly the opposite direction,
creating criminal prohibitions on assisted suicide where none have
existed before. The states of Tennessee and Kentucky, for example,
enacted statutes making assisted suicide a felony, 7 and in so doing,
joined the majority of states that have long criminalized assisted
suicide. 8
85. I do not criticize Judge Hogan for holding these views. Rather, I am concerned
with his questionable use of constitutional doctrine to strike down a statute that he thinks is
unwise.
86. In an unusual move, the Ninth Circuit has signaled that it will likely reverse the
district court decision in Lee. In ruling in a different case involving a challenge to
Washington's ban on assisted suicide, see infra Part IIC2, the en banc panel expressed its
disapproval of both Judge Hogan's reasoning and conclusions. See Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110). The court
explained that Judge Hogan had "clearly erred" in treating a benefit (the right to physicianassisted suicide) as a burden and a burden (the statute prohibiting assisted suicide) as a
benefit. Id. at 838.
In light of the court's language and holding in Compassion in Dying, the State of
Oregon filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit asking that it lift the injunction currently
operating against the Oregon law. See 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 395 (Mar. 14,
1996). The Ninth Circuit denied the motion, stating that Oregon should ask the district
court to lift the injunction. See 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 433 (Mar. 21, 1996).
Judge Hogan has since denied Oregon's motion; the appeal of the original decision in Lee
remains before the Ninth Circuit.
87. See Legislature Repeals ProviderTax, Makes Aiding Suicides a Felony Offense,
2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 683 (May 27, 1993) (Tenn.); New Law Makes Suicide
Assistance Punishable by Up to 10-Year Prison Tenn, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at
494 (Apr. 14, 1994) (Ky.).
88. The following states currently prohibit and provide criminal sanctions for
assisting in suicide: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (Michie 1985); ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1103(A)(3) (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 1985); Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (West
1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1996); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(b) (1995); 720
IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-31(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5
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In an interesting contrast to the Oregon litigation, these statutes
have recently come under constitutional attack. Here the question is
not whether a state can constitutionally legalize assisted suicide, but
rather, whether a state can constitutionally prohibit it. Proponents of
physician-assisted death have a strong incentive to concentrate their
efforts in this area. If they can prevail in their view that laws
prohibiting assisted suicide violate the Federal Constitution, the
question in every state immediately shifts from whether to legalize
assisted suicide, to how to regulate it. Thus far, constitutional
challenges have been raised in three states: Michigan, Washington,
and New York. The challenge began in Michigan, with Jack
Kevorkian leading the way.

1.

Michigan
When Kevorkian first began his crusade in 1990 by hooking

Janet Adkins up to his "suicide machine,"89 Michigan did not have a

statute on the books making assisted suicide a crime. The Michigan

(Michie Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 216.300.308 (Michie 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1995); 1992
Mich. Pub. Acts 270 (temporary statute, no longer in effect); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215
(West Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023.1(2)
(West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 28-307 (1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-2-4 (Michie 1995); N.Y PENAL LAw § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-16-04 (Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-818 (West 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.125(1)(b) (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505(b) (West 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-37 & -38 (Michie 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp.
1996); TExAs PENALCODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 1994); WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 9A.36.060
(West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1996).
89. Janet Adkins was a 54-year-old woman who had been diagnosed with
Alzheimer's disease. See Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor's World: Use of Suicide Device
Sets in Motion Debate on a DisturbingIssue, N.Y TIMEs, June 12, 1990, at C3. She was
evidently in the early stages of the disease, suffering from forgetfulness but still
able to
function. See Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al. In 1990, after learning of Dr. Kevorkian through local
newspapers, Ms. Adkins flew from her home in Oregon to seek Dr. Kevorkian's aid in
ending her life. See id. Dr. Kevorkian met with Janet Adkins and her husband and
ultimately agreed to assist. See id. After unsuccessfully trying to locate a place that would
allow him to carry out the procedure, Kevorkian resorted to using his Volkswagen van,
which he had equipped with a cot, curtains, and his suicide machine. See id. He inserted an
intravenous tube in Ms. Adkins' arm that dripped saline solution. See id. When Ms. Adkins
was ready, she pressed a button that released thiopental into her vein, causing her to lose
consciousness. See id. The machine then released potassium chloride, which stopped Ms.
Adkins' heart and caused her death within a few minutes. See id.
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Legislature, propelled by Kevorkian's continued activities, 90 passed a
statute which set up a commission to study the issue and temporarily
criminalized assisted suicide. 91

The threat of prosecution under the new law did not stop
Kevorkian-if anything, it spurred him on.92 But there was method in
his madness; in deliberately flouting the law, he was able to directly
challenge its constitutionality. Three times he was charged,93 and in
two of those cases the statute was declared unconstitutional. 94 But the
90. See supra note 9. Prosecutors' early attempts to try Kevorkian on murder
charges were unsuccessful. See Tamar Lewin, Doctor Cleared of Murdering Woman with
Suicide Machine, N.Y TIEs, Dec. 14, 1990, at B6 (stating that judge dismissed murder
charges in Adkins case because Ms. Adkins and not Dr. Kevorkian caused her death);
Murder Charges Against Kevorkian are Dismissed, N.Y TMES, July 22, 1992, at A12
(detailing ruling in which judge held that, at most, Kevorkian assisted in suicide and
Michigan does not bar assisted suicides).
91. The original bill proposed to set up a commission, which was to be given 15
months to develop recommendations for the legislature concerning voluntary selftermination of life. See Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Mich. Ct. App.),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995). But as the number of Kevorkian-assisted deaths
mounted, the legislature amended the bill to add a provision that would temporarily
criminalize assisted suicide. See id. at 490. The amended bill prohibited a person who has
knowledge that another intends to commit suicide from intentionally providing the physical
means or participating in a physical act by which another attempts or commits suicide. See
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1993). Criminal assistance to suicide was made
a felony punishable by not more than four years in prison. See id. The bill provided,
however, that the criminal proscriptions would be automatically repealed six months after
the commission made its recommendations to the legislature. See id. § 752.1027(5). The
Michigan Legislature passed the amended version in December 1992 and then moved its
effective date from March 30, 1993 to February 25, 1993, after Kevorkian assisted in nine
deaths between December and February alone. See Kevorkian-Aided Suicide Investigated
as Homicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at A10; Kevorkian Aids in 2 More Suicides; Total
Is at 15, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 19, 1993, at A10.
92. See Kevorkian, Pushingfor Jail,Aids in Suicide in His Home, N.Y TIMES, Oct.
23, 1993, at 8 (stating that Kevorkian had assisted a suicide in his own home in an attempt
to provoke authorities into jailing him).
93. See Don Terry, As He Hoped, Kevorkian Is Charged in a Suicide, N.Y TMES,
Aug. 18, 1993, at A12; Kevorkian Charged a 2d Time Under Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1993, at A20; Kevorkian Is ChargedAgain with Aiding a Suicide, N.Y TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1993, at Al8.
94. See Suicide Law Struck Down, but Kevorkian Stays Jailed,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1993, at A18 (noting that the court found that the statute infringes impermissibly on liberty
interests guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); Aided-Suicide Law Invalidated Again, N.Y.
TMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at A17 (noting that the court found that the statute violates state
constitution because legislature amended bill to change its original purpose and bill has
more than one objective).
The Michigan statute had previously been declared
unconstitutional in a declaratory judgment action brought by a group of terminally ill
individuals and health-care providers. See Isabel Wilkerson, Suicide Law Struck Down, for
Now, N.Y. TmES, May 21, 1993, at B9. The judge in that action held that the law violated
the state constitution because it had been passed by the legislature without a public hearing

68

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 71:45

criminal charges stuck in a third case, in which Kevorkian went out of
his way to force a trial because he was convinced that a jury would not

and because it contained more than one objective. See id The court also found a dueprocess right to commit suicide but denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction, holding that hearings would be necessary to determine whether the statute
unduly burdened the right. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Mich. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
At the same time that the State proceeded with its prosecution of Kevorkian in the
"Hyde case," see infra note 95 and accompanying text, it appealed the three lower-court
decisions holding the assisted-suicide statute to be unconstitutional. On consolidated
appeal, the Michigan appellate court affirmed all three decisions by a 2-1 vote, but it did so
on the narrow state constitutional ground that the legislation violated the "one object"
provision of the Michigan Constitution because it contained two objects: criminalizing
assisted suicide and setting up a study commission. See Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518
N.W.2d at 489-92. A different two-judge majority also opined that the statute did not
violate the Federal Constitution because the Constitution does not guarantee a right to
assisted suicide. See id. at 492-94.
Simultaneous with the above ruling, the appellate court issued an opinion in a
companion case also involving Jack Kevorkian, in which he had been charged with murder
for assisting two women to commit suicide prior to the effective date of Michigan's new
assisted-suicide statute. See DoctorFaces Murder Trialfor Suicide Aid, N.Y TIMES, Feb.
29, 1992, at 10. The trial court judge had dismissed the murder charges, ruling that since the
two women tripped the suicide devices themselves, Kevorkian could not be charged with
homicide. See Murder ChargesAgainst Kevorkian Are Dismissed, N.Y TIMEs, July 22,
1992, at A12. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the murder charges,
holding that Michigan's common-law definition of murder encompassed the act of aiding a
suicide. See People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d 293, 295-98 (Mich. Ct. App.), vacated, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995).
The Supreme Court of Michigan granted leave to appeal in both the assisted-suicide
and murder cases. See People v. Kevorkian, 521 N.W.2d 4, aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995). In a rather splintered
opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately ruled in late 1994 that the assisted-suicide
provisions were validly enacted and did not violate the 'Title object" provision of the state
constitution, see People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 716; that the Due Process Clause of
the U.S. Constitution does not encompass a fundamental right to assisted suicide so that
Michigan may constitutionally prohibit such conduct, see id. at 733; that a defendant who
assists a suicide may be prosecuted for common-law murder only if probable cause exists
that the "death was the direct and natural result of the defendant's act," id. at 738; and that
even in the absence of a statute prohibiting assisted suicide, such actions could still be
prosecuted as the common-law offense of assisted suicide under a statutory saving clause.
See id. at 739. The United States Supreme Court denied Kevorkian's certiorari petition in
April 1995. See Hobbins v. Kelley, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995); see also Linda Greenhouse,
Court Won't HearAppeal in Case of Assisted Suicide, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1995, at A17.
Michigan's statutory ban on assisted suicide automatically expired on November 25,
1994 (six months after the commission issued its report). The Michigan Supreme Court
decision to both uphold Michigan's temporary ban on assisted suicide and to recognize a
common-law felony of assisting suicide has not stopped Kevorkian's activities, see supra
note 9, but no additional charges have been brought against Kevorkian since November
1993. See Body in Auto Is Reported to Be Kevorkian's 26th Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1995, at A17; Woman Dies at Kevorkian Clinic,N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at A12.
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convict him for his actions.95 After four long years, Kevorkian finally
faced a jury of his peers.96 Incredibly, the jury acquitted him,97 even
though he had done everything but proclaim in open court that he had
violated the law against assisted suicide. 98 The jury's willingness to
acquit him in a case where he had clearly violated the plain language
and intent of the statute99 sent a strong message about the public's
reticence to convict "physicians" for acts of assisted suicide. This
message was only reinforced by Kevorkian's acquittal in two
subsequent prosecutions, in which he switched tactics, claiming that
he never intended to cause the death of his patients but only to relieve
their suffering.1°0 As important as these distinctions are, Kevorkian's
95. See Kevorkian Details His Role in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 28.
Thomas W. Hyde Jr. was a thirty-year-old man who suffered from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease), which causes progressive loss of all motor function. See
Kevorkian Said to Face Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at A12. Kevorkian assisted
Mr. Hyde in taking his own life through the use of carbon monoxide. See id.
96. See Trial Is Ordered for Suicide Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1994, at 9
(containing a statement by the judge that he was not bound by prior rulings in other
Michigan counties declaring the statute unconstitutional).
97. See David Margolick, Jury Acquits Dr Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at Al.
98. In statements to the media, Kevorkian claimed, "'I supplied the van .... I drove
him to Belle Isle. I supplied the gas. I supplied the tubing and the mask and all the
necessary equipment. I connected the tubing [to the tank of carbon monoxide] .... I put the
mask on Mr. Hyde's face...."' Kevorkian Details His Role in Suicide, N.Y. IMES, Aug. 7,
1993 at 28.
99. The jury acquitted Kevorkian of providing the physical means or participating in
an act of suicide, evidently by finding that Kevorkian's actions fell within an exception in
the statute for persons administering medication or procedures "if the intent is to relieve pain
or discomfort and not to cause death." See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027(3) (West
Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
As Yale Kamisar notes, the jury effectively negated the law when it used this exception
to acquit Kevorkian. See Margolick, supra note 97, at Al. The Michigan Legislature
included the language in question to prevent prosecutions in cases where medications
administered for pain relief had the unintended effect of hastening or increasing the risk of
death. The provision thus reassured physicians that they would not be prosecuted if
medications they prescribed contributed to a patient's death, as long as the physician's intent
in prescribing the drugs was to relieve pain rather than to cause death. See Timothy E. Quill,
The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1039, 1039 (1993).
Kevorkian's actions, based on his earlier statements and testimony at trial, simply do not fall
within this exception, in that he clearly intended from the beginning to use the carbon
monoxide to bring about Mr. Hyde's death. See Kevorkian Takes Stand in Own Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at A16 (relating trial testimony in which Kevorkian stated that he
used carbon monoxide to end Mr. Hyde's suffering and that he 'had a fairly good idea that
[Hyde] would die."').
100. The first of these most recent prosecutions arose from charges against Kevorkian
for assisting in the 1993 carbon monoxide deaths of Merian Frederick and Dr. Ali Khaili in
violation of Michigan's temporary assisted-suicide statute. See Kevorkian and the Issue of
Assisted Suicide Will Go on Trialfor Second ime, N.Y. MMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at A10. The
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legal maneuvers may have left an even more important legacy in the
realm of constitutional law. The constitutional question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from banning physicianassisted death, first raised by Jack Kevorkian in Michigan, now
occupies center stage.in two cases arising out of direct challenges to
such statutory bans in Washington and New York."0 '
2.

Washington

In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,02 a coalition of
terminally ill patients, physicians who treat the terminally ill, and an
charges were reinstated following the Michigan Supreme Court's decision upholding the
constitutionality of that statute. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995); see also supra note 94. At trial, Kevorkian testified
that his sole intent in assisting Frederick and Khalili was not to end their lives but rather to
end their suffering. See Kevorkian Says He Aims to Ease Suffering, Not to Hasten Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A19. The jury was ultimately convinced that Kevorkian's
actions fell within the statutory exception for the administration of medication with the
intent to relieve pain and not to cause death; they voted to acquit Kevorkian after
deliberating for less than nine hours. See Jack Lessenberry, Kevorkian Again Not Guilty of
Aiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at 7.
Shortly after the acquittal, Kevorkian stood trial for assisting in the deaths of Marjorie
Wantz and Sherry Miller. These charges were also reinstated following the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision, but were based on the common-law crime of assisting suicide
rather than Michigan's temporary statute. See Jack Lessenberry, After Victory, a New Trial
for a Weary Kevorkian, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at A13; see also People v. Kevorkian,
527 N.W.2d at 714 (declaring that the charge of assisting in a suicide is to be prosecuted as a
common-law felony). This case was more difficult for both sides to try-the prosecution
had to convince the jury that Kevorkian had violated a law that could not be found within
the codified laws of Michigan and Kevorkian had to convince the jury that his actions were
appropriate even though neither of the women he assisted was terminally ill. See Kevorldan
Faces Suicide Prosecution Without a Law Being Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996, at A20.
Kevorkian again defended himself on the ground that his purpose as a physician was to
relieve pain and suffering and that, in the cases of Wantz and Miller, that purpose could only
be accomplished by treatment that caused their deaths. See Jack Lessenberry, Specialist
Testifies Depression Was Issue in Kevorkian Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1996, at A17. The
jury once again voted to acquit, in what many believe will be the last criminal prosecution
brought against Kevorkian. See Jack Lessenberry, JuryAcquits Kevorkian in Common-Law
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at A14. Defense counsel evidently carried the day with
his argument that Kevorkian should not be found guilty for having committed the crime of
assisted suicide in 1991 when the Supreme Court of Michigan did not even make it clear
that such actions constituted a common law-crime until 1994. See id; see also supra note
94 (describing the Michigan decisions).
101. I have chosen to focus on the Washington and New York cases rather than the
Kevorkian cases in Michigan because the latter involved additional state constitutional and
common-law claims that complicate the holdings and add little to the federal constitutional
analysis. For a brief description of the Michigan decisions, see supranote 94.
102. 850 F Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd
en banc, 79 E3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65
U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110).
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organization called "Compassion in Dying' ' 03 mounted a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the Washington statute that makes
assisting a suicide a crime. 1°4 The plaintiffs challenged the statute only
to the extent that it bars physician-assisted suicide by mentally
competent, terminally ill adults who knowingly and voluntarily seek to
end their lives by taking a lethal dose of prescription drugs. 105
From the beginning, Compassion in Dying raised a fascinating
question regarding the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. On
the one hand, the district court could look to the 1990 Cruzan v.
Director,Missouri Departmentof Health decision,'0 6 the only case in
which the Supreme Court has been called upon directly to decide
whether there is a federal constitutional "right to die" embodied within
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 7 In that case,
103. Compassion in Dying is an organization devoted to providing support,
counseling, and assistance to terminally ill adults contemplating suicide through selfadministration of prescription drugs. See id. at 1458. The organization contends that
terminally ill adults have the constitutional right to request assistance from its members,
whose services include delivering or mixing the drugs to be used in the suicide. See id. at
1459. As of 1993, Compassion in Dying had assisted two individuals to commit suicide by
helping them obtain lethal drugs and was counseling five to ten others. See Warren King,
Seattle Group Assists Second Personin Suicide, SEATrLE TmES, Aug. 31, 1993, at B1. The
organization joined the lawsuit because its members feared criminal prosecution under the
statute for their actions in assisting terminally ill individuals to commit suicide. See
Compassionin Dying, 850 F Supp. at 1459.
104. See id. at 1456. The statute in question makes it a crime to knowingly aid
another person in committing suicide. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN § 9A.36.060 (West
1988) ("A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids
another person to attempt suicide."). Promoting a suicide is a Class C felony, see id.
§ 9A.36.060(2), which is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum of five years, or a fine
of up to ten thousand dollars, or both. See id. § 9A.20.021(1)(c) (West 1988).
105. See Compassion in Dying, 850 R Supp. at 1456. The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment striking down the statute, and injunctive relief barring its enforcement.
See id.
106. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Nancy Cruzan was an incompetent individual who had
been in a persistent vegetative state for a number of years and who was being cared for in a
Missouri state hospital at state expense. See id. at 265-66. The state of Missouri refused to
honor her parents' requests to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, in this case artificial
nutrition and hydration, in order to allow her to die. See id. at 267-68. Missouri premised
its refusal on both the lack of clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's wishes and
the State's interest in the preservation of human life. See id. at 280-82.
107. See id. at 277. ("This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented
with the issue whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance
referred to as a 'right to die."').
Leon Kass points out the confusion in public discourse over the meaning of the term
"right to die." See Leon R. Kass, Is There a Right to Die?,23 HASTNGS CENTER REP., Jan.Feb. 1993, at 34, 36. According to Kass, it is variously used to refer to the "right to refuse
treatment even if, or so that, death may occur; right to be killed or to become dead; right to
control one's own dying; right to die with dignity; right to assistance in death." Id. Thus, in
this context particularly, it is important to clarify the intended meaning of such terms.
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the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, upheld the State's power to require that evidence of an
incompetent's wishes for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
be proven by clear and convincing evidence." 8 Although Cruzan has
repeatedly been cited in the media for the proposition that competent
individuals have a constitutional right to die,' °9 Rehnquist's opinion is
notable for the ways in which it explicitly and implicitly limited this
so-called constitutional right. First, he made it clear that, in his view,
the holding was a narrow one confined entirely to the factual
circumstances presented by the case."' Second, Rehnquist went out of
his way to avoid holding that there is a constitutional right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment. For purposes of this case only, he agreed to
assume "that the United States Constitution would grant a competent
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition."' Third, he expressly rejected the characterization of
this assumed interest as a privacy right, choosing instead to
denominate it a "liberty interest."' " 2 While Rehnquist did not say so
explicitly, the clear import of his choice of labels is that the interest
involved is not a fundamental right and thus can be subjected to
significant state regulation." 3 Finally, while balancing the individual's
liberty interest against the State's interest, Rehnquist supported his
assertion of the State's strong interest in preserving and protecting
108. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
109. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, JusticesFinda Right to Die, but the Majority Sees
Needfor Clear Proofof Intent, N.Y TIMES, June 26, 1990, at Al (stating that eight justices
in the Cruzan case ruled that a person whose wishes are known has a constitutional right to
discontinue life-sustaining treatment); Linda Greenhouse, Liberty to Reject Life, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1990, at A16 (stating that the Court in Cruzan concluded that "the Constitution
protects a person's liberty to reject life-sustaining technology"). But see, Kass, supra note
107, at 40-41 (arguing that such claims were founded on misinterpretations of the decision).
110. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("We follow the judicious
counsel of our decision in Twin City Bank v. Nebeker ... where we said that in deciding 'a
question of such magnitude and importance ... it is the [better] part of wisdom not to
attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject."').
111. Id. at 279.
112. Seeid. at279n.7.
113. See John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the ConstitutionalStatus of Nontreatment
Decisionsfor Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1174-75 & n.132 (1991). Both
the outcome in the case (upholding the state regulation) and Rehnquist's analysis are far
more consistent with rationality review than strict scrutiny. In contrast, Justice Brennan's
dissent contends that if a competent person has a liberty interest to be free of unwanted
medical treatment, then that interest must be a fundamental one. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
304-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan proceeds to perform strict scrutiny of the
State's clear and convincing evidence requirement and concludes that it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 312-21.
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human life by pointing out that the majority of states have laws
criminalizing assisted suicide.' 4 Furthermore, none of the justices
directly refuted Justice Scalia's assertion that "there is no significant
support for the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition
that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' ' ' 1 5
On the other hand, as a counterbalance to the Cruzan case and its
rather niggardly view of personal liberty in the medical treatment
setting, the district court in Compassion in Dying could look to the
1992 case of PlannedParenthoodv. Casey." 6 In that decision, the
Supreme Court adopted an "undue burden standard" for determining
when state regulation violates a woman's constitutional right to choose
to terminate a pregnancy." 7 The jointly authored plurality opinion
explained that "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of
law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.""' The plurality opinion contained a crucial statement that is
at the crux of the plaintiffs' due process arguments in Compassion in
Dying:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.'

9

114. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. As Yale Kamisar points out, this language
suggests that the majority in Cruzan did not view as constitutionally suspect state statutes
that criminalize assisted suicide. See Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide
Unconstitutional?,23 HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1993, at 32, 34.
115. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Unlike Justice Scalia, who chose suicide as his paradigm for the
Cruzan case, the majority chose instead the paradigm of the right to refuse medical
treatment. See Kamisar, supra note 114, at 34.
116. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Of course, my characterizations of these cases are relative.
If one were to compare the Casey case with its predecessor, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), one could fairly characterize the Casey decision as less generous than Roe in its
view of personal liberty.
117. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
118. Id. at 878 (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, J.J., joint opinion).
119. Id.at851.
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The relevance of Casey lay in the possible analogy: if the right of
terminally ill, competent individuals to choose assisted death is
analogous to a woman's constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy,
then state regulation of the "right to die" through euthanasia or assisted
suicide may be subject to an undue burden analysis as well. Put
differently, the deferential standard of review of state regulation
evidenced in Cruzan may have been supplanted in Casey by a standard
more protective of individual liberty. If this is the case, state statutes
criminalizing all forms
of assisted suicide are now more vulnerable to
120
attack.
constitutional
This, then, was the constitutional context for Judge Rothstein's
decision for the district court. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, she ultimately held the Washington statute unconstitutional
on two grounds. First, she found that the statute places an undue
burden on the exercise of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
accorded the terminally ill who wish to commit physician-assisted
suicide. 21 Second, she held that the law violates the right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting physician-

120. Legal commentators who debated this question prior to the district court's
decision reached different conclusions depending on whether they relied on Cruzan or
Casey for support. For example, Professor Kamisar used the Cruzan decision to argue that
the Court will not in the foreseeable future find a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in
assisted suicide. See Kamisar, supra note 114, at 34. Professor Kass also used Cruzan to
argue against such a right, but noted that the concurring opinions by Justices O'Connor and
Scalia may contain the seeds for "inventing a constitutional right to suicide and ...
assistance with suicide." Kass, supra note 107, at 41. He noted that when Scalia's argument
(refusal of nutrition and hydration is the equivalent of suicide) is combined with O'Connor's
position (the right to refuse nutrition and hydration is already constitutionally protected),
one could conclude that a constitutional right to suicide exists. See id. Interestingly, neither
Kamisar nor Kass made any mention of the Casey decision.
In contrast, Professor Robert Sedler used Casey to argue that the liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause is broad enough to include the right of the terminally ill
to make decisions to voluntarily end their lives. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and
Hastening Inevitable Death, 23 HASTNGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 20, 23. He
analogized the decision by a terminally ill individual to terminate his or her life to the
decision to terminate a pregnancy, arguing that both decisions are based on personal
autonomy and protected by the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 23.
Further, using the Casey standard, he contended that the statutes criminalizing assisted
suicide place a "substantial obstacle" in the way of the terminally ill who wish to use
physician-prescribed medications to hasten their deaths. See id. Sedler, of course, omitted
any discussion of the Cruzan decision in reaching his conclusion.
121. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110). Her decision is essentially that the ban on assisted suicide is overbroad.
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assisted suicide while permitting the withdrawal of life-support
systems from terminally ill individuals."
Given this outcome, it is not suprising that Judge Rothstein
centered her analysis on Casey. The key to the decision is her view
that "the suffering of a terminally ill person cannot be deemed any less
intimate or personal, or any less deserving of protection from
unwarranted governmental interference, than that of a pregnant
woman."' 23 Having made the connection between the abortion
decision and the decision to commit physician-assisted suicide, 124 she
held that the latter decision "falls within the realm of the liberties
constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment."' s Her
decision to equate abortion and physician-assisted suicide dictated the
result in this case because if Casey made anything clear, it was that
regulation taking the form of outright prohibition constitutes
an undue
26
burden on a protected liberty interest and cannot stand.
Judge Rothstein did not ignore the Supreme Court's decision in
Cruzan, but her attempts to harmonize it with Casey were less than
convincing. She acknowledged that Justice Rehnquist's "conclusion"
in Cruzan that competent individuals have a protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted treatment was "tentative,' ' 27 but predicted that
were it faced squarely with the question, the Supreme Court would
reaffirm that conclusion.'2 She further predicted that the Court would
not distinguish, as a constitutional matter, between withdrawal
of life29
sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide.
There are two possible critiques of Judge Rothstein's analysis.
First, she seemed to assume that all liberty interests are created equal.
She thus begged the key constitutional question when she predicted
122. See id. at 1467.
123. ld. at 1460.
124. The State argued that the abortion and physician-assisted suicide decisions
involved different competing interests. See id. Judge Rothstein agreed but concluded that
the assisted-suicide decision actually raises less difficult questions because, unlike the
abortion decision, only one life is involved, and the individual is capable of expressing his
or her wishes. See id.
125. l She states, "The liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is
the freedom to make choices according to one's individual conscience about those matters
which are essential to personal autonomy and basic human dignity." Id. at 1461.
126. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (stating that a
statute that places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice is an undue

burden).
127. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461; see also supra notes 109-114
and accompanying text.
128. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
129. See id.
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that the Supreme Court would find a "liberty interest" in the decision
to commit physician-assisted suicide. The important question is not
whether the Court would find a liberty interest, but rather what level of
constitutional protection the Court would afford any such liberty
interest. If the Court chose to apply the Cruzan analysis and level of
protection,30 itcould uphold even a total ban on assisted suicide as
rationally related to legitimate state objectives.'
In contrast, if the
Court were to apply a Casey undue burden analysis, it would likely
find a total ban unconstitutional.' 32 The second, and related, problem
with Judge Rothstein's opinion is that she equated physician-assisted
suicide with the long line of cases protecting "personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing and education."' 33 In doing so, she ignored the fact that
the Supreme Court, in the one instance it was called upon to discuss
the parameters of any constitutional right to die, 134 did not place that
so-called liberty interest within the above line of cases. 135 Instead,
when describing the liberty interest in Cruzan, the majority cited the
case of Bowers v. Hardwick,136 hardly a high-water mark in the
jurisprudence of constitutional protection of liberty interests.
The State of Washington ultimately appealed the district court
decision 137 and, in a much-anticipated opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court

130. See supra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
131. The State could legitimately assert a generalized interest in preventing suicide as
well as a more particularized interest in protecting the terminally ill from committing suicide
under undue influence and duress. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F Supp. at 1464-65.
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133. Compassion in Dying, 850 F Supp. at 1459-60.
134. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
135. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Easing the Passing,24 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
July-Aug. 1994, at 25 (noting that the Court has repeatedly stressed that the protected liberty
interest in those cases is solely the decision to bear or beget children).
136. See Cruzan,497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
137. See State to Appeal DistrictCourt Ruling on Assisted Suicidesfor Terminally Ill,
3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 737-38 (June 2, 1994). During the pendency of the
appeal, the medical community expressed uncertainty over the legal status of physicianassisted death in Washington. See Carol M. Ostrom & Susan Gilmore, Doctors Split on
Whether Ruling Gives Them OK to Assist Suicides, SEATrLE TIMES, May 4, 1994, at Al.
The Assistant Attorney General cautioned physicians that anyone who assisted a suicide
could be prosecuted later if the law was upheld on appeal, see id., and the Washington State
Medical Association and the American Medical Association quickly announced that, despite
the Rothstein ruling, physicians who participated in assisted death violated professional
ethics standards. See Carol M. Ostrom, Two Medical GroupsHit Assisted Suicides, SEATrLE
TimES, May 6, 1994, at B1.
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of Appeals reversed. 3 '
Judge Noonan's majority opinion is
remarkable for its relative brevity and clipped, almost derisive, tone.
Although the court takes issue with virtually every facet of Judge
Rothstein's opinion, two primary themes emerge, relating to the
relevant Supreme Court precedent and Washington's interests in
prohibiting assisted suicide.
The majority began by challenging the district court's reliance on
Casey.139 According to Judge Noonan, the Court's decision in Casey
was irrelevant to the question at hand, both because abortion is sui
generis and because there are significant "differences between the
regulation of reproduction and the prevention of the promotion of
killing a patient at his or her request." 1'4 The court was clearly
concerned that if it were to find a constitutional right to assisted
suicide in this case, it would be unable in the future to limit that right
to the terminally ill.'4 To avoid this result, which Judge Noonan
termed "reductio ad absurdum,"'42 the circuit court looked to Cruzan
as the guiding Supreme Court precedent. 143 Whereas Judge Rothstein
emphasized the Court's willingness in Cruzan to posit a competent
individual's constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment,1" the Ninth Circuit found determinative the Court's
willingness in Cruzan to distinguish between the withdrawal of life
support and assisted suicide. 45 Having found that the district court
decision lacked foundation in recent precedent, and noting that no
court of final jurisdiction in this country has ever upheld a

138. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 E3d 586 (9th Cir.), rev'd,49 E3d 586
(9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110). Judges
Noonan and O'Scannlain made up the majority while Judge Wright dissented.
139. See id. at 590.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 591. Judge Noonan referred to the category of terminally ill persons as
"inherently unstable." Id. at 590. But see id. at 594-95 (Wright, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the court is not now called upon to define the parameters of the right).
142. Id. at 591.
143. "While Casey was not about suicide at all, Cruzan was about the termination of
life." Id.
144. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F Supp. 1454, 1461 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110). Judge Rothstein then extrapolated the right to assisted suicide for the terminally ill
from the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. See id.
145. See Compassionin Dying, 49 F.3d at 591 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990)).
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constitutional right to assisted suicide,' 6 Judge Noonan concluded this
portion of the opinion in ringing fashion by declaring that "a federal
court should not invent a constitutional right unknown to the past and
antithetical to the defense of human life."' 147
The appellate court next shifted its focus from whether
individuals have a liberty interest in assisted suicide to an analysis of
Washington's interest in prohibiting such activities. The court briefly
identified five state interests'48 to which Judge Rothstein gave
insufficient consideration: (1) the interest in not having physicians in
the role of killers of their patients, 49 (2) the interest in protecting the
elderly and infirm from psychological pressure to consent to their own
deaths,' 5 ° (3) the interest in protecting minorities and the poor from
exploitation,'15 (4)-the interest in protecting the handicapped from
societal indifference and antipathy, 52 and (5) the interest in preventing
abuses such as have occurred in the Netherlands. 53 While the interests
were listed separately, the latter four are all concerned with the state's
interest in protecting individuals who are vulnerable (through
socioeconomic status, racial classification, advanced age, or disability)
from coerced or involuntary assisted suicide. Because the court had
earlier in the opinion rejected the notion of a fundamental right to
assisted suicide, it easily concluded that these state interests are
sufficient to justify Washington's statutory ban. 54
As so often happens in constitutional jurisprudence, the way in
which the court characterizes the right in question goes a long way
toward determining the result. The majority spoke of a right to
assisted suicide and found none, while Judge Wright in dissent spoke
of a right to self-determination and privacy regarding personal
decisions and located this right within American history and
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. The court actually listed seven state interests but the last two are less state
interests than they are additional critiques of the district court opinion. See id. at 592-94
(questioning the indefinite scope of the district court judgment and the lower court's refusal
to recognize the difference between withdrawal of life support and assisted suicide).
149. See id. at 592.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 593.
154. See id. at 591. Because the court did not find a fundamental right to assisted
suicide, it subjected the Washington regulation to deferential rationality review. See id. at
593-94 (stating that the statute must be upheld unless the plaintiffs show that the
legislature's actions were irrational).

1996]

AUTONOMYAND DEATH

traditions.155 He countered the majority's assertion that the relevant
language in Casey must be confined to the abortion context, 156 and, in
fact, went beyond Casey by arguing for strict scrutiny of any state
regulation of a terminally ill, competent individual's fundamental
privacy right to choose physician-assisted death. 57 As to the issue of
the State's interest in protecting vulnerable citizens, Judge Wright
evinced confidence in the Washington Legislature's ability to enact
sufficiently protective regulations. 5
Buoyed by Judge Wright's dissent, the plaintiffs petitioned the
Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc. In an interesting twist, a majority
of the circuit judges voted to grant the plaintiffs' petition.'59 On March
6, 1996, the en banc panel, by an eight-to-three vote, repudiated the
original appellate decision by affirming Judge Rothstein and striking
down Washington's statute
under the Due Process Clause of the
6
Fourteenth Amendment.1
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, is a
sweeping exploration of the historical, societal, and legal implications
of physician-assisted suicide. The court first examined whether "a
liberty interest exists in determining the time and manner of one's
death," and found the similarities between the right-to-die cases and
the abortion cases to be compelling.161 In an interesting jurisprudential
maneuver, the Ninth Circuit refused to categorize the liberty interest in
hastening one's death as either a fundamental right requiring strict
scrutiny, or a mere liberty interest requiring only rational basis
155. See id. at 596 (Wright, J., dissenting). Judge Wright asserted that when
analyzing whether American tradition and history support the right in question, the court
must conduct the inquiry at a more abstract level than the majority does in order to account
for the evolution of medicine and the correspondingly new legal questions. See id.
156. See id. at 595 (stating that the language in Casey was derived from a long line of
Supreme Court decisions).
157. See id. Judge Wright rejected the undue-burden standard applied by the district
court because, in his view, Casey did not discard the traditional strict scrutiny test in
fundamental-rights cases not involving abortion. See id. at 596 n.6.
158. See id. at 597.
159. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995). Under
the federal appellate rules, a majority vote of the active circuit court judges is required for a
rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). By circuit rule, the Ninth Circuit en banc
court is a limited one, consisting of the Chief Judge and ten additional active circuit judges
chosen by lot. See 9TH CiR. R. 35-3.
160. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110).
161. Id. at 800. The court explicitly rejected the "suicide" terminology and instead
explored whether an individual has a liberty interest in hastening one's own death or
determining the time and manner of death. See id. at 802.
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review. 162 The court argued that the Supreme Court's substantive due
process cases have moved away from the "artificial" two- or three-tier
level of scrutiny analysis toward a continuum approach in which the
more important the individual's right, the stronger the required
justification from the State for infringing on that right. 163 The court
concluded that, although there might be legitimate disagreement over
whether the liberty interest to hasten one's own death is a fundamental
right, or simply an important interest subject to a balancing test,
no one
1 64
appropriate.
is
review
basis
rational
that
argue
can legitimately
Judge Reinhardt's opinion then moved to an examination of the
existence and strength of the liberty interest in question. The court
explicitly rejected a purely historical approach, arguing that the route
chosen by the original three-judge panel had been foreclosed by
Casey.6 Furthermore, the majority asserted that historical attitudes
toward suicide have evolved over time to the point that most
Americans now support allowing the terminally ill to hasten their
deaths and relieve their suffering through the withdrawal of lifesustaining 1treatment
or the administration of lethal doses of
66
medication.
The Ninth Circuit found additional support for a constitutional
right to choose the timing and manner of one's own death in Casey 67
and Cruzan.168 Quoting the critical language from Casey, which
defines the intimate and personal choices protected by the Due Process
Clause, 169 and analogizing the decision to end one's life to a woman's
decision to terminate a pregnancy, the court found that a competent,
terminally ill adult has a strong liberty interest in choosing to hasten
his or her own death. ° The court also used the Cruzan decision to
support its conclusion, arguing that the Court's recognition in Cruzan
of the right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration
was necessarily a
17 1
death.
hastening
in
interest
liberty
a
recognition of

162.
163.
164.
165.
(1992)).
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 804-05.
See id. at 803-04.
See id. at 804.
See id. at 805-06 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-49
See id. at 806-10.
505 U.S. at 833.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See Compassionin Dying, 79 3d at 813-14.
See id. at 814-16.
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Having explored the origins and strength of the liberty interest in
question, the opinion turned to a balancing of the State's competing
interests in banning physician-assisted suicide. It is here that the
differences between the three-judge panel's decision and the en bane
decision are most apparent. While recognizing Washington's legitimate
interest in preserving life, the en bane opinion asserted that the state's
interests are dramatically reduced in the case of terminally ill
individuals who wish to die.1 72 Judge Reinhardt argued that, in fact,
Washington has already conceded as much through its common law
and the enactment of a Natural Death Act that acknowledges and
effectuates the rights of adult persons to refuse treatment, including the
right of terminally ill or permanently unconscious individuals to refuse
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment through living wills and durable
powers of attorney.7 3 The court stated: "In light of [these commonlaw and statutory developments], opponents of physician-assisted
suicide must now explain precisely what it is about the physician's
conduct in assisted suicide cases that distinguishes it from the conduct
that the state has explicitly authorized."'174 Thus, the key to the Ninth
Circuit decision is the majority's view that no ethical or constitutional
difference exists between a physician pulling the plug on a ventilator
and a physician writing a prescription so that a terminally ill individual
can end her own life. 5 In fact, the court even questioned whether the
latter should be classified as "suicide.
Having equated the various forms of "hastening death," the
majority summarily rejected the contention that legalization of
physician-assisted death will lead to exploitation of the poor and
minorities. The court labeled this contention "disingenuous" and
"fallacious,"' 7 7 and in doing so, appeared to understate the very real
risks that numerous commentators, even those in favor of physicianassisted death, have recognized. Finally, in its analysis of possible
state interests in banning assisted suicide, the court rejected the view
that allowing physicians to assist in suicides would threaten the
integrity of the medical profession. The court again built on the
172. See id. at 820.
173. See id. at 817-18 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996)).
174. Id. at 822.
175. See id. at 824. The court states that no valid legal foundation exists for drawing
a distinction on the basis of whether the individual's death results from the underlying

disease or from a lethal dose of medication. See id. at 822.
176. See id. at 824.
177. Id. at 825.
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premise that, through the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and
the administration of pain medications that can themselves cause
death, physicians already hasten their patients' deaths 7 in ways that
cannot be distinguished from physician-assisted suicide.
The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that when a mentally
competent, terminally ill individual wishes to hasten his death, that
person's liberty interest is at its height and the State's interest in
preserving the individual's life is at its nadir. 179 Given this, the
balancing of interests required under a substantive due process analysis
weighs heavily in favor of the individual, leading to the conclusion
that Washington's ban on assisted suicide is unconstitutional as applied
to terminally ill, competent individuals who wish to hasten their deaths
with prescription medication.180 In reaching this conclusion, the court
acknowledged that additional questions are raised, such as whether a
state can constitutionally prevent the non-terminally ill from using
physician-assisted suicide, and whether a state can constitutionally
limit assisted suicide to the writing of a prescription, as opposed to the
administration of a lethal injection.' 8 ' The court, not surprisingly, left
those questions for another day but hinted that it might draw the line
82
between voluntary and involuntary termination of a person's life.
This of course signals the very real possibility of future judicial
expansion of the constitutional right to die.
In contrast to the majority opinion, the primary dissenting
opinion, authored by Judge Beezer, 8 1 took a traditional due process
approach to the question and concluded that mentally competent,
terminally ill individuals do not have a fundamental right to physicianassisted suicide. 8 4 He applied a rational basis test to Washington's
178. See id. at 828-29.
179. See id. at 837.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 831. The court also discusses the Lee v. Oregon case and states that
Judge Hogan erred in declaring Oregon's statute to be unconstitutional. See id. at 837-38;
see also supranote 86 (discussing the procedural history of Lee in the Ninth Circuit and the
clear error involved in Judge Hogan's analysis).
182. See id. at 831-32 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
183. Judge Fernandez joined Judge Beezer's dissent with the caveat that Fernandez
did not find even a nonfundamental liberty interest in assisted suicide in the Constitution.
See id. at 857. Judge Kleinfeld joined Judge Beezer's dissent with two caveats: he doubted
the existence of any constitutional protection for assisted suicide and he would go further
than Judge Beezer in denouncing the majority's view that there is no constitutional or ethical
difference between the provision of medication for pain relief and the provision of
medication to cause death. See id at 857-58.
184. See id. at 845-49.
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statute and found that the State has sufficiently legitimate interests in
preserving life and preventing suicide to justify its ban on assisted
suicide.18 5
Following the announcement of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Compassionin Dying, the State of Washington quickly announced that
it would petition the Supreme Court for review. 186 The certiorari
petition was delayed, however, by a request from the court that the
parties submit briefs addressing whether the entire twenty-five-judge
court should rehear the case. 8 7 The court ultimately denied further
review,188 clearing the way for an appeal to the Supreme Court.
3.

New York

The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its consideration of the thorny
issue of physician-assisted death. Much has occurred in other venues
in which this battle is being fought. Shortly after Judge Rothstein's
decision in Washington, three terminally ill patients and their
physicians 89 filed suit in federal district court in Manhattan seeking to
have New York's criminal prohibition on assisted suicide declared
unconstitutional."9° The lawsuit was filed, in part, to counteract an
influential 1994 report by the New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law, which recommended against legalizing physician-assisted
suicide in New York by a unanimous vote of its twenty-four92
members.' 9' That the facts and legal issues raised in Quill v. Koppell
185. See id. at 851-55. He similarly finds that the statute survives equal protection
analysis because the state may rationally distinguish between death through the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment and death by prescription medication. See id. at 856-57.
186. See 5 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 479 (Mar. 28, 1996).
187. See Carol M. Ostrom, Suicide Issue May Be Reheard-9th Circuit Asks for
Briefs in Case, SEATrLE TImES, Mar. 28, 1996, at B3. A judge or judges on the Ninth
Circuit evidently made the request. See id.
188. See Assisted-Suicide Ruling Blocked, SEATrLETIMES, May 30, 1996, at B2.
189. One of the physician plaintiffs is Dr. Timothy Quill. For a discussion of Dr.
Quill's experience with physician-assisted suicide, see infra Part II.A.4.
190. See Ronald Sullivan, Suit ChallengesNew York's Law Banning Doctor-Assisted
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1994, at B3.
191. See Timothy E. Quill, The Care ofLast Resort, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1994, at 9;
see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F3d 586, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en
banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65
U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110) (describing the genesis of the Task Force
and its composition); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Panel Tells Albany to Resist Legalizing Assisted
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at Al. The task force, which reported to Governor
Cuomo, concluded that legalized assisted suicide would benefit a few individuals but that
the risk of widespread abuse outweighed any benefits. See Rosenthal, supra,at Al.
192. 870 F Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d
Cir. 1996), cert. granted,64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
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are virtually identical to those of Compassion in Dying is not
surprising given that the Compassion in Dying Organization funded
the New York challenge and the same attorney represented the
plaintiffs in both actions. 193 The only significant difference at the
district court level was the outcome.
Chief Judge Griesa's opinion in Quill reads like a mirror image of
Judge Rothstein's in Compassion in Dying. Where she found a
constitutionally protected right to assisted suicide, 194 he found a long
tradition of state criminalization of such activities.1 95 Where she found
Casey to be practically prescriptive on the question,196 he read Casey to
be limited to abortion rights cases.' 97 Where she found a violation of
equal protection,' 98 he found a rational basis for states to distinguish
between the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted
suicide.1 99

After a lengthy delay, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals this
year issued its opinion in the Quill case, holding New York's statute to
be unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibits a physician from
prescribing a lethal dose of medication to competent, terminally ill
individuals. 2°° But the Second Circuit's reasoning differed significantly
from both Judge Rothstein's and the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinions
in Compassion in Dying. The opinion, written by Judge Miner and
joined by Judge Pollack, 20 ' explicitly rejected the notion that
individuals have a fundamental constitutional right to assisted suicide.
The court noted that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand
the list of fundamental substantive due process rights, and concluded
193. See id.
194. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110).
195. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83-84.
196. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459.
197. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 83.
198. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
199. See Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84-85.
200. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted,64 U.S.L.W. 3795
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
201. Judge Guido Calabresi concurred in the result but wrote separately to explain his
reasoning. See id. at 731 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Judge Calabresi took the position that
New York's statute is constitutionally suspect under both due process and equal protection
analysis but that it is not clearly invalid. See id. at 738. He would therefore strike down the
statute while leaving open the possibility of reconsideration if the state were to come
forward with current and clearly expressed policy statements in support of the statutory ban
on assisted suicide. See id.
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that a right to assisted suicide is neither implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty nor deeply rooted in our country's traditions and
202
history.

Instead, the Second Circuit grounded its holding in equal
protection. Because the court viewed New York's statute as falling
within the category of social-welfare legislation, it subjected the
statutory ban to rational basis scrutiny.20 3 Despite the deferential
nature of this standard of review, the court found the statute to be
constitutionally infirm by comparing the different ways in which the
state treats the terminally ill who wish to die by withdrawing lifesustaining treatment and those who wish to die through the use of
prescription medication. In the case of the former, New York allows
individuals to refuse or withdraw life support under common-law
authority as well as statutory authority providing for Do-NotResuscitate (DNR) orders and the appointment of health care
proxies. 204 In contrast, New York's statute criminalizing assistance in
suicide effectively prevents terminally ill individuals who are not
dependent on life support from similarly hastening their deaths
through the use of prescription drugs. 2 5 Having found that the State
treats similarly situated groups of people differently, the court went on
to conclude that the different treatment is not rationally related to any
legitimate state interest.206 In the court's view, the State cannot
rationally take a greater interest in preserving the lives of one group as
compared to the other. In addition, physicians are not fulfilling the
role of "killer" by prescribing drugs to hasten death any more than they
are by disconnecting life-sustaining treatment. Furthermore, the risks
of psychological pressure and undue influence are not higher in one
group as opposed to the other.207 In effect, the court concluded that
one form of hastening death is equivalent to the other;208 therefore, the
State cannot authorize one and prohibit the other, particularly when
doing so operates to the detriment of a similarly situated group of
terminally ill individuals.

202. See id. at 723-25.
203. See id. at 726-27.
204. See id. at 727-28.
205. See id. at 729.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 729-30.
208. The Second Circuit took the view that death by the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment and death by prescription medication are both artificial-neither comes about as
the natural result of the patient's disease. See id. at 729.
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The constitutional landscape on the issue of physician-assisted
death has become increasingly complex. The various courts that have
taken up the, issue have applied virtually every possible mode of
constitutional analysis and have reached varied conclusions. For
example, in taking the position that a complete ban on assisted suicide
is unconstitutional, Judge Rothstein applied Casey's undue-burden
analysis and found a substantive due process violation; 2°9 the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en bane, applied a "continuum" and balancing analysis
and found a substantive due process violation; 210 the Second Circuit
applied a traditional analysis and found no substantive due process
violation but did find an equal protection violation under rational basis
review;21 ' and Judge Wright of the original Ninth Circuit panel found a
fundamental right and used strict scrutiny to strike the statute. 2' 2 On
the other hand, in taking the position that such bans do not violate the
Constitution, Judge Griesa applied traditional Fourteenth Amendment
analysis and found no substantive due process or equal protection
violations, 213 as did the majority in the original Ninth Circuit panel, the
dissents in the Ninth Circuit en banc decision, and the majority in the
Michigan Supreme Court decision. 4
Perhaps the confusion over the proper mode of constitutional
analysis is not all that surprising. The proper choice among Cruzan's
liberty-interest with rationality review analysis, Casey's undue-burden
standard, traditional fundamental-rights analysis with strict scrutiny, or
something in between is neither easy nor obvious. The answer likely
turns on the extent to which the Supreme Court's opinion in Casey
signaled a fundamental shift in substantive due process jurisprudence
generally, as opposed to a constitutional middle ground intended for
the issue of abortion alone. Regardless, the stage was clearly set for
209. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 R Supp. 1454, 1464-65 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 E3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 .3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996)
(No. 96-110).
210. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110).
211. See Quill, 80 F.3d at 716.
212. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F3d at 790.
213. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 82-84 (S.D.N.Y 1994), rev'd sub nom.
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996)
(No. 95-1858).
214. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995);
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 790; People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994),
cert.denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
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Supreme Court review, and on October 1, 1996, the Court granted
certiorari in both the Compassion in Dying and Quill cases.215 The
direction the Court takes in deciding whether terminally ill individuals
have a constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted death may
determine
the course of substantive due process analysis for years to
216
come.

It is thus almost impossible to overstate the importance of the
pending constitutional challenges to statutes that legalize or
criminalize physician-assisted death. Yet, having said that, I propose
to leave the reading of the Supreme Court tea leaves to others, 217 and
move on to an issue that has received less attention but is no less
important. Whatever the outcome of the pending litigation, one thing
is clear: the Supreme Court will be asked to consider the question of
assisted death in a medical context, and physicians and the medical
profession will figure prominently in the ultimate decision. The
remainder of this Article is devoted to an exploration of the
significance of physician involvement in assisted death-for
physicians and for society.
Il.

THE PNYsICiAN's ROLE: T-E MEDICAL PERsPEcnvE

The current climate is in a tremendous state of flux. Virtually
every state in the union is dealing with the issue of physician-assisted
death, either through legislative bills designed to criminalize or
legalize these activities; grassroots initiatives such as Initiative 119,218

215. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110); Quill v. Vacco, 80 E3d 176 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S.

Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
216. The probable outcome is difficult to predict, particularly given the dramatic
change in the makeup of the Supreme Court over the last four years. Since the 5-4 decision
in Cruzan in 1990, Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun have retired and
Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer have joined the Court.
217. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a

Wonderful Life?, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 519, 545-80 (1995); Carl H. Coleman & Tracy E.
Miller, Stemming the Tide: Assisted Suicide and the Constitution, 23 J.L. MED. & EThics
389 (1995); Kreimer, supra note 3; Edward J. Larson, Seeking Compassion in Dying: The
Washington State Law Against Assisted Suicide, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 509 (1995); Kathryn
L. Tucker & David J. Burman, Physician Aid in Dying: A Humane Option, a
Constitutionally Protected Choice, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 495 (1995); Willard C. Shih,
Note, Assisted Suicide, the Due Process Clause and "Fidelityin Translation,"63 FoRD-AM
L. REV. 1245 (1995).
218. See Initiative 119.
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Proposition 161,2"9 and Ballot Measure 16;2° task forces and
commissions called upon to study the issue; or court challenges to the
constitutionality of assisted-suicide statutes. Despite the rapidly
changing legal and societal landscape, however, there is one constant.
Every public debate over assisted death-every initiative, proposition,
legislative bill, task force recommendation, and court decisionoperates under the singular assumption that physicians and the medical
profession are the only possible providers of this "service."
Even the way commentators discuss assisted death reflects this
assumption. In years past, scholars on the subject wrote and spoke of
"voluntary euthanasia." That term is rapidly being replaced with the
phrase "physician-assisted suicide."
This shift in rhetoric to
emphasize physician involvement is neither accidental nor
insignificant. It is symbolic of the fact that we can no longer imagine
assisted death outside of a medical context. One way to explore this
"medicalization" of assisted death is to view it through the eyes of the
medical profession.
A.

Defining Events in Medicine

"I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor
will I make a suggestion to this effect. 2 2 ' These words have survived
to the present day as part of the Oath of Hippocrates, the starting point
for every medical ethics code written since."' Those who invoke the
Oath of Hippocrates on this issue usually do so to emphasize that the
prohibition against physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia has stood
for thousands of years.223 But because a number of the Oath's
mandates have not been carried forward into present day codes, and
are in fact disregarded by the profession,224 attempts to use the Oath as
219. See Proposition 161.
220. See ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.895 (1995).
221. LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH:
INTERPRETATION 3 (Henry Sigerist ed., 1943).

TEXT, TRANSLATION,

AND

222. See Ben A. Rich, Postmodern Medicine: Deconstructing the HippocraticOath,

65 U. CoLo.L. REv. 77, 86 & n.48 (1993). Several historians have taken the position that
the Oath was not the product of the Greek physician Hippocrates but rather was written by
members of the Pythagorean cult sometime after Hippocrates' death. See id. at 88. They
argue that the proscriptions against euthanasia and abortion are inconsistent with the
prevailing attitudes among physicians and the public at the time of Hippocrates. See id.
223. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 1844 (stating that the prohibition against
assisting in patients' deaths has been with us "from the time of Hippocrates").
224. For example, many physicians do not comply with the extensive filial and
financial obligations toward fellow medical practitioners and the covenants to refrain from
performing abortions and surgery that are set out in the Hippocratic Oath. See EDELSTEIN,
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binding authority on the issues of physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia are problematic. Proponents of assisted death have gone so
far as to argue that the Hippocratic Oath is anachronistic and of little
relevance to the practice of medicine today.22' As a result, much of the
debate within the profession over physician-assisted suicide revolves
more around current conceptions of the healing role than around the
literal words of Hippocrates.226
Physicians form their attitudes and opinions about such issues as
assisted death within the discourse of the medical profession. As a
group, they are "professionalized" to respond to individuals within the
ranks and to resist demands from those outside. It is thus not
surprising that for years the organized profession held fast to its
position against euthanasia2 27 and ignored entreaties by Derek
Humphry and the Hemlock Society for physicians to take an active
role in helping their patients achieve "dignified" deaths. It was only
when physicians themselves began to question the healer's role and
rethink the issue of assisted death that the medical profession as a
whole finally entered into the public discourse on physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia. The defining events in this process of
reevaluation are recorded in the pages of the preeminent medical
journals, where physicians have described their own experiences with

supra note 221, at 3. The only provisions of the Oath that appear in all modem codes of
medical professional responsibility are the prohibitions against having sexual relations with
patients and those against disclosing patient confidences. See Rich, supra note 222, at 90.
225. See, e.g., Richard L. Brown, Euthanasia Debate [Letter], 323 JAMA 1771,
1771-72 (1990) (arguing that the medical profession's resistance to euthanasia reflects the
anachronistic values of the Hippocratic Oath); Herbert S. Gross, Euthanasia Debate
[Letter], 323 JAMA 1770 (1990) (stating that the distinction between healing and killing
that was clear to Hippocrates is anachronistic).
226. Dr. Thomas Preston persuasively argues that physicians' perceptions of their
proper roles are based more on professional training and socialization than they are on
professional codes of ethics. See Thomas A. Preston, ProfessionalNorms and Physician
Attitudes, 22 J.L. MED. & ETfI-cS 36, 39 (1994). He contends, moreover, that medical codes
of ethics have historically reflected self-serving professional interests rather than patients'
interests, making them poor guides for present-day discussions of medical ethics. See id.
227. The American Medical Association (AMA) has historically taken a position
against euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Despite the current debate, the AMAs
position has not changed. See COUNCIL ON ETICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS wrrH ANNOTATIONS

§§ 2.21, 2.211 (1994) (stating that physicians should not engage in euthanasia or physicianassisted suicide, but rather should provide dying patients with emotional support, comfort
care, and pain control); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical
Association, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2233 (1992) (stating that
"[pihysicians must not perform euthanasia or participate in assisted suicide").
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assisted death and their colleagues have responded, provoking a
vigorous debate.
1. "It's Over, Debbie"
The first in this series of reevaluations was an account written by
an anonymous gynecology resident and published in the Journalof the
American MedicalAssociationin 1988. In condensed form, the author
told the following story:
The call came in the middle of the night. As a gynecology resident
rotating through a large, private hospital, I had come to detest
telephone calls, because invariably I would be up for several hours and
would not feel good the next day. However, duty called, so I answered
the phone. A nurse informed me that a patient was having difficulty
getting rest, could I please see her....
I grabbed the chart from the nurses station on my way to the
patient's room, and the nurse gave me some hurried details: a twentyyear-old girl named Debbie was dying of ovarian cancer... Hmmm, I
thought. Very sad. As I approached the room I could hear loud,
labored breathing. I entered and saw an emaciated, dark-haired woman
who appeared much older than twenty.... The room seemed filled
with the patient's desperate effort to survive. Her eyes were hollow,
and she had suprastemal and intercostal retractions with her rapid
inspirations. She had not eaten or slept in two days.... It was a
gallows scene, a cruel mockery of her youth and unfulfilled potential.
Her only words to me were, "Let's get this over with."
I retreated with my thoughts to the nurses station. The patient was
tired and needed rest. I could not give her health, but I could give her
rest. I asked the nurse to draw 20 mg of morphine sulfate into a
syringe. Enough, I thought, to do the job. I took the syringe into the
room ....Debbie looked at the syringe, then laid her head on the
pillow with her eyes open, watching what was left of the world. I
injected the morphine intravenously and watched to see if my
calculations on its effects would be correct. Within seconds her
breathing slowed to a normal rate, her eyes closed, and her features
softened as she seemed restful at last.... I waited for the inevitable
next effect of depressing the respiratory drive. With clocklike
certainty, within four minutes the breathing slowed even more, then
became irregular, then
ceased....
228
It's over, Debbie.

228. It's Over,Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
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The medical profession's reaction to this account was swift and
extremely critical.229 In a scathing commentary, several well-known
physicians and academicians condemned the resident's actions as
criminal, unprofessional, and unethical.230 Their criticism centered
first on the way in which the act was done. The resident had never
seen or conversed with this patient before, had not studied her chart, or
spoken with her attending physician or family.231 To make matters
worse, the physician did not talk with the patient or ask her to explain
her ambiguous statement, but instead interpreted her words as a plea
for death and then acted upon those words seemingly without
hesitation.232 The commentators labeled the resident "an impulsive yet
cold technician,233arrogantly masquerading as a knight of compassion
and humanity."
Some physician commentators saw this incident as much more
than an isolated illegal and unethical act by a member of the
profession. In their view, the resident's actions and the Journal of the
American Medical Association's willingness to publish the story
without editorial criticism or comment put "[t]he very soul of medicine
... on trial."2 34 They argued that the moral center of medicine, the
ethical canon that "doctors must not kill," was at stake,235 and they
urged physicians to take up the gauntlet by proclaiming to society that

229. Early responsive letters from physicians to the Journalof the American Medical
Association ran against the actions of the resident by a ratio of four to one, but later letters
ran strongly in favor. See George D. Lundberg, 'It's Over Debbie' and the Euthanasia
Debate, 259 JAMA 2142, 2142 (1988).
230. See Willard Gaylin et al., 'Doctors Must Not Kill,' 259 JAMA 2139, 2139
(1988).
231. See id.
232. See id. The resident appeared to assume that he or she had given a lethal dose of
morphine that would inevitably cause the patient's death. One physician attempted to justify
the resident's actions by suggesting that 20 mg of morphine is not unquestionably a lethal
dose so that the resident may have been attempting to relieve pain rather than kill. See
Kenneth L. Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mercy Killing and the Good Death, 259 JAMA 2140,
2140 (1988).
233. Gaylin et al., supra note 230, at 2139.
234. Id. They roundly criticized the Journal's editor for shielding the author from
criminal action by withholding his or her name. See id. The editorial staff responded by
arguing that publication was appropriate in order to provoke responsible debate over
euthanasia within the profession and society. See Lundberg, supranote 229, at 2142.
235. See Gaylin et al., supra note 230, at 2140. According to the authors, Western
medicine since Hippocrates' time has regarded the intentional killing of patients, even with
their consent, as a violation of one of the fundamental canons of the medical profession. See
id. at 2139.
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"it [would] have to find
if it chose to tolerate euthanasia,
' 236
nonphysicians to do its killing.
Other responses were more subdued, condemning this particular
act but questioning whether there might not be a role for assisted
suicide or euthanasia under different circumstances. For example, one
bioethicist argued that throughout the centuries of medical practice, an
allowance for "exceptional-case" active euthanasia for the relief of
suffering has existed alongside the principle proscribing such
actions. 7
2.

The Council of Twelve

The next defining event occurred in 1989 when a group of twelve
highly respected physicians, brought together by the Society for the
Right to Die, produced a report on physicians' responsibility toward
"hopelessly ill patients.' 238 The authors intended the report to provide
a comprehensive examination of current clinical practices affecting the
care of dying patients; physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia were
but two of many topics they took up. 239 In the course of their
discussion, the physicians drew two immensely important conclusions.
First, they agreed that under certain rare circumstances, a terminally ill
patient's wish to end his or her life may be rational. 24° Second, a
majority of the physicians concluded that it was "not immoral" for a
physician to assist a rational, terminally ill person in committing
suicide. 241 As they explained in a subsequent editorial letter, the
236. Id. at 2140.
237. See Vaux, supra note 232, at 2141.
238. See Wanzer et al., supra note 1. This same group of twelve wrote a report five
years earlier on the same subject. See Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's
Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients,310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984).
239. Among the other subjects covered were the importance of discussions between
physicians and their patients about the dying process, the utility of advance directives in
directing care, the need to better educate medical students and residents in the care of the
dying, the ways in which pain control for the terminally ill could be improved, and possible
settings for death such as home, nursing home, and hospital. See Wanzer et. al., supra note
1, at 844-47.
240. See id. at 848. According to the authors, proper care at the end of life should
make the desire to commit suicide rare. See id. at 847. Their vision of a rational suicide is
one in which the terminally ill individual does not suffer from a treatable depression and
where health-care providers and family have done everything possible to relieve the
individual's pain and distress, and yet the person still perceives the situation as intolerable
and seeks to die. See id. at 847-48.
241. See id. at 848. Ten of the twelve physicians took this position. See id. The
report also discusses euthanasia, in which the physician would perform the final act that
causes death, but the authors did not take a position on the morality of such conduct. See id.
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choice of the "not immoral" language was deliberate because the
authors could
not agree that such actions could be described as
242
"ethical."

Even though the authors had intended to stimulate discussion on
a broad range of issues related to the care of the dying, almost all of the
readers who responded spoke exclusively to the issues of physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia. 243 One individual, despite disagreeing
with the authors' position, called the article "a landmark that clearly
identifies a change in physicians' attitudes toward the helplessly
sick." 244 The American Medical Association responded with a
position paper justifying the longstanding medical tradition (and the
American Medical Association position) against physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia, arguing that such actions are fundamentally
inconsistent with physicians' primary role as healers. 245
3.

Jack Kevorkian

At about the time that physicians as a group were beginning to
seriously grapple with the professional and societal questions posed by
assisted death, Jack Kevorkian burst onto the scene. 246 His actions
posed particular problems for the medical profession. On the one
hand, he seemed an unusual individual with some rather bizarre
ideas247 who appeared to glory in the media attention each time he
at 848-49. They did note that the likelihood of prosecution for euthanasia is much higher
than for physician-assisted suicide, thus leading to additional deterrence among physicians.
See id. at 849.
242. Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill
Patients [Letter], 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 975, 978 (1989). According to the authors, an
ethical action is one that "would conform to professionally endorsed principles and
standards." Id.
243. See The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients[Letters], 321
NEw ENG. J. MED. 975-78 (1989).
244. James R. Boyce, The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients
[Letter], 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 976 (1989).
245. See Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 1844-45. This article also provoked a good
deal of discussion. See Physician Participationin Assisted Suicide [Letters], 263 JAMA
1197-98 (1990).
246. See supranote 89 and accompanying text.
247. Kevorkian's now famous proposals include using death row inmates for medical
experiments and organ donations, and transfusing blood directly from dead soldiers, into the
nearby wounded on the battlefield. See Belkin, supra note 89, at Al. More recently, he
attempted to put together an exhibition of Hitler's paintings to raise money for charity. See
Kevorkian and HitlerArt, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at B7. Kevorkian later clarified that
what he had attempted to organize was an exhibition of artwork by three World War II
leaders-Winston Churchill, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Adolf Hitler. See Kevorkian
Explains Ideafor HitlerArtShow, N.Y. TMES, May 22, 1994, at 24.
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used his "suicide machine" or carbon monoxide contraption. 241 On the
other hand, he was a licensed member of the medical profession.249
There seems little doubt that if Jack Kevorkian had not had an "M.D."
after his name, physicians, and the general public for that matter,
would have dismissed him out of hand as a dangerous extremist. But,
Kevorkian was shrewd enough to capitalize on the respect and
credibility that are accorded someone with a medical degree by
repeatedly contextualizing his actions as those of a physician, 250 and by
framing assisted suicide as a purely medical act72'
As Kevorkian attempted to place his actions solidly within the
medical sphere, the medical profession responded by disowning him.
This was a two-step process; the first step took place when physicians
universally condemned his actions,25 the second when Kevorkian was
248. See Kevorkian Details His Role in Suicide, N.Y. T MES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 28
(describing in detail Kevorkian's use of carbon monoxide to assist an individual to die).
Kevorkian was forced to turn to carbon monoxide after Michigan state officials revoked his
license to practice medicine, thus depriving him of access to the pharmaceutical agents
needed to operate his suicide machine. See Kevorkian, Pushingfor Jail,Aids in Suicide in
His Home, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, at 8.
249. Kevorkian is a retired pathologist who received his medical degree from the
University of Michigan. See Belkin, supranote 89, at Al.
250. See, e.g., Geoffrey Nels Fieger, Kevorkian's Crusade,N.Y TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1993,
at A33 (containing a statement by Kevorkian's lawyer that "'Jack is a physician first and
foremost"'); Kevorkian Takes Stand in Own Defense, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at A16
(quoting Kevorkian, "[a]ny physician who is a real physician would care for nothing,
nothing, nothing other than the welfare of his patient"); id. (quoting Kevorkian, "I didn't
want Mr. Hyde to die, just as a surgeon doesn't want to cut off a leg"); Don Terry, Kevorkian
Assists in Death of His 17th Suicide Patient, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at A14 (quoting
Kevorkian, "Iwill always [help] when a patient needs me").
251. See, e.g., Doctors Offer Some Support to Kevorkian, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995,
at A21 (quoting one doctor as saying, "I'his is a medical matter-solely"); Kevorkian
Details His Role in Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 7, 1993, at 28 (noting that Kevorkian has
always insisted that assisted suicide is a medical rather than a legal issue); Kevorkian Is
Charged Again with Aiding a Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at A18 (quoting
Kevorkian, "[t]he only people qualified to regulate this are medical men. This is solely a
medical matter..."); Kevorkian's BallotDrive on Suicide Aid Stumbles, N.Y TIMES, July 6,
1994, at A14 (quoting Kevorkian, "[t]his is a medical issue, but again religion is sticking its
nose into a secular right"); Jack Lessenberry, In Latest Suicide Trial, Kevorkian Asserts
'Dutyas a Doctor' N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1996, at 10 (quoting Kevorkian, "[m]y intent was to
carry out my duty as a doctor and to end their suffering").
252. See Marcia Angell, Don't CriticizeDr Death ... , N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1990, at
A27 (noting that the criticism of Kevorkian "is nearly universal"); Altman, supra note 10, at
C3 (stating that "[flew if any doctors have voiced support for Dr. Kevorkian's action");
Christine K. Cassel & Diane E. Meier, Morals and Moralism in the Debate Over
Euthanasiaand Assisted Suicide, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 750, 750 (1990) (remarking that
physicians, lawyers, and ethicists uniformly expressed their disapproval of Kevorkian's
actions and his suicide machine).
In an interesting twist, a small group of Michigan physicians, calling themselves the
"Physicians for Mercy," recently allied themselves with Jack Kevorkian in his battle for
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literally disenfranchised from the profession of medicine.253 This
process of disowning Kevorkian created philosophical difficulties for
those physicians who found his actions abhorrent but who supported
the concepts of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Their
response was to distance themselves from Kevorkian, but to continue
the argument that society must not lose sight of "the profound and
genuine suffering and legitimate
wish for release that motivates some
' '214
suicide.
consider
to
patients
4.

Dr. Timothy Quill

If the medical profession distanced itself from Jack Kevorkian, it
positively embraced Timothy Quill. Dr. Quill catapulted onto center
stage on the issue of physician-assisted suicide when on March 7,
1991, The New England Journal of Medicine published Quill's
narrative of his role in the death of one of his patientsY s In condensed
form, Quill told the following story:
Diane was feeling tired and had a rash. A common scenario, though
there was something subliminally worrisome that prompted me to
check her blood count. Her hematocrit was 22, and the white-cell
count was 4.3 with some metamyelocytes and unusual white cells....
I called Diane and told her it might be more serious than I had initially
physician-assisted death. See Small Group of Doctors Supports Concept of Assisting in
Suicides, N.Y. TnIES, Oct. 31, 1995, at A20. They have since developed a set of guidelines
which would require that a mentally competent patient seeking assisted death consult several
physicians, including a psychiatrist, a specialist in the patient's disease, and a specialist in
pain management. See Doctors Offer Some Support to Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1995, at A21. If the consulting doctors agreed that physician-assisted suicide was
appropriate under the circumstances, a qualified physician "obitiatrist" would then assist the
individual to die. Id. The group endorses the term "patholysis," which signifies the relief of
suffering, for this process rather than the term "assisted suicide." Id. Earlier this year,
members of Physicians for Mercy joined Jack Kevorkian for the first time as he assisted the
suicide of a Canadian citizen. See Kevorkian Back at Trial as Talk of DetroitIs of Another
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996, at A16.
253. The Michigan Board of Medicine in 1991 suspended his license indefinitely,
making it illegal for Kevorkian to practice medicine in the state of Michigan. See Michigan
Board Suspends License of Doctor Who Aided in Suicides, N.Y. TwEs, Nov. 21, 1991, at
D22. Likewise, after a request by the California Medical Board, an administrative law judge
suspended Kevorkian's California medical license in 1993. See Doctor Who Aided Suicide
Loses License in California,N.Y. TIMFs, Apr. 28, 1993, at A13. As a result, Kevorkian is
no longer licensed to practice medicine anywhere in the United States.
254. Cassel & Meier, supra note 252, at 751.
255. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized
Decisionmaking, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991). Dr. Quill is Associate Professor of
Medicine and Psychiatry at the University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry in
Rochester, New York, where he was a hospice medical director for eight years. He also has
a primary care internal medicine practice at The Genesee Hospital in Rochester, New York.
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thought .... When she pressed for the possibilities, I reluctantly
opened the door to leukemia....
Diane was no ordinary person (although no one I have ever come to
know has been really ordinary). She was raised in an alcoholic family
and had felt alone for much of her life. She had vaginal cancer as a
young woman. Through much of her adult life, she had struggled with
depression and her own alcoholism. I had come to know, respect, and
admire her over the previous eight years as she confronted these
problems and gradually overcame them. She was an incredibly clear,
at times brutally honest, thinker and communicator. As she took
control of her life, she developed a strong sense of independence and
confidence....
The bone marrow confirmed the worst: acute myelomonocytic
leukemia. In the face of this tragedy, we looked for signs of hope.
This is an area of medicine in which technological intervention has
been successful, with cures 25 percent of the time .... As I probed the
costs of these cures, I heard about induction chemotherapy (three
weeks in the hospital, prolonged neutropenia, probable infectious
complications, and hair loss; 75 percent of patients respond, 25 percent
do not). For the survivors, this is followed by consolidation
chemotherapy .... Those still alive, to have a reasonable chance of
long-term survival, then need bone marrow transplantation ....
Though hematologists may argue over the exact percentages, they
don't argue about the outcome of no treatment-certain death in days,
weeks, or at most a few months.
Believing that delay was dangerous, our oncologist broke the news
to Diane and began making plans .... [S]he was enraged at his
presumption that she would want treatment, and devastated by the
finality of the diagnosis. All she wanted to do was go home and be
with her family. She had no further questions about treatment and in
fact had decided that she wanted none....
... She remained very clear about her wish not to undergo
chemotherapy and to live whatever time she had left outside the
hospital. As we explored her thinking further, it became clear that she
was convinced she would die during the period of treatment and would
suffer unspeakably in the process ....
Just as I was adjusting to her decision, she opened up another area
that would stretch me profoundly. It was extraordinarily important to
Diane to maintain control of herself and her own dignity during the
time remaining to her. When this was no longer possible, she clearly
wanted to die.... In our discussion, it became clear that preoccupation
with her fear of a lingering death would interfere with Diane's getting
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the most out of the time she had left until she found a safe way to
ensure her death.... I told Diane that information was available from
the Hemlock Society that might be helpful to her.
A week later she phoned me with a request for barbiturates for
sleep. Since I knew that this was an essential ingredient in a Hemlock
Society suicide, I asked her to come to the office to talk things over....
It was clear that she was not despondent and that in fact she was
making deep, personal connections with her family and close friends. I
made sure that she knew how to use the barbiturates for sleep, and also
that she knew the amount needed to commit suicide. We agreed to
meet regularly, and she promised to meet with me before taking her
life, to ensure that all other avenues had been exhausted. I wrote the
prescription with an uneasy feeling about the boundaries I was
exploring-spiritual, legal, professional, and personal....
The next several months were very intense and important for
Diane.... After three tumultuous months, there were two weeks of
relative calm and well-being, and fantasies of a miracle began to
surface.
Unfortunately, we had no miracle. Bone pain, weakness, fatigue,
and fevers began to dominate her life.... [1it was clear that the end
was approaching. Diane's immediate future held what she feared the
most-increasing discomfort, dependence, and hard choices between
pain and sedation.... When we met, it was clear that she knew what
she was doing, that she was sad and frightened to be leaving, but that
she would be even more terrified to stay and suffer. ....
Two days later her husband called to say that Diane had died. 6
Following publication of Diane's story, Quill became an
overnight celebrity. New York law enforcement officials initially
declined to prosecute him until an anonymous tip identified the
deceased as Patricia Diane Trumbull. 7 When an autopsy revealed the
presence of a lethal dose of barbiturates, a grand jury was impaneled to
consider whether to indict Dr. Quill on criminal charges of
intentionally assisting in a suicide." s The grand jury, after hearing
Quill testife 9 recommended against prosecution.2 60
256. Quill, supranote 255, at 691-93.
257. See William Glaberson, Panel to Decide: Should Doctor Who Aided SuicideBe
Tried?, N.Y TIMEs, July 22, 1991, at B1.
258. See id.

259. Quill waived his Fifth Amendment right and testified at the grand jury
proceeding. See Timothy E.Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57

ALB. L. REv. 693,705 (1994).
260. See Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He Aided

in a Suicide, N.Y TMEs, July 27, 1991, at 1. The New York State Board of Professional
Conduct also declined to discipline Quill for his actions. See Quill, supra note 259, at 706;
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Dr. Quill went public with his role in Diane's death in part to
present an alternative to the actions of Jack Kevorkian and his suicide
machine.26' The hallmarks of this setting-a clearly competent patient
with a certain diagnosis of a terminal illness, a longtern physicianpatient relationship, the deliberate and painstaking exploration of the
issue by patient and physician, and the family's involvement in the
decision-all served to differentiate this case from the Kevorkianassisted deaths, as well as the "It's Over, Debbie" scenario. Before
long, Dr. Quill was being hailed as having provided the paradigm for
responsible physician-assisted suicide.
B.

The Debatefrom Within

The anonymous gynecology resident, the Council of Twelve,
Jack Kevorkian, and Timothy Quill-these individuals have had a
profound effect on the discourse on assisted death. Their accounts,
recorded in the pages of the medical literature, have provoked wave
2 62
after wave of commentary from within the medical community.
These responsive arguments can usefully be divided into two
categories: those that address the broad substantive question of
whether to support assisted suicide and euthanasia, and those that deal
specifically with the proper role of the physician, if any, in assisted
death.
1.

Medical Perspectives on Assisted Death

The reasons for and against assisted death articulated in the
263
medical literature tend to mirror the broader debate within society.
Those in favor of assisted death base their support first on notions of
personal autonomy, contending that the right to request and receive
Lisa W. Foderaro, New York Will Not DisciplineDoctorfor His Role in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1991, at 25.
261. See QunLL, supra note 8, at 123-25; Glaberson, supra note 257, at Bi; see also
Jack P. Freer, Death andDignity: The Case of Diane [Letter], 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 658,
658 (1991) (stating that Dr. Quill provided a useful counterpoint to the Kevorkian and "It's
Over, Debbie" cases); Lawrence K. Altman, DoctorSays He Gave PatientDrug to Help Her
Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at Al (quoting Professor George Annas as
saying, "[t]he difference in the cases is like night and day because Dr. Quill's patient
received good care and she was long known to him").
262. One advantage of the medical literature over traditional legal literature such as
law reviews is that medical journals frequently contain "Letters to the Editor" sections where
individuals can critique and comment on recently published articles.
263. Because the general arguments for and against physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia have been dealt with extensively elsewhere, see supra note 8, my goal here is to
summarize those positions rather than examine them in great detail.
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assistance in ending one's own life is an essential element of personal
liberty and the right to self-determination.26 Implicit in this argument
is the view that there is no difference between the right to choose death
by refusal of life-sustaining treatment, already recognized as a moral
and legal right in this country, and the right to choose death through
more active means. 265 Second, proponents ground their support in
notions of mercy, arguing that it is inhumane to force an individual to
continue a life of unbearable suffering and pain.266 Proponents point
out that physician-assisted suicide occurs despite the prohibitions
against it;267 a more open and regulated process would produce a
higher level of accountability and limit its use to clearly appropriate
cases.268 They maintain that unless we give people facing intolerable
suffering some measure of control over the dying process, we will
continue to see the kinds of abuses exemplified by "It's Over, Debbie"
and the Kevorkian cases.269

264. See Robert I. Misbin, Physicians'Aid in Dying, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1307,
1308 (1991); Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1881.
265. See Marcia Angell, Euthanasia,319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1348, 1349-50 (1988);
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Ethics, 265 JAMA 3118, 3118-19 (1991); Preston, supra note 226,
at 37. Proponents of assisted death take the position that it is unjust to allow those who are
"fortunate" enough to be dependent on life-sustaining treatment to choose death by refusal
of treatment but to deny that same choice to those not dependent on some form of life
support. See Angell, supra, at 1350; Pellegrino, supra, at 3118-19.
266. See Angell, supra note 265, at 1349.
267. See Kenneth V. Iverson, Death and Dignity: The Case of Diane [Letter], 325
NEw ENG. J. MED. 659, 659 (1991) ("In discussing bioethics with groups of physicians, I
have rarely found a primary care clinician who has not helped a patient to die .... );
Wanzer et al., supra note 1, at 848 (asserting that physician-assisted suicide is not a rare
occurrence).
268. See Cassel & Meier, supra note 252, at 751. Physicians who support
legalization of physician-assisted death also generally support safeguards that would limit
such assistance to competent, terminally ill adults for whom comfort care and pain relief
have not succeeded in making life tolerable. See, e.g., Angell, supranote 265, at 1350; Guy
I. Benrubi, Euthanasia-TheNeed ForProceduralSafeguards,326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 197,
197-98 (1992); Franklin G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 119, 119 (1994). Timothy Quill rejects the notion that physician-assisted
suicide should be available only to the terminally ill. He would support its use in cases
where the individual is not terminally ill but suffers from an incurable, progressive disease.
See Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteriafor
Physician-AssistedSuicide, 327 NEwENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381-82 (1992).
269. See Cassel & Meier, supra note 252, at 750-51. Some have suggested that Janet
Adkins might not have taken her life so early in the course of her disease if she could have
been assured that she would receive assistance later as her condition deteriorated. See
Misbin, supra note 264, at 1308.
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In contrast, the opposition charges that assisted death represents
an assault on the sanctity of life,270 and they explicitly reject the
contention that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and assisted
death are medically and ethically indistinguishable.271 They warn that
assisted suicide and euthanasia threaten to send us down a slippery
slope in which human life is increasingly devalued.72 Further,
opponents of assisted death raise the concern that this devaluation will
be selective, operating against the weak and powerless in society to
produce involuntary euthanasia, 7 3 and that safeguards will not
adequately protect against this kind of abuse.274 They thus take the
position that the interests of the individual who is suffering and wants
to die must bow to a concern for other vulnerable members of society,
who might be euthanized without their consent or coerced into
consenting if the proscription against assisted death were relaxed. 275
Put simply, "the public good served by the prohibition of276
euthanasia
outweighs the private interests of the persons requesting it.

270. Proponents of euthanasia disagree, arguing that by effectuating selfdetermination, assisted death enhances rather than diminishes respect for life. See Angell,
supra note 265, at 1350.
271. See Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 96. Pellegrino distinguishes the two on the basis
that with withdrawal of treatment, the underlying disease kills the patient, whereas with
assisted death, the physician both intends and brings about the patient's death. See id.
272. See Angell, supra note 265, at 1348. For those individuals whose religious
beliefs dictate that life is a gift and that human beings are stewards rather than masters of
their bodies, assisted death is not just a slippery slope-it is a moral wrong in and of itself.
See Pellegrino, supra note 265, at 3119.
273. See Angell, supra note 265, at 1349; Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1882.
Drs. Singer and Siegler suggest four ways in which acceptance of voluntary euthanasia
might lead to involuntary euthanasia. First, individuals might be secretly euthanized without
their consent as allegedly happens in the Netherlands. Second, chronically ill or dying
patients could be pressured into consenting in order to relieve their families of financial or
emotional strain. Third, euthanasia would likely be extended to incompetent individuals
through the use of substituted judgment or benefits-and-burdens analysis. And fourth, the
poor, the elderly, the disabled and physically handicapped, and other vulnerable members of
society might be subtly coerced into consenting. See id. at 1882.
274. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Compassion Needs Reason Too, 270 JAMA 874, 874
(1993) ("[Assisted suicide and euthanasia] are not containable by placing legal limits on
their practice. Arguments to the contrary, the 'slippery slope' is an inescapable logical,
psychological, historical, and empirical reality."); Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 188283.
275. See Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1882 (using the Netherlands as an
example of this phenomenon).
276. Id.; see also Angell, supranote 265, at 1349.
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Medical Perspectives on the Physician's Role

Physicians and the organized medical profession have no
particular expertise on the general question of whether we as a society
should support or oppose assisted death. It is not surprising then that
the discourse within the medical community reflects the larger societal
debate. The real value of the dialogue between physicians becomes
apparent when one broaches the question of physician participation in
assisted death, because here physicians do have special expertise, as
well as immense personal and professional investments in the
resolution.
Members of the medical community appear to agree that the
primary goals of medicine are to preserve and sustain life and to
relieve pain and suffering.277 There is, however, a great deal less
agreement on the proper role of the physician when these two goals
come into conflict, as they arguably do when a terminally ill individual
is suffering and asks the physician to help him or her die. The medical
literature reveals a critical division among physicians on the question
whether giving assistance under these circumstances lies along the
medical continuum of providing compassionate care to dying patients
or whether, in fact, such assistance is antithetical to the physician's role
as healer. The question thus becomes whether the physician's role,
properly conceived, is broad enough to encompass assisted suicide and
euthanasia. The answers provided by physicians to this question are
remarkable in that they are almost mutually exclusive. This
fundamental difference in perspective is well-illustrated by a recent
exchange between two physicians. A representative of the American
Medical Association asserted that "[w]hat the sick need and are
entitled to seek from the efforts of physicians is health."278 A
colleague responded, "[s]ubstitute
the word help for health and the
' 279
phrase becomes universally apt.
On what foundation do the participants in this debate rest their
respective positions? A member of the medical community who
opposes physician involvement in assisted death would likely justify
that opposition as follows: Physicians throughout the ages have been
277. See Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 1844 (stating that "a physician provides
medical care for two reasons: to sustain life and to relieve suffering").
278. Id. at 1845 (emphasis added). He reasoned that treatment designed to produce
death does not heal and is therefore inconsistent with the physician's proper role. See id.
279. Frederick R. Abrams, PhysicianParticipationin Assisted Suicide [Letter], 263
JAMA 1197, 1197 (1990).
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healers first and foremost, in the same way that medicine has
traditionally been a healing art.280 Because physician-assisted death,
by definition, is not undertaken to heal the patient and in fact directly
contravenes the primary goals of medicine,81 physician participation
threatens the moral integrity of the profession.282 If the medical
community insists on endorsing such practices, the profession will
inevitably lose the trust and respect that society accords physicians on
the basis of their role as healers and protectors of life.283 Thus, as the
power to heal is expanded to include the power to "kill," patients will
come to fear their doctors.284
According to the opponents, because physician-assisted suicide
and euthanasia are inconsistent with the goals of medicine, the medical
profession is under no moral, ethical, or legal obligation to grant a
patient's request for assisted death.285 When the refusal to condone
such practices is grounded on valid professional and societal concerns,
such refusal does not indicate a lack of compassion on the part of
doctors. 286 Conversely, the fact that physician-assisted death is a
common practice among physicians, or the fact that their participation

is motivated by compassion, neither changes the nature of the
underlying act nor provides a convincing justification for its

commission. 287
280. Edmund Pellegrino describes medicine as a "healing relationship" in which the
physician restores the patient to health or assists the patient in coping with disability and
death where a cure is not possible. See Pellegrino, supranote 2, at 98.
281. See Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 1844.
282. See Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1883; Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 98.
283. See Ronald Anderson et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly
Ill Patients[Letter], 321 JAMA 975, 975 (1989) (stating that patients would no longer trust
or disclose their true feelings to physicians who actively terminate life); Gaylin et al., supra
note 230, at 2140; Sanford A. Marcus, The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill
Patients [Letter], 321 JAMA 978, 978 (1989) (arguing that society holds physicians in
esteem solely on the basis of their role as healers); Orentlicher, supra note 2, at 1845
(contending that assisted suicide would undermine the essential element of trust in the
patient-physician relationship); Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 98 (stating that the trust
relationship would be distorted if the healing function were expanded to include killing).
284. See Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 98. Pellegrino argues that a patient will never
know whether a physician's motivation for promoting euthanasia is because it is the best
option for the patient or because the physician devalues the patient's life and wants to
conserve scarce medical resources. See id.
285. See Frank J. Brescia et al., The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill
Patients [Letter], 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 977, 977 (1989); Orentlicher, supra note 2, at
1845.
286. See Myles N. Sheehan, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia [Letter], 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1436, 1436 (1991).
287. See Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 97-99.
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No one in the profession would deny the duty of the physician to
help the patient achieve a "good death." 288 But, opponents of assisted
death contend most individuals can experience a dignified dying
process with a minimum of pain and suffering without resort to
physician-assisted death.289 What these individuals need, according to
this view, is compassionate care with attention to pain relief and
emotional support-all things within the capabilities of physicians to
provide. Individuals in this country seek assisted death precisely
because medical professionals have failed to provide effective
supportive and palliative care to the dying.290 The solution to this
admittedly serious problem is not to promote assisted death, but rather
to demand that physicians improve pain control, provide adequate
comfort care, and make more appropriate use of life-sustaining
" ' To countenance physician-assisted suicide
treatments.29
now would
be nothing short of disastrous because it would eliminate the pressure
presently directed at the profession to improve its care of the dying.292
In contrast, a member of the medical community who supports
physician participation in assisted death might justify that position in
the following manner: For persons who are dying, "relieving
symptoms, enhancing control, and preserving dignity" ought to be the
primary goals of medicine.293 The concept of the physician as "healer"
under these circumstances clearly encompasses the obligation to
relieve a patient's suffering. 94 But in some rare instances, despite
adequate hospice and comfort-care management, individuals
experience intolerable pain and suffering that no amount of emotional
and pharmacological support can alleviate. 295 Or, in another scenario,
the individual may be faced with a choice between unbearable pain
288. See id.
at 97.
289. Proponents of this position claim that most pain can be adequately controlled
with analgesic agents. See Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1881.
290. See Joanne Lynn, Euthanasia[Letter], 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 119, 119 (1989).
291. See id.; Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1883.
292. See id.
293. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: The Case of Diane [Letter], 325 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 660,660 (1991).
294. See Preston, supra note 226, at 39.
295. See Quill, supra note 191, at 9. One physician described symptoms such as
shortness of breath, nausea, and feelings of helplessness in dying patients that analgesic
agents (pain relievers) did nothing to allay. See Richard Finley, EuthanasiaDebate [Letter],
323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1771, 1771 (1990). Others suggested that even the best terminal
care may not eliminate the loss of dignity that can accompany terminal illness. See Aaron
Spital & Max Spital, Euthanasia Debate [Letter], 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1771, 1771

(1990).
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and unacceptable levels of sedation caused by the pain medications.296
The physician who refuses to assist such a person to achieve a
dignified death through physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia
abandons the patient at his or her time of greatest need. Not only does
the physician abandon the patient, but she frequently does so under
circumstances where the physician is directly responsible, through the
use of medical technology that prolongs life, for bringing the patient to
this state of unbearable pain and suffering.297
When the goals of sustaining life and relieving suffering conflict,
it is for the patient to decide which goal medicine ought to serve,
according to proponents.298 Physicians need to be sensitive to the
meaning their patients ascribe to their lives and be prepared to assist
when dying a dignified and controlled death comes to mean more to
their patients than prolonging life.299 That physicians routinely ignore
their dying patients' wishes is symptomatic of physicians' seeming
inability to assist them through the dying process, either because the
physicians have not received proper training in the care of the dying, or
because they are unwilling to confront their own mortality, or both. °°
Whatever the cause, physicians risk a greater loss of trust if they
continue to hold patients hostage to technology than if they participate
in helping them to die. 30' Thus, unless the power to heal is expanded
to include the power to help, patients will come to fear not death, but
physicians.302
Despite the very different perceptions of those members of the
medical profession who support physician-assisted death and those
who oppose it, these two groups do share some common ground.
They agree that physicians' obligations to their dying patients are
substantial and include the professional and ethical duties to stay with
their patients through the dying process. They further agree that
physicians must do everything medically possible to minimize the
296. See Quill, supra note 255, at 693 (describing Diane's difficult choice between
pain and sedation).
297. See Benrubi, supra note 268, at 197-98 (asserting that through the use of
technological interventions such as chemotherapy and radiation therapy, physicians extend
patients' lives but also prolong their suffering).
298. See Abrams, supra note 279, at 1197. Or, as Preston puts it, 'qhe conflict
between the obligation to heal and the obligation to relieve suffering becomes one between
professional values and patients' values." Preston, supra note 226, at 39.
299. See Cassel & Meier, supranote 252, at 751.
300. See id.; Christine K. Cassel & Diane Meier, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
[Letter], 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1436, 1436-37 (1991).
301. See Preston, supranote 226, at 39.
302. See id.
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distress and discomfort of the terminally ill through the use of pain
management, palliative care, and emotional support." 3 And virtually
everyone involved concedes that the medical profession does not
adequately fulfill its obligations toward the dying, and in fact fails
miserably in some cases. 3" But, they differ strongly on the question of
how far a physician can and should go to discharge his or her duties to
a dying patient.
3.

Physician Survey Results

A survey conducted among 1355 randomly selected physicians in
the state of Washington illustrates this polarization on the issue of
physician-assisted death. 30 5 The study was designed to elicit
information on whether physicians believe that assisted suicide and
euthanasia are ethical, whether either or both should be legalized, and
whether physicians would be willing to participate in these practices. 3 6
The results of the survey are fascinating. Thirty-nine percent of
physicians agreed that physician-assisted suicide30 7 is never ethically
justified, while fifty percent disagreed with that statement.30 8

303. See Quill, supranote 191, at 9; Pellegrino, supra note 274, at 874; Wanzer et al.,
supra note I, at 847 (stating that "[t]o allow a patient to experience unbearable pain or
suffering is unethical medical practice").
304. See Singer & Siegler, supra note 1, at 1881-82. Physicians who undenise pain
relievers in the care of the dying may do so because of concerns about depressing respiration
or causing drug addiction. See id. at 1882.
305. See Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
Among Physiciansin Washington State, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 89 (1994).
306. See id. at 89. The survey authors selected potential respondents from a
Washington State Medical Association data base that included both members and
nonmembers of the Association. See id. Two hundred fifty physicians were randomly
selected from each of the specialties of general internal medicine, family practice, general
surgery, psychiatry, and a combination of other specialties. See id. In addition, 166
hematologists and oncologists were added to the survey sample. See id. Of these 1416
physicians, 1355 were found to be eligible for the study and of these, 938 responded, for a
response rate of 69%. See id. at 90. The survey consisted of 48 questions about the
characteristics of the respondents, attitudes about assisted suicide and euthanasia, views
about legalization, willingness to participate in assisted suicide or euthanasia, and views
about safeguards or restrictions. See id. Responses were recorded using a five-point scale,
ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Id. For reporting purposes, the five
response categories were collapsed into three: strongly agree or agree, neutral, and disagree
or strongly disagree. See id.
307. To avoid confusion, the authors of the study substituted the phrase "prescription
of medication [e.g., narcotics or barbiturates] or the counseling of an ill patient so he or she
may use an overdose to end his or her own life" for the term "physician-assisted suicide."
308. See id.
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Euthanasia 9 received a somewhat lower approval rating, with fortyeight percent agreeing that euthanasia is never ethically justified.10
On the question of legalization, just over fifty percent thought
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia should be legal under some
circumstances,311 but not all of those in favor of legalizing physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia would be willing to participate
themselves. Forty percent of respondents stated they would be willing
to assist a patient commit suicide, while thirty-three percent would be
willing to perform euthanasia.312
The majority who favored
legalization of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia also
expressed strong support for safeguards such as requiring an
independent witness to the patient's request, an established
relationship between physician and patient, two physicians who agree
on the proposed course, a waiting period between the request and the
assistance, and the exhaustion of available alternatives such as pain
control and hospice care before resort is made to assisted death.3 13
Respondents' attitudes about assisted death varied considerably
across specialties. Hematologists and oncologists, who as a group had
the most exposure to dying patients, were the most strongly opposed to
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. 314 In contrast, psychiatrists,
who as a group had the least exposure to dying patients, were the most
strongly in favor of the two practices.315 The study also revealed that
men were more likely than women to believe that assisted suicide is
unethical.316
The reasoning behind these positions closely tracks the
arguments set forth in the medical literature. A majority of those who
opposed assisted death considered it inconsistent with the physician's
proper role; a majority of supporters thought it entirely consistent with
309. To avoid confusion, the authors substituted the phrase "deliberate administration
of an overdose of medication to an ill patient at his or her request with the primary intent to
end his or her life" for the term "euthanasia." Id.
310. See id. Forty-two percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that
euthanasia is never ethically justified. See id
311. The numbers were 53% in favor of legalizing assisted suicide and 54% in favor
of legalizing euthanasia. See id. at 90-91.
312. See id.
313. Seeid. at92-93.
314. See id. at 93. The study's authors posited that hematologists and oncologists as a
group might believe that more effective use of treatments for pain and suffering would
eliminate the need for assisted death, See id.
315. Seeid.
316. See id. at 91. The significance of this finding is unclear since the study did not
reveal a gender difference on the ethics of euthanasia. See id.
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their role as physicians.317 Opponents expressed concerns over the
potential for abuse; proponents felt strongly that physicians should
respect patients' rights to self-deternination.1 8 Opponents viewed
currently available treatments as adequate to eliminate pain and
suffering; proponents disagreed.3 19
A recent survey of Michigan physicians yielded similar results.
Fifty-six percent of Michigan physicians expressed approval for a plan
to legalize physician-assisted death, 320 while thirty-five percent would
be willing to assist their patients to die.321 Interestingly, when
presented with an additional option of "no law," 322 a significant
percentage of physicians who had expressed support for a ban on
323
physician-assisted death shifted their support to the "no law" option,
suggesting that they would prefer that the legal system stay out of the
area altogether.
Another survey, of Oregon physicians, revealed a somewhat
higher level of physician approval and willingness to participate in
assisted suicide.324 Sixty-six percent responded that physician-assisted
suicide would be ethical in some circumstances, and sixty percent felt
that it should be legal in some cases. 32 Further, forty-six percent of
317. See id. at 91-92.
318. See id. at 92.
319. See id.
320. See Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physiciansand the Public
Toward Legalizing Physician-AssistedSuicide and Voluntary Euthanasia,334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 303, 306 (1996). These authors confined their survey to physicians who practiced
specialties that involve caring for patients with terminal or chronic illnesses. See id. at 304.
The response rate among eligible physicians was 74%. See id. at 306.
Similar to the Washington findings, physicians who had the least contact with
terminally ill patients were the most likely to support legalized assisted suicide. See id. at
308. Further, physicians' religious beliefs correlated strongly with their positions-those
who said religion was very important in their lives were the least likely to support physicianassisted death. See id.
321. See id. at 308. Contained within this 35% figure were 13% who would
participate only in assisted suicide and 22% who would participate in assisted suicide and
euthanasia. See id. at 306.
322. The "no law" options would either leave decisions about physician-assisted
death to the doctor-patient relationship or subject those decisions to guidelines or
regulations generated by the medical profession. See id. at 305 fig. 1.
323. See id. at 305 fig. 1 & 307.
324. See Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physiciansin
Oregon, 334 New ENG. J. MED. 310 (1996). This study surveyed physicians in the
specialties of internal medicine, family practice, general practice, neurology, gynecology,
therapeutic radiology, and surgery. See id. The response rate was 70% among eligible
physicians. See id. at 311.
325. See id. at 311 & 312 fig. 1. Because The Oregon Death with Dignity Act would
legalize only physician-assisted suicide and not euthanasia, the study's authors confined
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the physicians surveyed expressed a willingness to prescribe a lethal
dose of
medication under appropriate circumstances if it were legal to
32 6

do SO.

A subsequent survey of Washington physicians focused attention
on the extent to which they received requests from patients for
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia and their responses to those
requests. 327 The responses revealed that twenty-six percent of the
physicians had received requests from their patients for physicianassisted suicide or euthanasia.328 Physicians were then asked to
provide case information about the last two individuals who had made
such requests, including the physicians' responses. 329 Respondents
provided information about 207 individuals who had requested
physician-assisted death, and reported that they had provided a
prescription for a lethal dose of medication to twenty-four percent of
the patients who asked for physician-assisted suicide, and administered
a lethal injection to twenty-four percent of the individuals who
33
requested
In contrast,
in thepreviously
Oregon survey,
twenty-one
percent ofeuthanasia.
respondents0 reported
having
received
requests
their questions to Oregon physicians' beliefs about and participation in physician-assisted
suicide. See id. at 314.
Similar to the Michigan findings, physicians' unwillingness to participate in physicianassisted suicide was correlated with a Catholic or other Christian affiliation. See id. at 312.
But unlike the Michigan and Washington surveys, this one found no correlation between
specialty or rate of caring for the terminally ill and willingness to participate. See id.
326. See id. at 312 & fig. 2. Despite the fact that almost half of the physicians would
consider writing such a prescription, many expressed practical concerns about which drugs
to prescribe, whether they could recognize depression in their patients requesting assistance,
and whether they could accurately predict that those patients had less than six months to
live. See id. at 312-13.
327. See Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in
Washington State, 275 JAMA 919 (1996). The survey authors randomly selected 25% of
the state's family practice physicians and 25% of the internal medicine physicians as well as
all physicians in subspecialties such as medical oncology, radiation oncology, cardiology,
pulmonary medicine, rehabilitation medicine, and geriatrics to receive the questionnaires.
The response rate was 57%. See id. at 920.
328. See id. As a group, oncologists were more likely to receive requests for
physician-assisted death than other specialists, and those physicians who cared for greater
numbers of terminally ill individuals received more requests. See id. at 920-21.
329. See id. at 920.
330. See id. at 921-23. The authors of the study conclude from these case reports that
in Washington, 24% of patient requests for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia are
granted. See id. at 924. It is not clear that this conclusion is valid. The physicians were
asked to provide information about the last two patients who requested assisted death from
them, which may or may not have been representative of the physicians' total experience
with physician-assisted death. In order to draw the above conclusion, the researchers should
have asked physicians to report both the total number of requests they had received while in
practice and the number of those requests that they granted.
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for assisted suicide, but only seven percent reported having complied
with those requests. 31
What conclusions can be drawn from these physician surveys in
Washington, Michigan, and Oregon? First, while there is no clear
consensus among the medical profession, the level of physician
support for legalized assisted death is quite high (although not as high
as the general public's). 32 Second, a lower percentage of physicians
are willing to participate than actually support its legalization. And
third, despite the illegality, or at least legal uncertainty, surrounding
physician-assisted death, some physicians are providing assisted death
services to their terminally ill and suffering patients in numbers that
are not insignificant. As the authors of one of the surveys noted, the
varying, and perhaps shifting, attitudes of physicians on the issue of
assisted death have important implications for legislative and policy
developments. 333 In the end, these authors offered what all
commentators in this area seem to offer: a call for continued discourse
on the role of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in the care of
334
the dying.
IV. T-E PHYSIcIAN's RoLE: A SocIEAL PERSPECTIVE
This debate within the medical community will not be resolved
in the near future, particularly since the concept of physician-assisted
death strikes at the very core of what it means to be a physician.
However, the profession's lack of consensus on whether to support and
take part in assisted suicide and euthanasia should not deter those
outside medicine from exploring the question. While physicians bring
considerable expertise to the discussion of the physician's proper role,
other citizens need not feel bound by any one resolution the medical
community comes to, nor should they feel constrained by the various
justifications physicians offer for their positions. It is possible that
there are additional reasons, not yet fully articulated, why society
ought to think again before it places assisted death within the province
of medicine. These more subtle arguments have perhaps escaped
comment because those most competent to make the arguments,
physicians themselves, have the least interest in doing so.
331. See Lee et al., supranote 324, at313.
332. See supra Part II.A; see also Bachman et al., supra note 320, at 306 (describing
a survey revealing that 66% of the Michigan public supported one of two plans to legalize
physician-assisted death as compared to 56% of Michigan physicians).
333. See Cohen et al., supranote 305, at 94.
334. See id. at 94.
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Asking the Process Question

I propose to raise these arguments by challenging the assumption
that we have no choice but to look to the medical profession to
facilitate and regulate assisted death. For purposes of this analysis, I
will posit that either we have reached a societal consensus in support
of assisted death or that the Supreme Court has ruled that states may
not ban assisted suicide for the competent, terminally ill. The next
question to be asked, and one that is invariably overlooked, is who is
to do the assisting. This is a fundamental process question that should
be answered before we take up the usual process questions concerning
limits and safeguards to prevent abuses. Yet the issue of who is to
assist does not come up in the standard debate.335 The process
question has been preempted by a legal system that allows those
individuals or organizations seeking change to set the parameters for
the discussion. Thus, citizens voting on Initiative 119, Proposition
161, or Ballot Measure 16 were not given a choice between assisted
death performed by physicians and assisted death performed by
someone else.336 They had to choose physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia or nothing. Likewise, Judge Rothstein was not asked to
strike down Washington's ban on assisted suicide generally. Instead,
proponents challenged the statute only to the extent that it criminalizes
physician-assisted suicide through the use of prescription drugs.337 No
wonder then that Judge Rothstein's opinion makes mention only of
physician assistance to the terminally ill.338 Similarly, the authors of a
model act to authorize and regulate assisted suicide, which is intended
for adoption by state legislatures, begin with the assumption that

335. Or, if it does come up, it is dismissed out-of-hand. See, e.g., Angell, supra note
265, at 1350 (labeling as an "unsavory prospect" the creation of a profession dedicated to
performing euthanasia).
336. See supraPart I.B.
337. See supratext accompanying note 105.
338. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1460 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) (defining the underlying constitutional issue as whether the state can deny a
terminally ill person the option to commit physician-assisted suicide), rev'd, 49 E3d 586
(9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 79 F3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110); see also id.
at 1461 (discussing the issue of whether withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is
constitutionally distinct from death through drugs prescribed by a physician); id. at 1465
(stating that the court has no doubt that legislatures can devise regulations to define the
proper boundaries of physician-assisted suicide); id. (holding that the challenged statute
places a substantial obstacle in the path of a person seeking physician-assisted suicide).
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physicians will provide the service and question only what type of
physician should be allowed to assist."'
One way around this type of preemption is to conduct a thought
experiment in which assisted suicide and euthanasia exist but in a form
not usually presented for public consumption. Imagine a scenario in
which euthanasia and assisted suicide are legal, but the power to assist
or act is given to someone other than physicians. Please note that in
conducting this thought experiment, I am not proposing sterile
euthanasia clinics in which individuals arrive, sign consent forms, and
are euthanized within the space of a few minutes . 4' Neither am I
suggesting that family members or friends ought to bear the burden of
helping a loved one to die. Rather, I am trying to construct a
responsible picture of a society in which euthanasia and assisted
suicide are regulated and controlled, but by a group other than the
medical profession. For my purposes, we can even imagine a system
that contains many of the safeguards that have been proposed in
relation to physician-assisted death, such as competent adults,
independent witnesses to the requests, waiting periods, family
notification, and required reporting. The primary difference is that
assistance
would be provided by individuals that I will term "aides-in34
dying.', '
Because I have deliberately chosen to imagine a system with
aides-in-dying rather than propose one, I feel no particular need to
prove that such a system would constitute a politically feasible
alternative to physician-assisted death. Nonetheless, I have little doubt
that a regulated process using aides-in-dying, if done correctly, could
function as a practical matter and survive constitutional challenge.
Physicians might object to the notion that anyone else could be
qualified to use pharmacological methods in assisting death. For
example, one of the physician plaintiffs in the Compassion in Dying
case, Dr. Geyman, stated to the court: "Knowing what drug, in what
amount, will hasten death for a particular patient, in light of the
patient's medical condition and medication regimen, is a complex
339. See Charles H. Baron et al., Statute: A Model State Act to Authorize and
Regulate Physician-AssistedSuicide, 33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17 (1996).
340. The specter of impersonal, profit-driven euthanasia clinics run by self-serving
physicians has been raised in the debate over euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. See
Misbin, supra note 264, at 1310.
341. 1 have derived this label from the term "aid-in-dying," the euphemism for
assisted death contained in Washington's Initiative 119. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text. My intent here is to choose a term that does not carry pejorative

connotations.
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medical task.' 3 42 While Dr. Geyman is no doubt correct in asserting
that an individual's medical condition and drug regimen are relevant to
this process, the notion that it takes four years of medical school, three
or four years of residency training, and several years of practice to
learn how to bring about a painless, dignified death with prescription
medications is questionable. The real complexity in medicine lies in
improving individuals' conditions and keeping them alive through the
use of medications, not in causing their deaths. Aides-in-dying could
be adequately trained in the pharmacological aspects of assisted death
and better trained than physicians in the psychological aspects.343 As
to the constitutional question, even if the Supreme Court were to hold
that terminally ill individuals have a constitutional right to assisted
death, the states would still have the power to regulate the process,
including the power to license and regulate a group of individuals who
were specially trained to provide competent assisted death services. 3"
That said, the notion of replacing physicians with trained aidesin-dying in this process is still a radical one. Even Edmund Pellegrino,
a vehement critic of assisted death, asserts that physician participation
is crucial to any effective social policy on this topic.345 What is it
about physicians and the medical profession that makes them so wellsuited to assist individuals with dying? This question has received
little attention in the literature, evidently because the answers are so
obvious.

342. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1457 (quoting Dr. John P. Geyman,
Professor Emeritus, University of Washington School of Medicine).
343. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.A.3.
344. Even those who would find a constitutional right to assisted suicide
acknowledge the power of a state to regulate the process. See Sedler, supra note 120, at 25
n.19 (suggesting that states would clearly have the constitutional power to regulate physician
involvement in assisted suicide); see also Compassion in Dying, 850 F Supp. at 1465
(stating that legislatures can devise regulations to define the appropriate boundaries of
physician-assisted suicide); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 E3d 790 (9th Cir.
1996) ("[W]e explicitly recognize that some prohibitory and regulatory state action is fully
consistent with constitutional principles."), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v.
Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110). While these authorities
discuss regulation in the context of assistance by physicians, a state could set up a different
statutory scheme as long as it adequately effectuated individuals' constitutional rights to
assisted death. The state would, of course, be required to articulate rational reasons for such
a statutory scheme. This would not be difficult given the problems inherent in physician
participation, see infra Part IV.A.1-3, and the fact that others could be trained to provide
competent assistance.
345. See Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 101; see also Bachman et al., supra note 320, at
303 (stating that it "seems likely that if any form of assisted suicide is legalized, legislators
will want to entrust the responsibility of assistance to physicians").
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The two strongest arguments are physicians' knowledge and their
power over the prescription process.34 Physicians, through medical
training and practice, acquire extensive knowledge of pharmaceutical
agents, their appropriate uses, the physiological bases for their actions,
and the recommended dosages to achieve the desired effects.347 While
doctors are not yet explicitly trained in the various pharmacological
methods of causing death, they are certainly capable of using their
medical knowledge to discern which drug or combination of drugs,
when applied in lethal amounts, will produce a quick, painless death.
Just as important, physicians are given by law access to the
pharmacological
means of death to the virtual exclusion of all
34
others. 8
In addition, if we intend to limit assisted death to the terminally
ill and perhaps those with chronic, degenerative diseases who are in
pain, the physicians who care for these individuals will already be an
integral part of the process.3 49 The preexisting relationship between
physicians and their patients, and the fact that patients often turn to
their physicians for relief of suffering, make them the logical choice to
provide assistance here. 350 Doctors could quite naturally function as
gatekeepers for assisted death because their diagnoses and prognoses
will presumably determine which patients are entitled to assisted
death. 35' The medical profession's ability to assess patients with
regard to mental status and degree of pain and suffering would be
useful in any regulatory scheme that required that qualified patients be
both competent and in pain. Physicians could also determine whether
these patients had received appropriate comfort care and palliative
measures before turning to assisted death.35 2 Thus, "doctors have the
346. See Pellegrino, supranote 2, at 101.
347. See Bachman et al., supranote 320, at 303.
348. As one commentator noted, "[I]f physicians did not have a virtual monopoly on
medications in this country, patients would not need to ask them for this kind of help."
Abrams, supra note 279, at 1197.
349. See QUI, supranote 8, at 126-27 (citing favorably Derek Humphry's view that
doctors are well-situated to oversee this process because of their medical knowledge and
preexisting relationships with their patients).
350. See Peter Steinfels, At Crossroads U.S. Ponders Ethics of Helping Others Die,
N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 28, 1991, at Al (quoting Cheryl K. Smith, staff attorney for the National
Hemlock Society).
351. Each of the initiative proposals in Washington, California, and Oregon would
have physicians function in precisely this manner. See supraPart II.B.
352. A number of proposals, including those of Dr. Timothy Quill, would require that
individuals first exhaust all possible comfort- and hospice-care options before turning to
assisted death.
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technical expertise to make sure [assisted death] is being done only in
the appropriate circumstances., 353 Because members of the medical
profession are subject to control through state licensure and
disciplinary processes, a mechanism already exists to oversee and
regulate their actions in facilitating death. 4
With all of these arguments in favor of physician-assisted death,
why even imagine a system where the assistance is provided by some
other group of trained individuals? The answers to this question are
more subtle than the usual arguments against physician involvement
and require a look at the nature of medical practice.
1.

Medical Technology

Modem medical technology is frequently cast as the culprit in
producing the unbearable distress that causes patients to want to end
their lives. 355 Dr. Guy Benrubi, for example, argues that in the case of
certain life-threatening cancers or other diseases, patients would die
rapidly if there were no medical intervention.35 6 Instead, with
treatments such as chemotherapy, blood transfusions, radiation
therapy, and surgical procedures, physicians are able to prolong
individuals' lives from a few months to several years.35 7 But at some
point the medical technology inevitably fails and the patient's
condition deteriorates, producing the potential for prolonged suffering.
Dr. Benrubi argues that by prolonging life, the medical profession also
prolongs agony, and then offers little or no help when the suffering
becomes unbearable.358 He likens the physician's refusal to aid the
patient's death under these circumstances to that of a parent who
encourages a child to climb higher and higher into a tree but then

353. Richard A. Knox, Poll: Americans FavorMercy Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
3, 1991, at 1 (quoting Dan Brock, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics, Brown
University).
354. See id.
355. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 226, at 39 (suggesting that medical technologies
have produced medical conditions that were unknown until the last few decades); Vaux,
supra note 232, at 2141 (arguing that medical intervention has transformed death from an
acute, natural, and noninterventional process into a more chronic, contrived, and
manipulated process). But see Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The History of EuthanasiaDebates in
the United States and Britain, 121 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 793, 799 (1994) (arguing that
from an historical perspective, no causal link exists between advances in medical technology
and societal interest in euthanasia).
356. See Benrubi, supra note 268, at 197.
357. See id.
358. See id.
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refuses to help the child come down.359 The argument is that
physicians are culpable in bringing their patients to a state of
unbearable agony and must therefore assist these individuals to die in
order to exculpate themselves. 3 °
I have three responses to the foregoing argument. First, I wonder
whether we as a society are not engaging in a form of presentism when
we assume that the pain and suffering we experience today is different
in kind and degree than that suffered in ages past. Without discounting
the very real pain and distress that are frequent companions of the
present-day dying process, I doubt that women who died in the throes
of childbirth, or persons who died of bubonic plague, or tetanus
poisoning experienced painless, dignified deaths. Acknowledging
that death accompanied by pain and suffering was the rule even before
the explosion in medical technology does not answer the question
whether physician-assisted death is an appropriate response, but it does
suggest that we need to move beyond such self-referential
justifications.
Second, it is surprising and a bit ironic that in this age of
individual and patient autonomy we revert so quickly to the position
that the physician is responsible for what the law would tell us is the
patient's choice to rely on medical technology. Surely we would not
label as irrational a decision by a well-informed patient to undergo lifeprolonging treatment with the knowledge that she may suffer more
pain and distress when the technology can no longer sustain her life.
But perhaps I have it wrong. Perhaps physicians exercise a
significant amount of control over the medical decision-making
process so that patients are routinely subjected to technological
invasions that are more a reflection of the physician's power than the
patient's choice. But this leads to my third point and the ultimate irony
in this debate. If the decision to use technology is in reality the
physician's, and if physicians misuse their power (as is implied by the
argument that they are responsible for their patients' pain and
suffering), then how can we in good conscience propose, in the name
of individual autonomy, a solution that hands the medical profession
even more power over their patients' lives?

359. See id.
360. See id at 197-98. See also Preston, supra note 226, at 39; Vaux, supra note
232, at 2141.
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Medical Decisionmaking

For hundreds of years, physician beneficence was the guiding
principle of medical ethics. 36' However, beneficence in the medical
setting was translated into something more than a duty to provide
benefit to patients and prevent harm; it became a license to decide
what was best for patients because they supposedly lacked the
362
expertise and knowledge to make medical decisions for themselves.
It was not until the 1960s that medical paternalism in the guise of
beneficence was exposed and renounced, first by the legal community
and more slowly by the medical conmunityo36 3 Today, patient
autonomy is heralded as the dominant principle shaping medical ethics
and the physician-patient relationship.3
Although the principle of individual autonomy has attained
primacy over physician beneficence at the theoretical level, very real
questions remain as to whether or how the principle of autonomy has
been translated into day-to-day medical practice. Dr. Jay Katz, a
renowned expert on the doctrine of informed consent and a vehement
critic of the medical profession in this regard, 365 recently summarized
his thoughts and conclusions on the doctrine of informed consent and
its impact on the physician-patient relationship.366 He argues
convincingly that informed consent today is "largely a charade which
misleads patients into thinking that they are making decisions when
indeed they are not."367 He challenges the notion that physicians have
internalized the principle of patient autonomy beyond the most
superficial of levels, and contends that informed consent will remain a
"fairy tale" until this commitment to autonomy becomes an integral
aspect of the medical ethos.368
361. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETmICS 209 (3d ed. 1989).
362. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting
Rights and Obligationsin the Physician-PatientRelationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 47, 50-51 (1994).
363. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a FairyTale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 69, 77 (1994).
364. See Pellegrino, supranote 362, at 47.
365. Dr. Katz is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor Emeritus of Law, Medicine, and
Psychiatry at Yale Law School, and the author of the celebrated book The Silent World of
Doctorand Patient. In his book, he describes the history of the doctor-patient relationship
and strongly criticizes the medical profession's failure to engage in shared decisionmaking
with patients. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD oFDOCrOR AND PATIENT (1984).

366. See Katz, supra note 363.
367. Id. at 84.
368. See id. at 87-91.
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A number of recent medical studies on end-of-life
decisionmaking support Katz's rather pessimistic view of the current
state of affairs.369 One prospective study analyzed the correlation
between patients' wishes as expressed in advance directives and the
subsequent medical treatment given those patients. 370 The researchers
found that in approximately seventy-five percent of cases, treatment
was consistent with patients' wishes as recorded in the advance
directives.7 While this figure is not highly disturbing on its face, it is
not entirely reassuring either. The authors allude to the fact that when
physicians made decisions contrary to those expressed in the advance
directives, they frequently did so by applying principles other than
patient autonomy.372 One commentator has gone further, suggesting
that the study reveals that physicians will follow patient preferences as
long as those preferences are consistent with the physicians' own
views on appropriate medical care, and that doctors will override
patients' wishes when they disagree with their choices.3 73
In a study of the withholding and withdrawing of medical
treatment from the critically ill, researchers analyzed decisionmaking
for individuals in intensive care units in two San Francisco hospitals
over a one-year period.374 In the seven percent of the cases in which
life support was withheld or withdrawn, physicians, rather than
patients or family members, initiated the issue of withholding or
withdrawal of care in the vast majority of cases.375 When families
were consulted, ninety-one percent of them agreed immediately with
the medical recommendation to withhold or withdraw care, and an
additional seven percent of families agreed with the recommendation
after two or three days of discussion and deliberation.376 While this
study can be read to signify the high degree of concordance between
physician and patient or family views on end-of-life decisions, it may
also reflect the degree of influence physicians have over both the
369. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see David Orentlicher, The Illusion of
PatientChoice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2101 (1992).
370. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directivesfor LifeSustainingCare, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 882 (1991).
371. Seeid.at884.
372. See id. at 887.
373. See Orentlicher, supra note 369, at 2101. Dr. Orentlicher would interpret the
75% figure as encompassing those circumstances where physicians agreed with the choices
made by their patients.
374. See Nicholas G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support
from the CriticallyIll, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309 (1990).
375. Seeid.at311.
376. Seeid. at312.
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decision-making process and the ultimate decisions. As Edmund
Pellegrino recently stated, "[A]ny clinician' 3knows,
she can get almost
7
any decision she wants from most patients. 1
In a recent Canadian study, a group of researchers specifically set
out to explore whether the attitudes and values of health care providers
influence decisionmaking in withdrawal-of-life-support cases.378 In an
era of patient autonomy, one might expect that such decisions would
be dictated by patients' and their families' values and preferences. The
study's authors turned that assumption on its head by suggesting that it
is the health-care providers' attitudes and values that are critical factors
in the decision-making process. They posited that physicians and
other health care providers use their own attitudes and values in
shaping and presenting the information given to patients and their
families, which in turn strongly influences patients' preferences and
choices.379 The study was designed to assess the variables that
influence health care providers' decisions in withdrawal-of-lifesupport cases. The researchers first asked intensive care unit
physicians and nurses to rank in order of importance various factors in
treatment-withdrawal cases, including likelihood of long term survival,
patient age, socioeconomic status, and risk of legal complications.38 °
The authors then asked the respondents to make hypothetical treatment
decisions in each of twelve detailed life-support scenarios. 381 Despite
the fact that respondents generally agreed on the relative importance of
the withdrawal-of-life-support factors in the abstract, 382 their responses
to the twelve scenarios revealed striking variability in whether and to
what extent life support should be withdrawn.383 After performing
377. Pellegrino, supra note 362, at 55.
378. See Deborah J. Cook et al., Determinants in CanadianHealth Care Workers of
the Decision to Withdraw Life Supportfrom the CriticallyIll, 273 JAMA 703 (1995).
379. See id. at 704.
380. See id. Respondents were asked to rank in order of importance 19 potential
determinants of life support, using a scale ranging from one (completely irrelevant) to seven
(extremely important). See id.
381. See id. In order to avoid confusion due to such variables as patient and family
preferences, the authors constructed scenarios in which the hypothetical patients were
unable to assist in decisionmaking and family and friends were unavailable. See id. The
respondents were asked to choose from among five levels of care that ranged from
aggressive management to comfort measures only. See id. at 704.
382. See id. at 706. Within the physician and nurse groups, the correlation for 17 of
the factors ranged from 0.68 to 0.96. See id. at 704. Two factors, those of sex and sexual
orientation, were deleted because almost all respondents ranked them as having little
importance. See id.
383. See id. at 706. This variability was reflected in the fact that in only one of the
scenarios did more than 50% of the respondents choose the same treatment course. See id.
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statistical analyses, the study's authors determined that the marked
variability in responses could only be explained by factors or
characteristics intrinsic to the individual health-care providers. s
From this, the researchers concluded that "even when clinicians make
decisions based on the best evidence available, their own ethical,
social, moral, ' 3and
religious values influence their medical
5
decisionmaking. 1
In another study, a group of researchers conducted a survey of
health-care professionals on the subject of end-of-life
decisionmaking 86 The questionnaire covered a range of issues
including knowledge and attitudes regarding the law and medical
ethics, knowledge of and adherence to institutional guidelines on the
use of life support, clinical practices in the use of life support, patient
involvement in decisionmaking, and perceived impediments to good
decisionmaking and quality care.387 Although most of the physicians
and nurses recognized patients' rights to refuse care, they also reported
that they sometimes ignored their patients' wishes and provided
inappropriate and overly burdensome care.38s Similarly, in a survey of
critical-care medicine specialists, thirty-four percent of the doctors
reported having refused patient or family requests to discontinue life
support,389 and thirty-five percent reported having withdrawn life
support either without the knowledge or without the formal consent of
the patient or the patient's family. 390 Whatever the reasons behind such
actions,39 the fact that physicians in high numbers report ignoring their
384. See id.
385. Id. at 708.
386. See Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional
Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 14 (1993); see also Jane E.
Brody, DoctorsAdmit Ignoring Dying Patients' Wishes, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1993, at 18.
The survey was conducted through a 123-item questionnaire and was completed by
approximately 1,400 physicians and nurses at five hospitals in various parts of the country.
See Solomon et al., supra,at 15.
387. See id. at 15.
388. See id. at 16-17. A high percentage of respondents reported dissatisfaction with
the level of patient involvement in treatment decisions, suggesting that they were concerned
with the lack of patient input in end-of-life decisions. See id. at 16.
389. See David A. Asch et al., Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining
Treatment by Critical Care Physiciansin the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians'
Practicesand Patients' Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITIcAL CARE MED. 288, 290
(1995). The survey was mailed in 1990 to all 1,970 members of the Critical Care Section of
the American Thoracic Society; 1,050 physicians responded, a 53% response rate. See id. at
289.
390. See id. at 291 tab. 6.
391. See Asch et al.,
supra note 389, at 290 tab. 4 (listing reasons why physicians
refused patient or family requests to withdraw life-sustaining treatment); Solomon et al.,
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patients' wishes and substituting their own values in end-of-life
decisions should give us pause.
Although these studies clearly suggest that physicians use their
power in the physician-patient relationship to either make or influence
end-of-life decisions, such studies do have inherent limitations. For
example, physician surveys may reveal more about what physicians
think they do than what they do in actual practice, while chart reviews
that document end-of-life decisions still leave unilluminated the
dynamics of the decision-making process itself. Fortunately,
researchers have recently begun to focus their attention on the process
of medical decisionmaking within the clinical setting.
The SUPPORT study, published in 1995, is a groundbreaking
piece of research in this area.3 92 In an effort to improve the process of
end-of-life decisionmaking, the researchers first documented the
decision-making processes among medical staff and their terminally ill
patients in five teaching hospitals over a two-year period. 393 They
gathered baseline information, including whether patients wanted
aggressive treatment such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and
mechanical ventilation, the percentage of physicians who could
accurately recount their patients' wishes, the type of treatments
physicians actually provided, and the degree of pain experienced by
patients before they died.394 They then carried out a two-year
controlled clinical trial in these same hospitals to see if intervention in
the decisionmaking process would lead to improved physician-patient
communication and end-of-life decisionmaking. 395
Phase I, the observational portion of the study, revealed that even
though these patients were known to be dying and in many cases were
hospitalized for extended periods, physicians frequently failed to
discuss end-of-life decisions with them until shortly before their

supra note 386, at 19-20 (discussing possible causes including health care provider
uncertainty about the law and ethics on withdrawal of treatment, inadequate communication
between physicians and patients, psychological discomfort with withdrawing treatment once
it has begun, and discomfort with withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition).
392. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995). "SUPPORT" is an
acronym for the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of
Treatment. See id.
393. See id. The researchers collected data through interviews with the hospitalized
patients or their surrogate decisionmakers and with the patients' physicians. See id. at 1592.
394. See id. at 1593; see also Susan Gilbert, Study Finds Doctors Refuse Patients'
Requests on Death, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 22, 1995 at Al (reporting on the SUPPORT study).
395. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, supranote 392, at 1593.
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deaths.39 6 Families reported that half of the patients who were able 397
to
communicate spent their final days in moderate or severe pain.
Thirty-one percent of the patients preferred that CPR be withheld, but
only forty-seven percent of their physicians could accurately recount
this preference. 391 Physicians failed to write DNR orders for forty-nine
percent of the patients who expressed a desire to have CPR
withheld.399 Half of the dying patients spent their final days in the
intensive care unit comatose or receiving mechanical ventilation.4
Having documented what they described as "substantial
shortcomings in communication and outcomes," ' the researchers
embarked on Phase I, the interventional portion of the study. Skilled
nurses met daily with hospitalized terminally ill patients or their
families to discuss their wishes for treatment and then relayed this
information to the attending physicians. These same nurses, through
the aid of a computer program, also provided physicians with their
patients' chances of surviving six months and estimates of their future
functional abilities. °a The nurses concurrently provided services to
the dying patients in the form of eliciting their treatment preferences;
providing information and enhancing patient understanding; arranging
meetings between physicians, patients, and their families; and
facilitating palliative care.403
If the study's authors were concerned by the results of Phase I,
they were even more dismayed by their findings in Phase II. The
intensive intervention, designed to improve information, enhance
conversation, and encourage use of outcome data and patient
preferences in decisionmaking, had no discernible effect on end-of-life
decisionmaking. 404 The treating physicians were no better at stating
their patients' preferences with regard to treatment, desired DNR
orders still went unwritten, and dying individuals languished in pain in

396. See id. at 1595.
397. See id.
398. See id. at 1594.
399. See id.
400. See id. at 1595.
401. Id. at 1592.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 1596. To reach this conclusion, the study compared the following data
before and after intervention: median time until desired DNR orders were written, physician
understanding of patient preferences, median length of time patients spent in intensive care
units while comatose or receiving mechanical ventilation, patient reports of pain, and health

care resource use. See id. at 1594-96 & tab. 4.
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the intensive care units at the same rate as before the intervention. 40 5
The authors, clearly troubled by these findings, concluded the report
with the following observation:
The picture we describe of the care of seriously ill or dying persons is
not attractive. One would certainly prefer to envision that, when
confronted with life-threatening illness, the patient and family would
be included in discussions, realistic estimates of outcome would be
valued, pain would be treated, and dying would not be prolonged.
That is still a worthy vision. However, it is not likely to be achieved
4 6
through an intervention such as that implemented by SUPPORT. 0
If patient preferences and prognoses are not driving end-of-life
decisionmaking, what is? Professor Robert Zussman, in his book
Intensive Care: Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession, provides
critical insights into the medical decision-making process.'
He
criticizes modem medical ethics commentators for concentrating on
questions of how medical decisions should be made to the exclusion
of examining how they are actually made in practice. 8 By
conducting extensive field research in the intensive care units of two
teaching hospitals, 4°9 he begins to bridge the gap between knowledge
of medical ethics principles and their actual implementation by
physicians.
Professor Zussman makes a number of interesting points, but, for
our purposes, the most important is his observation that physicians
seem to inhabit two different worlds: the culture of patients' rights
and the culture of the ward.4 1° The culture of rights arises from
bioethics, law, and social policy; it validates individual patient
autonomy.411 The culture of the ward arises from the socialization of
physicians through training and practice; it validates physician
authority and discretion.41 2 A great tension obviously exists between
these two cultures. Professor Zussman found that physicians navigate
between the two cultures by turning to the culture of rights when
discussing general ethical principles, but reverting to the culture of the
405. See id. at 1595.
406. Id. at 1597 (footnotes omitted).
407. ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE: MEDICAL ETHIcs AND THE MEDICAL
PROFESSION (1992).
408. See id. at 1-2.
409. See id. at 15-16. Professor Zussman did his field work at a New York City
hospital between 1985 and 1987, and at a Boston hospital in 1989. See id. at 26.
410. See id. at 222-24.
411. Seeid. at9-12.
412. See id. at 112.
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ward when making decisions in particular cases.413 In other words,
physicians acknowledge that patients have the right to make medical
treatment decisions in the abstract, but in practice frequently arrogate
decision-making power to themselves.414 Professor Zussman does not
see their actions as hypocritical, but rather as an understandable
attempt to function professionally within two competing and
conflicting cultures.415
The ways in which physicians make decisions for their patients
are many and varied. Physicians actively shape their patients' wishes
by framing information and controlling choices so that patients or their
families end up "choosing" the course of action desired by their
doctors.416 Professor Zussman relates one incident where a resident
physician forestalled discussion with a family about whether they
wished kidney dialysis for their relative by stating, "'First, we have4to
17
decide what we want to do.... It depends on how we present it.'
To which the attending physician responded, "'The family will do
what we want."' 1 8 Physicians frequently label the question in a
particular case as one of technique, requiring medical expertise, rather
than one of values falling within the patient's domain.4 19 In addition,
they may narrow the scope of alternatives presented to the patient 20
and discount or ignore families' wishes because of the family
members' emotional involvement.42 Professor Zussman summarizes
physicians' actions as follows:
Although courts, state law, and hospital policies are all virtually
unanimous in their insistence that decisions to limit treatment be made
by patients ...I have argued that decisions are, in fact, as often (or
more often) made by physicians. Unable to evaluate the course of a
disease or the possibility of treatment on their own, patients and their
families rely on the technical judgment of physicians. But the
judgment of physicians in these matters is not simply technical. It is
also shaped by their own interests and by adaptations to the stresses of
medical practice, as well as by apparently high-minded concerns that
413. Seeid. at224.
414. For example, Professor Zussman described one incident in which a resident
physician first stated, "the decision is not mine-whose treatment should be withdrawn, who
should be code or no-code," but then proceeded to make the decision anyway. Id.
415. See id. at 152-53.
416. See id. at 142-44.
417. Id. at 143.
418. Id.
419. See id. at 141-51.
420. See id. at 147-48.
421. See icL at 144-45.
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are at best ambiguously patient centered. Whether physicians report a
patient as "terminal" or the possibility of recovery "realistic" does
involve technical judgment, but technical
judgment shaped by the
422
distinctive values of their occupation.
Such empirical findings are surely relevant in the context of
deciding whether physicians are the proper individuals in whom to
place the power over assisted death. Some bioethicists suggest that the
option of physician-assisted death would help dying patients break free
from the vicious cycle of treatment and torment. They argue that the
recategorization of death as a good, or at least acceptable, outcome
under certain circumstances is long overdue and a much needed
change from the current medical emphasis on sustaining life.
However, that is only true if each individual is allowed the opportunity
to decide for herself whether and when death is an acceptable
outcome. This is a questionable proposition in the context of
physician-assisted death where medical providers hold such power
over the decision-making process. As one commentator asserted, the
ways in which a physician frames medical facts and treatment options
"are often subtly or frankly conditioned by [the physician's] judgment
of what she thinks is in the patient's best interests."423 The principles
of individual and patient autonomy that form the foundation for
physician-assisted death are seriously undercut by the power
differential in the physician-patient relationship and the fact that
physicians can so easily influence their patients' choices. 4
It is worth examining the kinds of influence physicians might
exert in the context of assisted death. First, members of the medical
profession could conceivably use their power in the medical decisionmaking process to bring about assisted deaths that individuals would
not otherwise have chosen. Supporters of physician-assisted suicide
might argue that this scenario is very unlikely because the studies
suggest that when physicians do substitute their own values for those
of their patients, they tend to preserve life at all costs rather than bring
about unwished-for deaths. Thus, far from embracing physicianassisted death, perhaps physicians would err on the side of life and turn
to assisted suicide only as a last resort.
There is another possibility, however. Howard Brody, in his
book The Healer's Power, develops the thesis that modem ethical
422. Id. at 221.
423. Pellegrino, supra note 362, at 55.
424. See id.
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theory fails to adequately describe the physician-patient relationship
and the nature of medical decisionmaking because it fails to take into
account the various forms of power wielded by members of the
medical profession. 4 5 Particularly relevant for our purposes 4 is26
Brody's examination of something he terms the "rescue fantasy.
The rescue fantasy incorporates a vision of the physician as an allpowerful individual who, by virtue of his or her medical knowledge
and expertise, is able to "snatch the patient from the jaws of death."427
While the rescue fantasy is a throwback to an earlier era, Brody argues
that it continues to thrive in modem-day medicine within the minds of
physicians and their patients.4 28 It thrives, despite our supposed
rejection of medical paternalism and our endorsement of individual
autonomy, because physicians, from the day they begin medical
training, define their worth as doctors and perhaps as individuals on
the basis of their ability to control bad outcomes. 429 Thus, Brody
would explain certain medical treatment decisions as resulting from
physicians' powerful need to rescue their patients, particularly from
the ultimate bad outcome, death.
Consistent with Brody's thesis, Sherwin Nuland, physician and
author of the influential book How We Die, describes doctors as
intensely controlling individuals who fear failure, particularly in their
professional lives.4 30 He adds an additional but related concept that he
terms the "Riddle." The "Riddle" is the quest by physicians to
diagnose and cure disease; Nuland describes it as the most powerful
and defining image in medicine.431 The desire to successfully solve
the "Riddle" drives physicians to such an extent that they sometimes
subordinate individual patient welfare to their own self-fulfillment.43
According to Nuland, this quest to succeed is what causes physicians
425. See HowARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER 26-43 (1992). Howard Brody is a
family practice physician and Director of the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life
Sciences at Michigan State University. See id. at xii.
426. See id. at 137-56. Brody credits Dr. Albert Jonsen and modem psychology for
the origins of this term. See id. at 137.
427. Id. at 139.
428. See id. at 140. Brody suggests that patients engage in the rescue fantasy when
they wish to transfer to someone else the responsibility for health or sickness and receive
reassurance. See id. at 141.
429. See id. at 139-40.
430. See SHERWIN B. NuLAND, How WE DiE 258 (1994). Nuland describes
physicians as highly competitive individuals by nature who require constant reassurance of
their abilities in order to maintain their sense of self worth. See id.

431. See id. at 248.
432. See id. at 248-49.
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to convince terminally ill patients to undergo incredibly burdensome
and even futile diagnostic and therapeutic measures.433
If we combine Brody's "rescue fantasy" and Nuland's "Riddle," it
is possible to construct a scenario in which physicians come 4to
34
embrace the concept of assisted death to a surprising degree.
Physicians need to rescue their patients in order to retain their own
sense of professional and personal self-worth, and they do so by
pushing treatment and technology on patients in an attempt to solve
the riddle of disease. But even physicians realize at some point that
rescue is impossible, and so they abandon the dying patient in order to
avoid facing the defeat that the patient's death represents.435 The
individual is thus left alone to face certain death preceded by
unbearable pain and suffering.436 Now, if we add the power to assist
death to the physician's technological armamentarium, the picture
changes. While the intent is to effectuate patient autonomy at the end
of life, the addition of this power actually provides physicians with the
perfect solution to the dilemma posed by the rescue fantasy: that
sometimes rescue is impossible. Physician-assisted death thus comes
to the physicians' rescue by eliminating their defeat at the hands of
their patients' deaths. 437 Rescue is no longer confined to cure; it now
includes providing a painless, dignified death.
The inclusion of physician-assisted death in the rescue fantasy
changes physician incentives and may actually exacerbate the
problems posed by doctors' use of technology in-attempting to defeat
disease. With assisted death as one of their options, physicians might
redouble their efforts, including the use of technology, to combat
disease even in cases where the prognoses are dim and the patients
hesitant. Doctors can use their power over assisted death to convince
patients that they have nothing to lose in fighting the battle with every
433. See id. at 249.
434. My point is counterintuitive in the sense that up until now, the combination of
the rescue fantasy and the Riddle has produced an incentive among physicians to sustain
life, not to end it.
435. See NuLAND, supranote 430, at 258 (stating that physicians' inability to face the
consequences presented by loss of control leads them to turn away from situations where
their power is of no use).
436. Of course, the scenario I have just constructed by combining the rescue fantasy
and the Riddle is the very same one that assisted-death advocates use in their arguments.
See supra notes 293-302 and accompanying text.
437. On a related note, some commentators have suggested that physicians might use
assisted death as a way to put an end to their own frustrations and burdens in caring for
terminally ill patients. See Steven H. Miles, Physiciansand Their Patients' Suicides, 271
JAMA 1786, 1786 (1994); Pellegrino, supranote 274, at 874-75.
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medical means possible because if things get too bad, they can always
choose a quick and painless death. Thus, physician-assisted death not
only becomes a part of the rescue fantasy; it also plays into the medical
profession's quest to solve the "Riddle." The ultimate irony in this
entire process is that the very same individuals and political
organizations who have fought so hard to wrest control over death
away from the medical profession and return it to individuals are now
willing to hand that control back to the medical
profession, and they
438
autonomy.
individual
do so in the name of
Having suggested that physicians might embrace assisted suicide
in ways that ought to give us pause, I will now propose the opposite,
but equally problematic, possibility. Rather than imposing their own
value judgments to convince individuals to turn to assisted death,
perhaps physicians will use their power in the decision-making process
to deny individuals access to assisted death even where those persons
meet all of the statutory requirements and have expressed their desire
to die.
Dr. Timothy Quill's proposal of clinical guidelines for physicianassisted suicide provides a useful example in this regard. 439 He and
two colleagues developed and published these clinical criteria
approximately a year and a half after Quill divulged his role in the
death of his patient Diane.440 The guidelines are preceded by a general
discussion in which Quill and his colleagues explain their decision to
support the legalization of physician-assisted suicide but not voluntary
euthanasia."
They justify the distinction between the two by
suggesting that the "risk of subtle coercion from doctors, family
members, institutions, or other social forces is greatly reduced" when
the patient performs the final act.442 In their opinion, the balance of
power between the physician and patient is more nearly equal when
the doctor acts as counselor and witness and provides the means but
does not perform the final act. In contrast, they contend that when the
physician provides the means and the ends, so to speak, the physician
wields so much power over the patient that the risk of error, coercion,
438. One ethicist has argued that it is illogical to suggest that the natural-death
movement and its skepticism toward medical technology lend support to the use of lethal
injections, which are after all a form of technology, to cause death. See Giles R. Scofield,
Euthanasia[Letter], 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 120, 120 (1989).
439. See Quill et al., supra note 268.
440. See supraPart III.A.4.
441. See Quill et al., supranote 268, at 1381.
442. See id.
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or abuse is unacceptably high. 43 Quill and his coauthors also
explained that they view physician-assisted suicide as a last resort
rather than a substitute for comfort care or for working with patients to
resolve the varied challenges posed by the dying process.'
The proposed seven "Clinical Criteria for Physician Assisted
Suicide," are as follows:
1. [Tihe patient must have a condition that is incurable and associated
with severe, unrelenting suffering. The patient must understand the
condition, prognosis, and the types of comfort care available as
alternatives. 45
2. [T~he physician must ensure that the patient's suffering and the
request are not the result of inadequate comfort care. All reasonable
comfort-oriented measures must at least have been tried, before the
means for a physician-assisted suicide are provided. 446
3. [T]he patient must clearly and repeatedly, of his own free will and
initiative, request to die rather than continue suffering. The physician
should understand thoroughly what continued life means to the patient
and why death appears preferable.... Any sign of ambivalence and
uncertainty on the part of the patient should abort the process, because
a clear, convincing, and continuous desire for an end of suffering
through death is a strict requirement to proceed. 447
4. [T]he physician must be sure that the patient's judgment is not
distorted. The patient must be capable of understanding the decision
and its implications. The presence of depression is relevant if it is
distorting rational decision making and is reversible in a way that
would substantially alter the situation. Expert psychiatric evaluation
should be sought when the primary physician is inexperienced in the
diagnosis and treatment of depression, or when there is uncertainty
about the rationality of the request or the presence of a reversible
mental disorder the treatment of which would
substantially change the
448
patient's perception of his or her condition.
5. [P]hysician-assisted suicide should be carried out only in the context
of a meaningful doctor-patient relationship. Ideally, the physician
should have witnessed the patient's previous illness and suffering.
There may not always be a preexisting relationship but the physician
must get to know the patient personally in order to understand fully the
reasons for the request.... Rather than create a new sub-specialty
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

See id.
See id. at 1380.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
Id.

448. Id.
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focused on death, assistance in suicide should be given by the same
physician who has been struggling with the patient to provide comfort
care, and who will stand by the patient and provide care until the time
of death, no matter what path is taken.449
6. [C]onsultation with another experienced physician is required to
ensure that the patient's request is voluntary and rational, the diagnosis
and prognosis accurate, and the exploration of comfort-oriented
alternatives thorough. 450

7. [C]lear documentation to support each condition is required. A
system must be developed for reporting, reviewing, and studying such
deaths and clearly distinguishing them from other forms of suicide. 451
Quill's proposal is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the
guidelines appear to be an almost perfect description of the Diane case.
One way of viewing these clinical criteria, then, is as an elaborate
justification for Dr. Quill's own actions. Second, the guidelines are
quite limiting on the question of who is entitled to assisted death. For
example, dying persons would not be entitled to assistance if they
expressed any ambivalence in the decision-making process.452 They
must have a condition that is associated with severe, unrelenting
suffering,453 and must have tried comfort care measures before they
can qualify for assisted death.454 It is insufficient to be terminally ill
and want to die. Third, the guidelines are extremely physiciancentered. The physician must get to know the patient; the physician
must understand the reasons for the request; the physician should
understand what continued life means to the patient; the physician
should have witnessed the patient's previous suffering. One gets the
sense that the patient who desires assistance carries the burden of
convincing the physician that he or she is worthy of the doctor's help.
As if these guidelines were not sufficiently physician-centered, a
subsequent proposal, in which Dr. Quill also played a role, would give
the medical profession even greater control. 5 Under this proposal,
case-specific oversight of decisions to utilize assisted death would be
provided by "palliative-care consultants."
These palliative-care
consultants would be physicians (who else?) trained in the care of the
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. See supra note 447 and accompanying text. This requirement is patently absurd.
Ambivalence in this context is not only understandable, it is rational and expected.
453. See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
454. See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
455. See Miller et al., supra note 268, at 119.
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dying, educated in ethics, and skilled in the assessment of decisionmaking capacity of patients 6 Their oversight responsibilities would
include reviewing medical records and interviewing the treating
physician, patient, and interested family members.457 Incredibly, the
certified palliative-care consultant would have the authority to override
the individual and treating physician's decision to go forward with
assisted death. 458
It ought to be clear by now that the proposals emanating from the
medical profession bear little resemblance to Washington's Initiative
119, California's Proposition 161, or Oregon's Ballot Measure 16. If
you look closely at them, the reason for the difference becomes clear:
the medical profession's proposals are derived from a physicianbeneficence rather than an individual-autonomy model. They are
designed first and foremost to protect the interests of the medical
profession in this process, and patients are entitled only to that which
physicians think is in their best interests, nothing more.
While it is entirely likely that such proposals will never become
law, their very existence ought to concern supporters of assisted death.
If physicians control this process, it does not matter how liberal or
autonomy-based the statutory framework for assisted death is; the
medical profession will translate that framework into something more
consonant with the medical beneficence model. Furthermore, when
deciding what is in the best interests of their terminally ill patients,
physicians will inevitably use their own values, albeit couched in terms
of medical expertise and judgment. Professor Zussman described this
very phenomenon when he observed that physicians at the New York
hospital he studied were more cautious about limiting treatment for
dying patients than physicians at the Massachusetts hospital, and that
this difference in treatment between hospitals occurred because
physicians used different definitions for the word "terminal." 459
Professor Zussman stated, "In this difference-masked by the
language of prognosis and diagnosis, by the results of laboratory tests
and probability estimates-is the open moral space of American

456.
457.
458.
committee,
459.

See id. at 121.
See id.
See id. They would have the right to appeal to a regional palliative-care
made up of professional and lay members. See id.
See ZUSSMAN, supra note 407, at 131-33.
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medicine. It is a space quickly filled with physicians' values. ' '460 For
purposes of my analysis, it matters little whether physicians are more
likely to use their power in the physician-patient relationship to
facilitate or to prevent assisted deaths. The point is that they will
control the process, and their values will dictate the results.
3.

The Nature of Medical Training

Perhaps commentators' seeming willingness to overlook the risks
to individual autonomy from physician participation in assisted death
arises from a societal belief that members of the medical profession
possess expertise not just in technical medical matters, but in ethical
and moral ones as well. It is important to examine whether deference
in such matters is justified because it is clear that physicians will not
shrink from exercising power in the moral realm if the community
cedes it to them:
With our technologies, we are forever leading our patients into
dilemmas that are inherently social and nonmedical, and increasingly
we shall need to help them in nonhealing ways.46' Physicians may
have no special expertise in making these social, end-of-life decisions,
but we are the only ones who can help patients with them....462
Are physicians qualified by virtue of their medical training to
claim expertise and authority in the realm of the nonmedical? In
answering this question, it is useful to briefly examine two related
aspects of medical training: education in ethics and education in
empathy.
One would expect that contemporary physicians would be
experts in medical ethics. They confront ethical dilemmas on virtually
a daily basis. 43 However, formalized ethics training within medical
school curricula is relatively new, with the result that most practicing
physicians have had little or no formal schooling in medical ethics
theory and its application. Further, although accrediting guidelines
have been recently revised to require all medical schools to provide

460. Id. at 133. When Professor Zussman speaks of "physicians' values," he refers
not to the philosophical sort but rather the basic assumptions, orientations, and concerns that
are central to the medical profession as a profession. See id. at 46.
461. Preston, supra note 226, at 39. Dr. Preston is a physician and outspoken
advocate of physician-assisted death.
462. Id. at 40.
463. See Edmund D. Pellegrino et al., Relevance and Utility of Courses in Medical
Ethics: A Survey of Physicians'Perceptions,253 JAMA 49, 52 (1985).

132

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7 1:45

ethics courses,' the content, quality, and quantity of ethics courses
and clinical experiences vary considerably from one school to the
next.465
Even with the move toward incorporating medical-ethics
education into the curriculum, there are indications that training falls
considerably short of what is needed. In a recent essay contest,
medical students were asked how they could best develop ethical
thinking and behavior.466 Through their essays, students called for
ethics teaching to be incorporated into all four years of medical school,
but particularly within the third and fourth clinical years, where too
often they are "left to themselves to puzzle out the right and the
good." 467 The students yearned for ongoing relationships with
physicians who could mentor them and provide guidance when ethical
dilemmas arose.468 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the essay
contest was the number of medical students who expressed the view
that medical training actually reduces their ethical sensitivity and
damages their moral development.469 These students expressed
considerable doubt over the extent to which they would be able to
retain their own humanity as they underwent the medical socialization
process.47

464. See Cheryl P. Weinstock, Adding a Personal Touch to Medicine, N.Y TIMES,
May 2, 1993, § 13LI, at 4.
465. See, e.g., David Barnard & K. Danner Clouser, Teaching Medical Ethics in Its
Contexts: Penn State College of Medicine, 64 ACAD. MED. 744 (1989); James F. Bresnahan
& Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, Ethics Education at Northwestern University Medical
School, 64 AcAD. MED. 740 (1989); Baruch A. Brody, The Baylor Experience in Teaching
Medical Ethics, 64 AcAD. MED. 715 (1989); Loretta M. Kopelman, Development of the
Medical Humanities Program at East Carolina University, 64 ACAD. MED. 730 (1989);
Donnie J. Self et al., The Effect of Teaching Medical Ethics on Medical Students' Moral
Reasoning, 64 AcAD. MED. 755 (1989).
466. See Rita Charon & Renee C. Fox, Critiques and Remedies: Medical Students
Callfor Change in Ethics Teaching, 274 JAMA 767, 771 (1995); see also Michael Sanders,
The Forgotten Curriculum: An Argumentfor Medical Ethics Education, 274 JAMA 768,
769 (1995) (asserting that students receive little ethics training during their clinical
rotations).
467. Charon & Fox, supra note 466, at 771.
468. See id. at 767; see also Roxanne B. Sukol, Teaching Ethical Thinking and
Behaviorto Medical Students, 273 JAMA 1388, 1388 (1995).
469. See Charon & Fox, supra note 466, at 767; see also Chris Feudtner et al., Do
Clinical Clerks Suffer EthicalErosion? Students' Perceptionsof Their EthicalEnvironment
and Personal Development, 69 ACAD. MED. 670 (1994); Chris Feudtner & Dimitri A.
Christakis, Making the Rounds: The Ethical Development of Medical Students in the
Context of ClinicalRotations,24 HASTNGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 6.
470. See Charon & Fox, supranote 466, at 767.

1996]

AUTONOMYAND DEATH

The students are right to be concerned. Medical training, which
includes medical school and the ever-lengthening residency, is a
demanding, exhausting, unforgiving experience. 47
Although
physicians gain technical skills, intellectual rigor, and self-discipline
through this process, they often lose empathy and compassion for their
patients.4 72 Empathy is rarely taught or nurtured in medical training; it
is neglected in favor of scientific reasoning and clinical detachment. 473
Although a few schools and training programs have recently begun to
address this problem by developing methods of teaching empathy and
communication skills,474 they can do little to combat the fact that
medicine as a profession does not hold as core values empathy or
understanding for the patient as a person.475
This fact is underscored in a book, entitled The Nature of
Suffering and the Goals of Medicine,476 in which Dr. Eric Cassell
explains why attempts to train doctors to have more concern for their
patients have generally failed. He notes that the intellectual basis of
modem medicine is scientific disease theory and that patients, as
persons, simply have no place within this intellectual framework.4 77 In
471. The popular and sociological literature are replete with first-hand accounts of the
cynicism and patient indifference engendered by medical training. See ZUSSMAN, supra
note 407, at 47 (describing the various first-person accounts of the medical socialization
experience); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, How Doctors Learn to Think They're Doctors,
N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 28, 1995, § 4, at 1 ("Some doctors say the rigors of training actually
squelched their humanity, by forcing them to operate in a high-stress atmosphere where
compassion, patience and giving are not high priorities.").
472. Empathy is the capacity to understand and be sensitive to the feelings, thoughts,
and experiences of another even when those thoughts or feelings are not explicitly
communicated. See WEBSTER'S NImH NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 407 (1991). In the

medical setting, an empathetic clinician understands the meaning of the disease for the
patient. See Jeanne Levasseur & David R. Vance, Doctors, Nurses, and Empathy, in
EMPATHY AND THEPRACTICE OFMEDICINE, 76,83 (Howard M. Spiro et al. eds., 1993).

473. See Howard M. Spiro, What Is Empathy and Can It Be Taught?, in EMPATHY
ANDTHE PRACTICE oFMEDICNm, 7, 8-9 (Howard M. Spiro et al. eds., 1993).
474. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, In Lessons on Empathy, Doctors Become Patients, N.Y.
TMES, June 4, 1992, at Al; Donna Greene, Teaching FutureDoctors the Art of Caring, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 13WC, at 3; Michael T. Kaufman, About New York; Teaching
Compassion in Theater of Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992, § 1, at 23; Cheryl P.
Weinstock, Adding a PersonalTouch to Medicine, N.Y. TMES, May 2, 1993, § 13LI, at 4.
475. See Levasseur & Vance, supra note 472, at 78.
476. ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 138
(1991).
477. See id. In one study done during the 1970s, medical students were videotaped
while performing clinical interviews of patients. The researchers found that first-year
students listened to the story of illness as recounted by the patient while third-year students
worked to write the story of disease. See Stanley J. Reiser, Science, Pedagogy, and the
Transformation of Empathy in Medicine, in EMPATHY AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 121,
128-29 (Howard M. Spiro et al. eds., 1993).
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many ways, the individual is irrelevant; it is the disease that requires
classification and treatment. Given this fundamental intellectual
framework, it should come as no surprise that physicians exhibit very
little understanding of human suffering.478 Suffering occurs when
there is a threat to the intactness of the person. 479 It follows, therefore,
that to recognize and understand human suffering requires a view of
the individual as a complex being with a past, cultural and societal
roles, associations and relationships, a body and an unconscious mind,
a perceived future, all of which are subject to loss and can lead to
suffering.480 Because suffering does not fit easily into the disease
model of medicine, it cannot be diagnosed. Because it is internal to the
person, it has no common pathophysiologic origin. Because it cannot
be cured by the science of medicine, physicians turn away from it and
thus, from their ill and dying patients.48' Some of these suffering but
abandoned individuals will ask their physicians to help them to die.
And thus we have come full circle.

478. See CAssELL, supra note 476, at 35-37. Despite the fact that the terms are
frequently used interchangeably, pain and suffering are not the same things. Physical pain
can surely cause suffering, but suffering is much broader, implying a threat to the integrity of
the person. See id. at 32-33.
479. See id.
480. See id. at 43.
481. See id. at 46. In fact, two recent studies tend to support the view that physicians
are poorly prepared to evaluate and respond to their patients' suffering. The survey of
Washington physicians that explored patient requests for physician-assisted death and
physicians' responses, see supra notes 327-331 and accompanying text, found that persons
requesting assistance frequently did so not because of intolerable pain or other physical
symptoms but rather because of nonphysical concerns such as loss of control, loss of dignity,
and the fear of becoming a burden and dependent on others. See Back et al., supra note
327, at 924. Yet physicians provided assisted death more often to patients with physical
symptoms such as pain, physical discomfort, and shortness of breath. See id. The more
common nonphysical concerns did not correlate with physician assistance at all, suggesting
that physicians weigh physical symptoms more heavily in deciding whether to help a patient
to die. See id.
Another study explored whether physicians distinguish between pain and suffering in
end-of-life decisionmaking. See Frederick Y. Huang & Linda L. Emanuel, PhysicianAid in
Dying and the Relief of Patients' Suffering: Physicians' Attitudes Regarding Patients'
Suffering and End-of-Life Decisions, 6 J. CuNICAL EThics 62 (Spring 1995). These
researchers found that physician responses to hypothetical situations differed depending
upon whether the hypothetical patient complained of extreme physical pain or extreme
nonphysical suffering. See id. at 66. The physicians did not assign the same moral weight
to nonphysical suffering and so considered assisted suicide or euthanasia to be less justified
under those circumstances. See id. The authors concluded that "physicians are less likely to
respect patients' autonomy when patients report extreme nonphysical suffering." Id. at 67.
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Revisiting the Substantive Question

Having provided some insights into the nature of the medical
profession, let me now return to my thought experiment in which
assisted death is provided not by physicians but by aides-in-dying.482 If
one were to set out ab initio to define the desirable characteristics for a
profession that provides assisted death, what would one look for?
Obviously aides-in-dying would need to be skilled in the
pharmacology and techniques for bringing about a quick and painless
death. These would be the minimum requirements. Aides-in-dying
would need strong communication and listening skills, empathy and
compassion in the face of suffering, respect for individual autonomy, a
willingness to share or cede decision-making power to ill individuals,
training in medical ethics and the psychosocial aspects of death and
dying, and a willingness to be subjected to regulation and oversight.
If these are desirable characteristics, is it so obvious that
physicians are the appropriate persons in whom to rest the legal power
to assist individuals to die? I submit that the medical profession is
singularly unqualified to take on this task.483 It is a profession defined
by power and authority, woefully undertrained in psychosocial skills,
and highly resistant to outside regulation.4 84 The ultimate irony in this
482. See supra notes 340-341 and accompanying text. Dr. Steven Miles has also
questioned the necessity for physician involvement in assisted death. See Steven H. Miles,
Physician-AssistedSuicide and the Profession's Gyrocompass, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 1995, at 17, 18. However, he proposes that in those rare cases where assisted
death is justified, control be placed within the dying individual's intimate community. See
id. This seems to me a less responsible model for non-physician assisted death than one
employing aides-in-dying. Even if one conceives of assisted death as a "sociopersonal"
rather than a "medicopersonal" event, see id., it still seems clear that some level of expertise
is needed beyond that which friends or family could reasonably provide.
483. I should add here that I have no doubt that there are doctors who would make
ideal aides-in-dying. My focus here is not on individual physicians but rather on the
medical profession qua profession, which neither values nor trains its members in the art of
caring for their patients.
484. In this regard, Professor Zussman makes a fascinating observation with regard to
the medical profession's view of the law. He states:
Physicians are not concerned about specific and limited legal obligations. Instead,
they are concerned with the bases of medical discretion. From this perspective,
the point is not what the law says but the simple fact that it says anything at all.
Even if the courts eventually permit physicians a wide range of discretion, this
discretion now depends, implicitly, on the indulgence of the courts. Physicians
are angry about-and often overestimate-the effects of the law on limitation of
treatment. But they are not angry so much because the law limits their discretion
as because the very presence of the law implies that that discretion is not theirs by
right.
ZUSSMAN, supra note 407, at 184.
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debate is that the proponents of physician-assisted death know this. In
fact, they use these deficiencies in the medical profession's response to
the dying-the inattention to pain control, the emphasis on cure over
care, and the abandonment of patients-to argueforphysician-assisted
death. The question is "Why?" Why are supporters of individual
autonomy so eager to hand power to physicians?
The answer, quite simply, is that it is politically expedient to do
so. The proponents of assisted-death legislation are well aware that
their success as a political matter is dependent upon their willingness
to embrace the medical profession. Does anyone believe that Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act would have passed if it had contained a
provision creating a new aid-in-dying profession? Physicians are
included in every assisted-death proposal, initiative, and constitutional
argument precisely because voters, legislators, and judges cannot
conceive of a responsible model of assisted death that does not provide
for physician involvement. Consider, for example, a recent report
exploring the extent to which nurses have assisted their patients to
die.485 Sixteen percent of the critical-care nurses surveyed reported
that they had participated in euthanasia or active suicide at least once
in their careers.4 86 The initial responses to the report included
statements that the results were shocking, problematic, concerning,
and frightening for the families of dying patients.48 7 And yet, one
could argue that nurses, by virtue of their training, are a much better
choice than physicians to assist patients to die. Nurses are encouraged
and taught to listen to their patients and to accede to their wishes.
They are trained to think of patients as individuals rather than diseases,
and they are expected to show empathy and understanding for their
patients' suffering. The negative response to nurse involvement
clearly illustrates the community's desire to defer to physicians on this
matter regardless of whether they are the proper individuals to provide
assisted-death services. In other words, nurses must not assist their
patients to die because nurses are not doctors.

For a description of the ways in which the medical profession has either resisted
regulation or turned it to its advantage, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERIcAN MEDICINE (1982).
485. See David A. Asch, The Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1374 (1996).
486. See id. at 1375.
487. See Gina Kolata, 1 in 5 Nurses Tell Survey They Helped Patients Die, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 23, 1996, at A14.
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I began by focusing on the process question: In a world where
assisted death is legal, is it clear that physicians are the appropriate
providers of this service? I have asserted in this Article that the
answer to that question is at least arguably "no," and yet I have no
doubt that society would be extremely resistant to a proposal in which
highly trained and skilled aides-in-dying would provide assisted death
to terminally ill persons who wish to die. Our unwillingness to even
imagine other possibilities tells us something about ourselves, and
informs the debate over the larger substantive question of whether we
as a society should support assisted death at all.
It is likely that had Jack Kevorkian done everything in exactly the
same way but did not have an "M.D." after his name, no jury would
have acquitted him.488 The jurors sympathized with his cause and
deferred to his judgment for the simple reason that he was a physician.
We as a society are doing precisely the same thing when we shift
responsibility for assisted death to the medical profession. We take
great comfort in assigning power over assisted death to physicians
because we desperately want to place responsibility for assisted death
with anyone other than ourselves. What better way to do it than to turn
to the medical profession where the decisions and their justifications
will be hidden from our view by the veil of the physician-patient
relationship?
But by placing assisted death within the province of medicine
and the medical profession, we risk losing the very autonomy that
assisted death is designed to effectuate. We are not entitled to the false
sense of comfort and security that physician involvement in assisted
death brings us. We have no business demanding that physicians
respect our decision-making autonomy only to hand that power back
to the profession when the exercise of autonomy becomes
uncomfortable or inconvenient. We are not justified in using the
medical profession in this manner, even if it is willing to be used. If
we cannot face the thought of assisted death facilitated by trained
aides-in-dying, then perhaps we ought to rethink the question of
whether we as a society are entitled to assisted death at all. Because
with individual and societal autonomy comes responsibility for our
choices, our decisions, and our acts.

488. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.

